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Introduction 
When writing about Qatar it is customary at the beginning to note that it is shaped like a 
mitten or a thumb and that it is about the size of Yorkshire or Connecticut.1 That it follows 
the strict Wahhabi creed of Islam is a key point, which is juxtaposed against Doha’s newly 
sprouted buildings, described as shimmering or glittering in the sunshine.2 Al Jazeera, the 
embattled Doha-based news channel, merits a mention as does Qatar’s extraordinary 
success in the race to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Qatar’s leading role in the Arab Spring 
is the latest hook for attention, but still editors unerringly resort to the old clichés describing 
Qatar as a state with a maverick foreign policy that punches above its weight.3 Always more 
entertaining with its titles The Economist prefers to describe Qatar as a ‘bouncy bantam’ 
and a ‘pygmy with the punch of a giant.’4 
Noting the bare facts is important but it is the context that is crucial. It is the geographical 
location – not the shape or necessarily the size – of Qatar that is decisive. Qatar is defined 
by its 72km land border with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the 270km sea border 
with Iran, which runs through the world’s largest gas field shared by the two countries. By 
                                                     
1
 Anthony Shadid, "Qatar Wields an Outsized Influence in Arab Politics," The New York Times 14 November 
2011. 
Steven Goff, "Qatar Gets 2022 World Cup over U.S.; Russia Beats out England for 2018 Event," The Washington 
Post, 08 March 2013 03 December 2010. 
Hugh Eakin, "The Strange Power of Qatar," New York Review of Books 28 October 2011. 
Maike Currie, "The Case for Qatar," Investors Chronicle 11 April 2011. 
Cameron Barr, "Qatar Stands by Us as War Looms," The Christian Science Monitor 10 December 2002. 
2
 Anthony Shadid, "Qatar's Capital Glitters Like a World City, but Few Feel at Home," The New York Times 29 
November 2011. 
Larry Luxner, "Qatar's Prosperity as High as Its Geopolitical Ambitions,"  The Wasington Diplomat(02 October 
2012) 
Jeffrey Fleishman and Noha El-Hannawy, "Qatar's Ambitions Roil Middle East," Los Angeles Times 21 April 
2009.  
Jenny Southan, "Doha's Ambition," Business Traveller 20 August 2010.  
3
 Yadullah Ijtehadi, "Qatar's Golbal Rise," Gulf Business 21 November 2011.  
Brandon Friedman, "Qatar: Security Amid Instability," The Jewish Policy Cetnre: inFocus V, no. 4 (Winter 2011).  
Kessler Oren, "Qatar Punches above Its Diplomatic Weight," The Jerusalem Post 3 August 2012. 
Elizabeth Dickinson, "Qatar Punches above Its Weight," The National 26 September 2012. 
David Rosenberg, "Qatar Punches above Its Weight," The Jerusalem Post 18 January 2012. 
Michael Young, "Pragmatic Diplomacy Enables Qatar to Punch above Weight," The National 24 November 
2011. 
Dominic Moran, "New Qatari Pm, Diplomatic 'Maverick',"  Internaitonal Relations and Security Netwoek 
(ISN)(06 April 2007) 
David B Roberts, "Punching above Its Weight," Foreign Policy (12th April 2011). 
4
 "A Bouncy Bantam," The Economist 07 September 2006. 
"Pygmy with the Punch of a Giant," The Economist (5 November 2011).  
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land mass, Qatar is approximately 187 times smaller than KSA and 144 times smaller than 
Iran. In terms of population, native Qataris are outnumbered approximately 1:68 by Saudis 
and 1:272 by Iranians.5 In terms of military strength, ignoring the fact that Qataris are a 
minority in their own armed forces (an estimated 10-15 per cent6) and including reservists 
and paramilitary units, ‘Qatar’ is outnumbered approximately 1:21 by Saudi and 1:159 by 
Iran.7   
The same yawning discrepancies in the basic building-blocks of power have been present for 
centuries. From the late 18th century, when Qatar’s modern history can be said to have 
begun, the typical policy of the principal Sheikh on the Qatari Peninsula was to seek security 
either with a local tribal alliance or under the aegis of an external guarantor. Leaders in 
Qatar needed to concentrate their limited resources on shoring up alliances and changing 
them when possible to secure protection with greater autonomy. Until the 1960s this left 
few resources over with which to engage in a wider foreign policy or anything but the most 
meagre domestic developments. Indeed, Qatar developed a reputation as being ‘known for 
being unknown’ and as ‘the most boring place in the Gulf.’ These adages spread over the 
decades throughout the Gulf summed up Qatar; a country that seldom entered 
international consciousness before the 1990s. Qatar’s role in the Ottoman Empire’s 
denouement was negligible, it played no meaningful role in World War One, World War 
Two, the Cold War, nor did it play a particularly active part in Arab affairs aside from 
sporadic donations of foreign aid when oil revenues allowed.  
Yet against this quietist historical background, as the 1990s wore-on Qatar began to eschew 
this modus operandi and instead embarked upon an overtly reactionary and provocative 
course of action both in foreign and domestic politics. The fundamental question that this 
thesis seeks to answer is why did Qatar undergo such changes?  
                                                     
5
 "Key Population Indicators (2011)," Central Department of Statistics and Information accessed 26 August 
2012.  
"Population, Total (1981-2011),"  in Data (World Bank, Accessed 26 August 2012). 
The native population of Qatar used here (275,000) stems from commonly accepted extrapolations of the 
Qatari population in lieu of available statistics from the Qatari Statistics Authority.   
6
 Percentage derived from various interviews and discussions along with examples from, for example, the 
Battle of Khafji.  
7
 The Military Balance 2010,   (Glasgow: Routledge, 2010).  
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Domestically, after a coup in 1995, censorship laws were relaxed, municipal elections were 
called, women were enfranchised, and a new emphasis on education was prioritised. The 
satellite TV station Al Jazeera was established in 1996. A firm change in external relations 
began with establishing diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union in 1988 
without waiting for Saudi Arabia to take the lead. Subsequently, relations were cultivated 
with Iran and Israel, a deeply anti-establishment policy for a previously stalwart Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) State like Qatar. An American security guarantee was obtained in 
1992, while Qatar slowly expanded its aid and political support to groups like Hamas and 
Hezbollah. Qatar expanded its influence particularly in the 2000s by mediating not only in 
the Gulf region (Yemen), the Levant (Lebanon), but in the Horn of Africa (Eritrea), West 
Africa (Mauritania), East Africa (Sudan) and North Africa (Libya).  
The diverse international relations were a part of boosting Qatar’s visibility across the 
region. Qatar also focused on increasing its soft power through the promotion of Al Jazeera, 
hosting world-class sporting and cultural events, and some of the largest conferences in the 
world such as the ‘Doha Round’ of World Trade Talks in 2001 and the 18th Conference of the 
Parties (COP 18) climate change conference in November 2012.   
Until the Arab Spring, Qatar avoided undertaking divisive policies preferring to use its 
reputation as a relatively unbiased and inoffensive state to great effect. Yet with, for 
example, its heavy diplomatic, material, and military support of the rebel forces in Libya, 
Qatar can no longer claim to be a neutral state. While support for Qatar’s ploys against 
Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi and Syria’s President Assad was initially widespread, the staunch 
financial and political support for many of the emergent Muslim Brotherhood Governments 
and parties around the region is divisive. Unsurprisingly given the post-revolutionary tumult, 
most of the new Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Governments are struggling and are 
deeply unpopular with large sections of society. By so visibly supporting these Governments 
Qatar is being tarred by association and even the once region-leading Al Jazeera is seeing its 
ratings plunge thanks to its association with the Qatari state and the assumed Muslim 
Brotherhood-supporting line that it is believed to tow. 
Understanding the genesis of the changes that culminated in Qatar’s provocative actions in 
the Arab Spring and account for the transformation of Qatar’s politics both domestically but 
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particularly externally is the central concern of this thesis. These queries, resistant to 
immediate explanation, require a systematic approach that firstly delineates exactly what 
the changes were. A careful analysis comparing Qatar’s historical policies with those from 
the 1990s onwards highlights several ahistorical policies that are either new in character or 
new in type. These concerns – the US security umbrella; international mediation; 
international alliance and investments; Al Jazeera, soft policies (Meetings Incentives, 
Conferences, and Exhibitions (MICE) industries, sport, culture and education); gas policies, 
and Arab Spring policies – will be the focus of analysis.  
Assessing the underlying motives for this paradigm shift in Qatar’s politics needs a 
structured approach. Gerd Nonneman’s framework, which is specific to understanding 
foreign policy in the Middle East, categorises determinants of policy by their different levels: 
domestic, regional, and international. Backed up with a rigorous theoretical pedigree but 
one that is not beholden to any one perspective, Nonneman’s framework offers a 
systematised way of analysing a state’s foreign policies.    
The domestic environment offers both perennial and changing factors that shape Qatar’s 
policies as well as the resources that propelled them. The power of the ruling family is 
enduring and their personal proclivities are important in driving policy both historically and 
today. Just as Emir Khalifah Bin Hamad Al Thani’s (r.1972-1995) personality disposed him to 
seek protection under Saudi Arabian auspices, the personality of his son – Emir Hamad Bin 
Khalifah Al Thani (r.1995-2013) – disposed him to find security anywhere but Saudi Arabia. 
Otherwise, Hamad Bin Khalifah pursued hitherto unimaginably progressive policies including 
modern ideas about education, social development, and international relations in his 
policies. These different ideas stemmed from not only his personality and those 
immediately around him, but were a product of a new age with new concerns. One such 
‘new’ tool available to leaders was soft power, something that many new Qatari policies 
promoted.   
Discernible throughout many of the identified ‘new’ policies is a domestically-focused 
dimension. Many of the softer policies improving Qatar’s education sector as well as wider 
policies creating a positive image for Qatar are aimed at broadening sources of legitimacy 
for the elite and creating important symbols and material to embellish Qatar’s national 
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identity. Many of these policies were expensive and were facilitated by Qatar’s prodigious 
gas reserves, which made it the richest country in the world by various metrics. Qatar’s 
domestic quietism, the result of intrinsic conservatism, the strong socioeconomic bargain, 
and trust in the leadership, gave the elite latitude particularly in foreign policy; a not 
insignificant facilitating factor by itself. 
Qatar’s region has been a source of instability and opportunity. The invasion of Kuwait 
offered a clear analogy for Qatar and demonstrated that black swan events do happen. In 
the Qatari case it is not Iraq that is the concern but Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the Janus-like 
relationship with Saudi Arabia can be seen as the handmaiden to a large segment of the 
new Qatari project. The roots of the issues in this relationship span the international arena 
with power rivalries, basic economic realities with gas opportunity-cost calculations, the 
personal level in terms of individual animus, rhetorical or ideational concerns with differing 
brands of Wahhabi Islam being showcased, and prosaic regional issues stemming from 
Qatar’s courting of Iran. Indeed, this one example neatly highlights the folly of attempting to 
understand Qatar through a rigid theoretical approach that would prioritise any one level of 
analysis over another versus the benefits of Nonneman’s framework with its multi-level 
approach.  
This multitude of threats and concerns surrounding Saudi Arabia was a key impetus to 
securing not only America as an outside guarantor of Qatar’s security but for altering 
Qatar’s perspective from intra-regional to extra-regional. Via its gas policies, investments, 
and the extensive reach (and aim) of its soft power tools, a trend has been for Qatar to 
integrate itself into the economies and the consciousness of key countries around the 
world. Aside from economic security that is bolstered from such entanglements, Qatar’s 
critical energy supplies to the UK, China, and Japan mean that their continued prosperity is 
near-inexorably tied into Qatar’s continued prosperity. This places Qatar in a powerful 
position.  
Qatar’s significant exploits to augment its soft power capability are also driven by regional 
competition. Within a few hundred kilometres of Doha are three city-states (Dubai, Abu 
Dhabi, and Manama) that are in direct competition for foreign direct investment (FDI), 
trade, and human resources. Various new policies can be seen as creating and propagating a 
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business-savvy, progressive brand for Qatar. This kind of soft power is critical in 
differentiating Qatar from these neighbouring states, something that is not necessarily so 
easy given their linguistic, economic, religious, societal, political, and geographical 
similarities.  
Equally, Qatar’s brand as a key font of its soft power is important internationally. The post-
1995 elite in Qatar was operating in a quickly changing world. The end of the Cold War and 
the increasing haste of globalisation heralded a new era with new sets of challenges. While 
the internationalisation of commerce and communication allowed city-states like Qatar to 
increasingly involve itself in pan-global business and finance, this very act of committing its 
economic model to serve such internationalised aims undercuts state building efforts. Just 
one example of this is the vast population growth that Qatar has experienced as it seeks to 
grow its capital city into a city on the world stage as a finance, commerce, energy, and 
cultural hub. This has badly skewed Qatar’s demographics and Qataris are outnumbered 
more than five to one. Such issues exacerbate on-going concerns with fostering national 
identity in Qatar; a relatively new state that was given independence only in 1971 and that 
has relatively few unique historical traits on which to differentiate itself from similar 
neighbours. Qatar’s brand creates Doha as a place known for education as well as sporting 
and cultural events. Not only does this boost and propagate Doha’s relative uniqueness 
giving it a ‘unique selling point’ externally, but this difference resonates internally and 
becomes one of the many factors folded into Qatar’s evolving national identity. 
Underlying many of these changes was a perennial Qatari policy made anew: seeking an 
external protector. Mindful of the invasion of Kuwait and subsequent decimation of the 
state, as Qatar was about to mortgage the country to invest in its LNG infrastructure in an 
era of deteriorating relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar needed an American protection 
agreement. Initially rebuffed, Qatar augmented relations with Iran, Iraq, and Israel as a way 
to coax America along. America had been looking to enter the Gulf for years and took the 
chance. Agreements were signed in 1992 and Qatar’s importance to America inexorably 
increased ever since. Just as with previous Qatari leaders, the protective agreement with an 
external guarantor has been the central plinth of Qatar’s security. But new opportunities 
facilitated by burgeoning financial resources, a variety of international factors, and a savvy, 
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ambitious elite seeking to diversify Qatar’s dependencies and remake its economy and 
polity propelled Qatar in entirely heretofore unseen directions.  
The growing reach and confidence of Qatar can be seen in its actions in the Arab Spring. 
Contributing significantly to unseating regional leaders is something that Qatar has never 
done before. Similarly with its support of Muslim Brotherhood-backed elites never before 
has Qatar become so divisive on such a large scale: for every Brother who supports Qatar 
there is an opposition member who sees Qatar in a febrile region as aiding the enemy. 
Plunging Al Jazeera ratings are but one manifestation of this wide and growing concern with 
Qatar seen as a partisan actor in the region.  
That Qatar has often relied on an external guarantor, which is presently the strongest 
military power in history, could also be an explanatory factor for why it took the risk of 
unseating a leader as mentally unhinged, as rich, and with as deadly a history in funding 
terrorist activities as Colonel Gaddafi in Libya. Snug in such pervasive protection, Qatar’s 
leaders may have felt worryingly unencumbered by the ramifications of their actions. Thus 
far, aside from humiliating cyber-attacks, Qatar has emerged from its policies of ousting 
Colonel Gaddafi and attempting to oust Bashar Al Assad in Syria relatively unscathed. Yet 
Qatar’s leadership needs to guard against automatically assuming that American guarantees 
are pervasive enough to protect Qatar from the consequences of its policies.  
Moreover, arguably the most potent weapon that Qatar has developed is its soft power, 
which has been fostered and propagated by Al Jazeera, the world-class educational hub in 
Doha, its burgeoning cultural power, and its sporting prowess encapsulated in its successful 
bid to host the FIFA 2022 World Cup. In the 2000s Qatar was a largely inoffensive actor in 
regional politics, but not anymore. Indeed, it is not just within the Middle East that Qatar’s 
brand is becoming tarnished with deep concern building in France as to the motives of 
recent Qatari ventures. Of particular concern was the example of Qatar seeking to invest in 
some of Paris’ Muslim-dominated, dilapidated suburbs. Fears that Qatar has some nefarious 
religiously-inspired agenda are baseless, but this is another indication that Qatar’s control of 
its image is getting out of control.  
Qatar is a small state that is blessed with prodigious financial resources but is much less 
lucky in terms of the human capital at its disposal with such a small population that has only 
Page 16 of 278 
 
benefitted from operating complex bureaucracies for a generation. It is difficult for a state 
like Qatar to conduct an ever more complicated set of foreign policies across the world from 
this intrinsically limited base. Qatar must prioritise its strengths. Al Jazeera, to take one 
aspect of its branding soft power, was a superbly effective, asymmetric use of financial 
resources to reach vast numbers of people with an intrinsically positive message about 
Qatar promoting dialogue. Such key fonts of soft power should be protected and nurtured, 
yet it is swiftly losing its importance in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. In the longer term, 
as Qatar’s leaders readily acknowledge, Qatar cannot continue to lead the Middle East as it 
has been. It does not have the capacity or the clout to maintain this position and traditional 
leaders that have been unusually silent in recent years – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq – will 
resume their traditional roles.  
In the interim Qatar needs to be sure not to damage its unique attributes. While Egypt or 
Saudi Arabia’s position in world politics is guaranteed by virtue of their large populations, 
military capacity, strategic location, and crucial historical and religious roles, Qatar has 
almost none of these intrinsic benefits. Its gas will be important for decades to come but, as 
the former Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani put it, the Stone Age did not end 
because it ran out of stone. Instead it is Qatar’s soft power that is the asset that has the 
potential to be region and world-leading for generations. Egypt can afford its politics to be 
tarnished and Saudi Arabia can afford its international image to be deeply sullied for a 
decade, but both will bounce back by virtue of their indispensability to the Middle East and 
international relations more generally. The same is not so for Qatar and it cannot afford for 
its fonts of soft power to be degraded for there is no guarantee that they can be 
rehabilitated; crucially, the Middle East could function without Qatar at its centre.  
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Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 will summarise the available literature on Qatar and highlight the place of this 
thesis within it.  
Chapter 2 outlines the approach to this study of Qatar and its foreign policies. This section 
includes an examination of the appropriate methodological issues as well as an examination 
of theoretical frameworks. Gerd Nonneman’s approach will be highlighted as one of several 
possibilities, but one that is best suited to the Qatar case study because of its flexibility and 
direct relevance stemming from a rigorously theoretical but also Middle East-focused 
background.  
Chapter 3 focuses on Qatar’s modern history from the late 18th century in order to 
understand the modern-day foreign policies in their historical context. This kind of approach 
clearly outlines how novel and unusual several of the newer foreign policies were compared 
to their antecedents. Equally this chapter allows conclusions to be drawn as to perennial 
tropes that remain embedded in Qatar’s foreign policies.  
Chapter 4 is the central analytical section. It begins by summarising the main policy 
differences between what may be described as the historically typical Qatari policy versus 
the ‘new’ policies as overseen by Hamad Bin Khalifah Al Thani. In some cases these policies 
are entirely new and have no meaningful comparison, such as Qatar’s founding of the 
satellite channel Al Jazeera, and in some cases the chapter focuses on explaining the latest 
iteration of policies that have occurred before, such as with American security guarantees. 
In total seven policies have been identified as either new in substance or entirely new.  
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and highlights traditional motivating factors as well as the 
new concerns that have contributed to driving a new wave of Qatari foreign policy.  
 
 
 
  
Page 18 of 278 
 
Chapter 1: Literature Review 
It is both a blessing and a curse that the literature on Qatar is so sparse. While this offers a 
researcher space to publish and a broad range of topics to focus on, the lack of a rigorous, 
existing architecture of knowledge on Qatar can leave a researcher isolated, obliging the use 
of a wider range of corroborating sources and alternative methods.  
The focus of this thesis is on aspects of modern Qatari policies; specifically, it discerns why 
Qatar’s elite has engaged in a raft of striking policies starting in the late-1980s. These 
policies can only be understood if they are suitably contextualised against both their 
antecedents and the evolution of Qatar’s history.  
The historical context 
A researcher focusing on Qatar must, for the majority of the time, be content with searching 
for sections referring to Qatar in books focussing on nearby topics. While this can be 
frustrating and can lead to a lack of detail at times, it is also useful as it firmly places Qatar 
and its growth in the local and regional context, an important factor given the porous 
borders and roaming tribes in the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth 
centuries.   
Abu Hakima’s excellent History of Eastern Arabia, 1750-1800 : The Rise and Development of 
Bahrain and Kuwait is something of a classic, as one might expect from someone who met 
extensively with Cornelius James Pelly, studied under Bernard Lewis, and was recommended 
by Albert Hourani. His accessible work, along with his other book specifically focussed on 
Kuwait, offers the best background on the machinations affecting the Eastern half of the 
Arabian Peninsula from the mid-18th century onwards.8 Al Rashid offers a similarly useful 
perspective on the eastern half of Arabia though with more of a focus on nascent Saudi 
Arabia and its relations with the Qatari peninsula.9 In a time when records were sparse and 
there is often confusion as to which tribe went where, when and did what to whom, these 
two sources are as reliable as they come and act as a baseline. Various other authors such as 
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J.B. Kelly, whose voluminous contributions eloquently span the region, add further depth 
and narrative.10  
Specifically focused on Qatar, Rahman’s The Emergence of Qatar offers the most thorough 
coverage of Qatar in the 17th and 18th centuries.11 Though at times Rahman draws 
conclusions that are not wholly backed up with evidence, he nevertheless acts as a good 
aggregator of sources relating to Qatar. 
The Ottomans were a feature of life on the Arabian Peninsula for four centuries from 1517 
onwards. There are many interesting and useful works which tangentially refer to life in 
eastern Arabia or which are otherwise relevant.12 Regarding Qatar specifically, by far the 
best author on this topic is Fred Anscombe, who has written at length about Qatar and its 
environs.13 Moreover, Anscombe’s work is useful and refreshing as he does not focus 
exclusively on British sources but instead he has, at some length, trawled the Ottoman 
archives in Istanbul and Sofia. His exposition of Qatar’s history is thus more nuanced and 
takes into account the important effects that nearly fifty years of Ottoman boots on the 
ground had on nascent Qatar. His book The Ottoman Gulf, for example, is mandatory 
reading for anyone interested in Qatar’s history at this time. Zekeriya Kursun’s short work 
on Qatar and the Ottomans is interesting if clearly biased towards augmenting the Ottoman 
importance in Qatar. Still, his extensive research in the Ottoman archives provides further 
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interesting snippets of life under the Ottomans, which, when taken into account with a 
knowledge of the time period, proves to be useful. 14   
There is no shortage of primary evidence dealing with the British influence on the Gulf. The 
Bombay Selections are one of the most oft-used sources. They are a voluminous “collection 
of reports received by the government of Bombay...designed to serve as a reference book 
for officers working in the area.”15 These varied intelligence reports, often focusing on the 
tribes and treaties of the region, act as the basis of many subsequent diaries, gazetteers and 
reports.16 They are the work of extensive primary research by the British agents at the time. 
Often there was no systematised or formal record keeping capacity, which means these 
reports are the primary source of first-hand information on this area.  
British correspondence to and from the region amounts to tens of thousands of documents, 
is readily accessible at the British Library and at Kew National Archives, and provides an 
outstanding source for historians.17 Additionally there are several précis of the British 
archives and other archives focusing on or with significant reference to Qatar: The Records 
of Qatar, edited by Penelope Tuson and Anita Burdette; The GCC States: National 
Development Records: Defence 1920-1960 also edited by Anita Burdette; Arabian Gulf Oil 
Concessions has several volumes focussing on Qatar;18 The Persian Gulf Précis edited by J.A. 
Saldanha; GCC National Development Records: Communications and Transport 1860-1960 
edited by Anita Burdette; Ruling Families of Arabia: Qatar by Alan de Lacy Rush; and Arabian 
Boundaries edited by Richard Schofield.19 Lastly, there is also a compilation of British records 
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pertaining to Doha as a city, which contains prosaic but essential information regarding, for 
example, urban development and education.20 
These précis are expertly distilled correspondence pertaining to a specific topic area of the 
numerous British Imperial sources. They are more manageable than the raw documents 
themselves though still run into thousands of pages. A combination approach using both the 
original sources and the précis was used for this thesis.  
Given the importance Britain played in the Gulf for much of Qatar’s existence, these 
documents often include correspondence from the leaders themselves. While clearly the 
majority of these sources are written from the British Imperial perspective and the 
conversations in question take place under the auspices of securing, guarding, and 
augmenting British power, they are nevertheless invaluable for researchers. On this point in 
particular as with the rest of this historical background, it is simply a matter of triangulation 
with other sources. When this is not available as is sometimes the case, the fact that the 
motives of the British are quite transparent means that the sources can be readily 
understood and used with the researcher keeping any bias in mind. Indeed, sometimes it is 
not even necessarily what these documents say, but where they are from. For example, the 
fact that increasingly communications between London and Emir Ahmed (r.1960-1972) are 
routed through Geneva in the 1960s tells its own story. 
The records are heavy on detail almost to a fault. They can be cumbersome and time-
consuming to wade through but a combination of the accuracy, the scope, and the 
relevance of the material makes these archives essential for any detailed study of Qatar or 
the other Gulf States.  
There are a range of articles to which this thesis will contribute using the British sources 
(and others) to analyse and attempt to understand better the Gulf States during the 
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Authors whose works reoccur often such is their 
depth of focus on the Gulf are James Onley, John Peterson, and Jill Crystal.21 
While some particular aspects of Qatar are dealt with in surprising detail over a number of 
articles, such as its geographical composition, the dearth of analysis of Qatar overall is 
disappointing.22  
The historical emergent bi-lateral relationship between Qatar and its modern-day GCC 
neighbours is dealt with sparingly in various texts. Donald Hawley’s work on The Trucial 
States, for example, while providing a detailed if at times dry overview from first-hand 
experience and diplomatic sources scarcely mentions Qatar despite its proximity, its ties, 
and interrelations with the Trucial States.23 
As more books emerged on the Gulf States – particularly focusing on Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
and Oman – so too there is more opportunity to gather snippets on Qatar’s bi-lateral 
relations or on a specific topic.  
Andrea Rugh’s focus on the history of the Emirates and the emergent political culture of 
leadership has frequent passing reference to Qatar.24 Christopher Davidson’s three seminal 
works on the Emirates contain between them numerous substantive references to Qatar 
and the emerging relationships between the statelets.25 Additionally, Ali Khalifah’s work on 
the Emirates also contributes, particularly regarding the period 1968-1971.26 
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Jacob Goldberg’s superb study of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy provides, from the earliest 
days until 1918, an excellent and illuminating commentary on Saudi-Qatari relations.27 
William B Quandt’s authoritative study of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy and security in the 
1980s makes a passing but crucial reference to Qatar: 
Qatar, as the only other political entity that shares Saudi Arabia’s adherence to the strict Wahhabi 
interpretation of Islam, is somewhat more securely anchored to the Saudi sphere of influence than 
the other gulf states and therefore is taken more for granted. Periodic visits take place, but Qatar is 
not a major actor in any of the arenas that interest the Saudis.
28
 
This neat encapsulation of the Saudi-Qatari relationship and the fundamental understanding 
of the relative importance to each other is a crucial explanatory factor of the increasingly 
poor bilateral relationship as the 1990s progress.  
Similarly, Jawad Al Arayed’s plotted history of the undulating Qatar-Bahrain relationship, 
though written from an unabashedly pro-Bahraini standpoint, is still useful when used in 
context with these other sources.29 Furthermore, in addition to the primary evidence 
relating to the boundary dispute there are also various other sources discussing this event 
including a thorough legal summary by Barbara Kwiatkowska.30 
Qatar’s important and interesting relationship with Iran is poorly covered; an area where 
sections of this thesis will add particular depth and analysis. Christin Marschall’s book on the 
topic is a pleasant anomaly in this respect, offering an in-depth look at this topic.31 Other 
works on Iran and the Gulf – and specifically Talat Parveen’s Iran’s Policy Towards the Gulf – 
do not offer enough critical rigour and is more of a narrative than a scholarly account,32  
                                                                                                                                                                     
Abu Dhabi: Oil and Beyond  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
26
 Ali Mohammed Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation  (Boulder: CO: Westview Press, 
1979). 
27
 Jacob Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia : The Formative Years, 1902-1918, Harvard Middle 
Eastern Studies (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
28
 William B Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil  (Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution 1981), p.25. 
29
 Jawad Salim Al Arayed, A Line in the Sea : The Qatar Versus Bahrain Border Dispute in the World Court  
(Berkeley, California: North Atlantic, 2003). 
30
 Barbara Kwiatkowska, The Qatar V Bahrain Maritime Delimitation and the Territorial Questions Case, Bwp 
the Law of the Sea Series Iii (Bosch: Book World Publishers, 2002). 
31
 Christin Marschall, Iran's Persian Gulf Policy : From Khomeini to Khatami  (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 
32
 Talat Parveen, Iran's Policy Towards the Gulf  (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2006). 
Page 24 of 278 
 
while others focusing on Iran’s foreign policy simply barely mention Qatar.33 Studies by 
Kamran Taremi focusing specifically on Iran’s water exporting policies and Ramazani’s work 
on Iran’s foreign policy orientation are critical in filling these gaps.34 
Despite sporadic lacunae in the available literature on Qatar, overall, there is a critical mass 
that, in conjunction with other courses (notably the aforementioned précis), offer a 
researcher the ability to triangulate quite accurately key aspects of Qatar’s history.  
With the arrival of oil comes another set of resources which tangentially discuss Qatar.35 
After oil is struck in Qatar in the 1930s, more of a focus is applied but still not with the 
rigour that Iraq or Bahrain are discussed: Qatar is simply peripheral and it remains so for the 
majority of the twentieth century. There is some discussion of the effects of oil on Qatar as 
this was a trope of Gulf Studies for a time, chronicling and analysing the vast changes in 
lifestyles on the post-oil Arabian Peninsula. This thesis will draw sporadically on this 
literature and will contribute only tangentially to such a specific focus.36 However, if one is 
to broaden out these discussions to a different iteration of the post oil and gas effects – 
which is essentially the essence of this thesis – then this thesis aspires to make a major 
contribution to this sub-field. 
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Still, Qatar is often mentioned in various ‘classics’ focusing on the region. John Duke 
Anthony’s Arab States of the Lower Gulf is particularly useful as it devotes a (small) chapter 
to Qatar.37 Though general, it is written by a scholar steeped in the region’s history and 
politics and is thus more useful than one might expect. Muhammad Sadik and William 
Snavely’s Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates is moderately useful too, providing a 
good, rounded history of Qatar and its micro-region up until independence.38 Works by 
Gregory Gause are, as ever, of the highest quality and situate Qatar superbly in its regional 
and temporal contexts.39 Specifically, Gause’s Oil Monarchies is important in linking the 
international level – primarily relations with America – to the domestic level including, as 
the title alludes, analysing the central role of the hydrocarbon-based economies of the Gulf 
States and its impact on the basic ruling bargain.   
Complementing these works are various other books that, while specifically focussing on 
Qatar, need the previously mentioned works for context. Ragaei El Mallakh’s two books on 
Qatar focusing on its development are statistically-based at the expense of actually 
explaining what is going on and, crucially, why things are happening: overall, they lack 
perspective.40 Still, if one wants to know the number of schools in Doha in 1960, El Mallekh 
is the first port of call. 
A few works by regional academics some of whom focus on Qatar specifically emerged in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Typically these either focused too heavily on statistics, with a 
commensurate lack of meaningful explanation or were little more than narratives. Either 
way, often lacking critical discussions and always lacking rigour, they can perhaps add a 
flavour of life in Qatar but are not of serious academic merit.41  
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It is at this point that arguably the two best works on Qatar become particularly useful. 
Rosemarie Said Zahlan’s The Making of Qatar and Jill Crystal’s Oil and Politics in the Gulf: 
Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar provide researchers with a superb overview and 
a structured understanding of Qatar in the twentieth century.42 Crystal’s work on Qatar 
expertly outlines her conception of the basic ruling dynamic in Qatar: the ruler-merchant 
nexus, which is usefully juxtaposed against the dynamic in Kuwait. Crystal compellingly 
argues that the reason Kuwait is today so rambunctious politically is because of the close 
and symbiotic relationship between the rulers and the merchant class. Both grew 
simultaneously and the rulers relied on the merchants occasionally for support and vice 
versa. This is in stark contrast to Qatar where no merchant elite emerged in anything like 
the Kuwait model: it was never as strong. Aside from the occasional merchant who captured 
a specific market, there was no class of merchants that stood up to the ruling family. This 
dynamic of dominance of the Al Thani family has deep ramifications to this day, Crystal 
cogently argues, and helps to explain the quiet ruling dynamic and the lack of vociferous 
domestic agitation. Zahlan’s work is more of a general tour de force of Qatar, eloquently 
delineating the history of the state and is crucial as a sound of insight.  
Overall, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of these two books to the field of Qatar 
studies. Without these books, there would be no overarching studies longitudinally focusing 
on Qatar. These immensely readable works are required reading for students of Qatari 
history and modern politics.  
Yet there remains, from the 1980s to end of the century, a relative lacuna in rigorous and 
reliable literature on Qatar. Zahlan’s work was published in 1979 and Crystal’s, though 
updated in 1995, is exceedingly brief on this later time period. This dearth of information 
stems primarily from two factors.  
Firstly, since independence in 1971, Qatar’s leaders explicitly eschewed the limelight, 
preferring to quietly live demonstrably under the shadow, auspices, and lead of Saudi Arabia 
following a well-trodden Qatari path. Without an identifiable ‘Qatari policy’ to follow, this 
                                                     
42
 Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Creation of Qatar  (London, New York: Croom Helm 1979). 
Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf : Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
Page 27 of 278 
 
meant that there was typically always some other more interesting story somewhere in the 
region. Secondly, the 1980s were a time of profound change in the Gulf. The aftermath of 
the Iranian Revolution, of the siege of Mecca, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan all 
occurred in 1979. These momentous events and their consequences, not least of which was 
the deadly Iran-Iraq war, captured attention. Little Qatar, going out of its way not to be 
recognised, understandably avoided the gaze of the majority of authors and academics at 
that time.  
The researcher must therefore be inventive. For example, laboriously scouring library 
resources reveals the archives of the Middle East Economic Digest, which go back as far as 
the early 1970s. These provide snippets of important comings and goings in Qatar. Yet 
again, this source suffers from Qatar’s overt desire to avoid the limelight, hence several 
months can go by with no real mention of events in Qatar, but it is nevertheless a 
sporadically useful source. After independence there are also ‘special issues’ which focus on 
Qatar.43 Granted, the prose is neither critical nor overly enlightening being aimed at those 
with little knowledge of Qatar, but if one wants to know how much aid Qatar gave Egypt or 
when the Sudanese Embassy opened, it is a good source.  
Other unusual, sparsely used but exceedingly useful sources can be found in the National 
Archives in Kew, London. Here are the Ambassadorial despatches of outgoing British 
Ambassadors, their final thoughts on the country, and their annual reports. Though there 
are not many archived yet, the ones that are there from the 1970s are excellent. Interesting 
and engagingly written, they offer an unvarnished glimpse of life in Qatar, often at high 
levels given the enduring importance of the British Ambassador in Doha. Moreover, the 
authors – the Ambassadors themselves – are seasoned diplomats and regional experts. By 
virtue of their experience, access, and knowledge, they can have an unerring ability to 
pierce the fog of assumptions and guess work that can plague the study of the smaller Gulf 
States in the absence of reliable and official reportage. 
In addition to perusing the archives the British Freedom of Information Act was used to 
procure Valedictory Despatches from five British Ambassadors who left in 1981, 1987, 1989, 
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1993 and 2008. Though these documents have redactions, these are exceedingly useful 
sources.44  
Arguably of yet more use are the annual assessments of British Ambassadors in Doha. Kew 
hosts these reports from the late 1970s and subsequently, as with the Valedictory 
Despatches, the reports from 1981 to 2004 were procured from the FCO via the Freedom of 
Information Act.45 Some documents may be held back should their release potentially 
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damage British interests and there are also at times swathes of redactions in the 
documents. Yet this never before accessed plethora of intelligent, expert, and relevant 
primary data is a treasure-trove for the Qatar researcher.  
It is not only the privileged and expert authors that make them so useful, but the fact that 
they are – prosaically – simply keeping a record of key observations throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. Indeed, Qatar studies suffer from a profound lack of solid information in the 
1980s. Heavy use is therefore made of these documents shining a light on this time in which 
it is difficult to come by other information. 
Of course, one must always be aware that these documents are not impartial. The British 
Ambassador writes from the perspective of someone looking to secure and extend British 
influence and interests in Qatar. Yet as long as this basic caveat is understood, these prove 
to be exceedingly useful sources.  
A range of generalist books focusing on the Gulf region emerged in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Some focussed across a variety of topics and countries. These books, while useful at 
providing an overview, can lack detail.46 However, there are notable exceptions. Sean Foley’s 
The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam, managed to, within the remit of the thrust of 
the book – the evolution of the Gulf States – contain some almost unique sections 
discussing, for example, the emergence of the Christian Churches in Qatar.47 Each one 
plugged a hole or two of information that together provide a useful and mostly complete 
picture of Qatar.  
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The topic of security was expertly analysed by Anthony Cordesman in various works, often 
in depth and by, for example, Robert Litwak.48 Joseph Kechichian provided an excellent 
overview of Monarchies across the Arab world in 2008 and Michael Herb has written 
eloquently on the topic too.49 Indeed, his 1999 book All in the Family is something of a 
modern-day classic.50 Herb branched out and looked at questions of participation in Qatar 
and elsewhere in the region and specifically attacked the simplistic understanding of the 
region through the lens of rentierism. While this concept is not to be ejected entirely, Herb 
argues, it is important to examine more specifically the nature of monarchical rule in the 
region and the overbearing importance of the ruling families themselves. This concept is, it 
could be argued, particularly important to Qatar given Crystal’s conclusions about the 
domineering nature of the Al Thani family. Other works on this broad topic include edited 
books on governance in the Middle East, the question of political change and a notably 
authoritative work in French on monarchies and societies in the Gulf.51  
In terms of articles, even to this day, there are but a handful dealing specifically with Qatar. 
Still, these few are useful when looking at Qatar’s foreign relations,52 its internal politics,53 its 
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domestic reforms,54 and its gas policies.55 By its very nature this thesis will act as an 
aggregation of the state of the art to date and add another layer of in-depth analysis of 
these exact factors, placing them in their historical and modern-day contexts.  
JE Peterson’s article is of particular importance to this thesis. This neatly describes the 
importance of reputation to a country like Qatar; about how fostering a reputation as x or y 
– i.e. developing Qatar’s ‘brand’ and soft power – is not an afterthought but key to 
understanding Qatar’s modern dynamism.  
Indeed, the branding literature more generally is of use when framing some of the key 
theories used in the thesis. Peter Van Ham wrote a seminal piece in Foreign Affairs in 2001, 
in many ways starting the serious study of country brand management.56 Subsequently, 
there has been some excellent work done, particularly in the Journal of Brand Management. 
A special focus on country branding in a 2002 issue provided interesting case study 
examples.57 
Since the Millennium there have been a couple of books published on Qatar. Unfortunately, the 
two which look the most promising, Michael Gray’s Qatar: Politics and the Challenges of 
Development and Mehran Kamrava’s Qatar: Small State, Big Politics were printed too late for 
inclusion to this thesis. Allen Fromherz’s 2012 Qatar: A Modern History, which offered a decent 
overview of Qatar, is ultimately not a suitable academic source. The book is riddled with factual 
                                                                                                                                                                     
53
 "Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar," Middle East Journal Vol. 62, no. No. 3 (Summer 
2009). 
54
 Andrew Rathmell and Kirsten Schulze, "Political Reform in the Gulf: The Case of Qatar," Middle Eastern 
Studies 36, no. 4 (2000). 
Peterson and Markaz al-Khal*ij lil-Ab.h*ath., The Arab Gulf States : Further Steps Towards Political 
Participation. 
55
 Justin  Dargin, "Qatar's Natural Gas: The Foreign-Policy Driver," Middle East Policy 14, no. 3 (2007). 
Kohei Hashimoto, Jareer Elass, and Stacy Eller, "Liquified Natural Gas from Qatar: The Qatargas Project," in 
Geopolitics of Gas Working Paper Series (Stanford: Baker Institute Energy Forum, Rice University, December 
2004). 
56
 Peter Van Ham, "The Rise of the Brand State: The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation," Foreign 
Affairs September-October 2001  
57
 Fiona Gilmore, "A Country Can It Be Repositioned? Spain - the Success Story of Country Branding," Brand 
Management 9, no. 4-5 (2002). 
Stjepo Martinovic, "Branding Hrvatska a Mixed Blessing That Might Succeed: The Advantage of Being 
Unrecognisable," ibid. 
Page 32 of 278 
 
errors, the chapter order makes no discernible sense indicating the book was rushed or at least 
poorly thought-through, and topics are glossed over quickly with no real depth of analysis.58 
The story of Qatar’s exploitation of its oil and most notably its gas resources is of central 
importance. In the early days the focus is generally on Iraq, Iran, and Bahrain. Yet Qatar’s 
concessions are not trivial and there are useful chapters to be read.59 Their evolution is 
traced sporadically by the afore mentioned Mallakh’s books, others looking at the industry 
as a whole, and by the seminal works of Gause, Crystal, and Zahlan.60 The various British 
records also provide the context for the oil-dependent development decisions as well as a 
highly detailed record of the early transactions, as mentioned earlier.  
Understanding Qatar as an oil power and the types of development that it allowed is 
important but is most useful when compared and contrasted with Qatar’s emergence from 
the early 1990s as a gas giant. As the 1980s progressed and the oil price dipped leading to 
some of Qatar’s first ever budget deficits, so the imperative to utilise their gas deposits 
increased. This topic, like most with Qatar particularly in the 1980s, suffers from a significant 
lack of research. However, there is one source in particular which is invaluable. Rice 
University commissioned a series of studies on Liquefied Natural Gas producers and markets 
around the world in December 2004. Three researchers focussed on Qatar to provide a 
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highly useful historical overview expanding on the phases of Qatar’s gas projects.61 Justin 
Dargin has also contributed to this topic in particular with an excellent overview.62 
The closer to the present the more one is reliant on informative newspaper and magazine 
articles. This requires a careful and circumspect selection of relevant articles. Often, and 
particularly as Qatar’s popularity picked up from the mid-2000s onwards, articles on Qatar 
can be highly general, profoundly lacking in depth or knowledgeable analysis, and clearly 
written by journalists with little (if any) experience of Qatar. Indeed, even the late, great 
Anthony Shadid followed the trend of flying into Qatar, spending 36 hours walking around 
the Museum, the Souq, and Education City, leaving and writing a sloppy article, heavy on 
generalisations and low on critical analysis.63  
The Financial Times is typically a good place to start. Not only is the coverage of Qatar 
usually directed from a place of expertise (i.e. financial business) but there are several 
journalists who, for many years, have produced a wealth of interesting and insightful articles 
focusing on Qatar. Simeon Kerr,64 Robin Wigglesworth,65 Roula Khalaf,66 and James 
Drummond67 can typically be relied upon to write knowledgeably about Qatar, often at 
reasonable length.  
The New York Times, when it does cover Qatar, often does so with skill.68 Robert Worth, for 
example, has written several excellent articles on Qatar,69 including one of the most useful.70 
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Vying with Worth for the most useful Qatar-focused article was a recent long article by Hugh 
Eakin of the New York Review of Books, perhaps the single best introduction to Qatar yet 
written.71  
Otherwise, one is left scouring other newspapers where gems do indeed turn up 
sporadically, including ‘special reports’ on Qatar, which can be highly useful as can Political 
Risk Analysis documents.72 Though only a smattering of these are publically available, when 
they focus directly on Qatar, they provide an intelligent and highly competent overview and 
analysis.73 The Gulf States Newsletter (GSN) with its archive going back to the late 1990s is 
something of a unique source of information. Collated and analysed by staff on the ground 
across the Gulf, GSN is consistently the best source for hard-to-find information and 
analysis.  
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) is another superlative source. Its use 
primarily stems from its coverage of events as far back as the 1940s. Ran by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) it translated, monitored, and republished a selection of foreign 
newspaper articles, radio broadcasts, speeches, and news agency releases from across the 
world. Its more accessible online archive from 1974-1996 in particular offers a Qatar 
researcher a plotted history of, for example, Embassy openings and foreign aid donations. 
Though one cannot say with certainty that such FBIS documents are completely 
comprehensive and they are often simply sentences announcing a policy with no 
background or analysis, the nuggets of information can be exceedingly useful when slotted 
into a more rounded context. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s ‘Country Reports’ are a useful and consistent source from 
the March 1996 onwards. Though their analysis must always be corroborated, it presents 
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single best regular reference work available to scholars.74 Indeed, with Qatar one is 
perennially searching for a reliable source of information sometimes even of the most basic 
facts, such as a political reshuffle. For this kind of information along with consistent analysis, 
these reports can be useful. 
The leak of American diplomatic cables (‘Wikileaks’ or ‘Cablegate’) also provide an 
interesting mix of primary and secondary resources. These documents often provide 
transcripts of private conversations between, in this case, Qatar’s elite and, for example, the 
American Ambassador in Doha or visiting American dignitaries. While one need understand 
that there is always the concern that Qatar’s elite are, to some degree, telling U.S. officials 
what they want to hear or what they think will best suit Qatar’s needs vis-à-vis their U.S. 
relationship, the leaks are highly revealing and, when triangulated with other evidence, can 
be critically useful. Other leaks that are equally interesting and useful are records of 
conversations between diplomats in Doha, often recounting conversations about Qatar with 
senior Ministers in other countries. For example, the conversation relayed by a former 
Egyptian Deputy Ambassador in Qatar to an American official of his briefing from the 
Egyptian Foreign Minister detailing that Egypt will under no circumstances support Qatar’s 
mediatory efforts in Darfur no matter how justified, speaks to the nature of the Qatari-
Egyptian relationship and Egypt’s deep concern over its political sphere of influence.75 
Aside from these diplomatic cables there are a few primary sources of transcripts of 
conversations and interviews with the Emir, Sheikha Moza, and Hamad Bin Jassem Al Thani. 
While some of these are platitudinous interviews on American TV shows revealing little, 
some are unusually interesting.76 Or particular note is an interview with the Emir in the 
Financial Times, in Arabic in Lebanese Newspaper As Safir, and an interview with Hamad Bin 
Jassem by Daniel Pipes (of all people) in 1996 for Middle East Quarterly.77 
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Theory 
Under the Church of ‘Foreign Policy’, as with international relations as a whole, there are 
four broad schools each of which has numerous derivatives. A more thorough analysis of 
these theoretical schools will be undertaken in the subsequent theory and methods chapter, 
but the schools will be briefly introduced here in order to place the theoretical approach of 
this thesis in its literary context.   
Realism as a school of thought claims a long and illustrious history of thinkers and 
practitioners: Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz, and Bismarck being some of its 
acclaimed antecedents.78 In the early twentieth century it is most closely associated with the 
likes of Kennan and Morgenthau.79 The traditional realist school of foreign policy focuses on 
traditionally realist conceptions: the state level as the key level of analysis; the state itself as 
an actor of unique importance; the international system of states as in a perpetual state of 
anarchy; and thus self-interested states must fend for themselves in a constant power 
struggle to survive.  
One iteration of realist thought leads to, for example, the balance of power system. In a 
Middle Eastern context, this kind of an outlook can seem appealing: the emphasis on power 
and balancing innately seems to make some sense. A glance at the competitive relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example, leads to such a basic conclusion. Yet equally, by 
typically ignoring the internal workings of the state and in particular references to the leader 
and the role of the elites, realism ignores a crucial factor afoot in the Middle East. Even 
Waltz’s neo-realism which sought to introduce some appreciation of what happened inside 
the ‘black box’ of the state is still some distance from taking the internal workings seriously 
enough and lending them the weight that they deserve.80 While this is true for the Middle 
East as a whole, it is particularly true in the Gulf States where the leader is unusually 
powerful thanks to a combination of a small population, a tribal heritage privileging the 
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leader, and a modern socio-economic-political apparatus maintaining typically highly 
centralised rule. Thus while the fundamental assertion of realism that states operate in a 
self-help system and power rules is appealing and a useful concept in the febrile Middle 
East, realism’s ignorance of the black box makes it unsuitable for wider application as a 
theoretical framework for this thesis.  
The fundamental reaction to this state-centric approach was to delve into the state. Foreign 
Policy Analysis as a distinct and modern subject emerged in the late 1950s with the works of 
Richard Snyder, James Rosenau, and Margaret and Harold Sprout.81 Significantly, these 
works all sought to eschew the traditional, prevalent realist focus at the state level and 
instead opened up the state’s ‘black-box.’ This bequeathed “FPA [Foreign Policy Analysis] its 
characteristic emphasis on foreign policy decision making as versus foreign policy 
outcomes.”82 Specifically, the bureaucracies, the elites, their perceptions, and their decisions 
are of key concern. Hence rationality as an enduring concept was questioned as was the 
necessary external nature of foreign policy. This last facet in particular is of direct relevance 
to the Qatari case study where policies aimed domestically arguably have audiences abroad 
as do foreign policies have audiences domestically.  
Small group dynamics, initially studied by Irving Janis with his work Victims of Groupthink, 
was one furrow which subsequently emerged under FPA.83 This begat a closer focus on small 
group dynamics and on bureaucracies themselves. Stemming from Rosenau’s original work, 
Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP) emerged with the aim of defining of “law-like 
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generalizations” from empirical studies.84 A strand of scholarship also focussed on 
leadership and the potential misperceptions of the elite.85  
By emphasizing the role of the elite FPA is clearly important in the Qatari context; however, 
the lack of an explicit or sufficient focus on the state-level and on the often crude modalities 
of power so important in the Middle Eastern context, means that the FPA approach – like 
realism – is not sufficient on its own.  
Liberalism as an explanatory theory is interesting in the same way that FPA is, in that it 
focuses on people and their effect on large-scale processes. While liberalism can be a broad 
church and is often misunderstood or mischaracterised, liberalism in the world of foreign 
policy seeks to inculcate within the process of foreign policy concerns of interests, ideals, 
and the importance of institutions.86 This contrasts explicitly with realism’s approach. 
Instead of realism’s assumptions about the direct and immutable effects of the state system 
on outcomes, liberalism as a foreign policy approach is complicated. Indeed, concerned as it 
is with “individual rights, private property, and representative government, liberalism is a 
domestic theory.”87 
For Locke, though he believed the international system to be anarchic just Like Hobbes, he 
fundamentally posits that rule is based on consent. The social contract in his vision went 
both ways and sought to enshrine individuals’ rights ‘life, liberty and happiness’ as opposed 
to a more abstract, state-centric Hobbesian conception. From the Qatari perspective, such 
Lockian notions strike a chord of relevance with the traditional role of the Sheikh being to 
provide for his people. While such tropes can sound like patronising Orientalism the fact 
remains that a significant part of the quietism in Qatari politics stems from conservative 
conceptions of the ruling bargain whereby citizens leave the rulers to rule. While this is a 
simplification of a complex conception there is an undeniable comparison at play, which is 
interesting to note.  
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Another central concept of liberalism located within the ‘second image’ as Waltz puts it, is 
concerned with the positive impact on commerce on the international system. Thinkers 
from Adam Smith through Schumpeter to Hirschman commented on this phenomenon from 
differing perspectives but all posited that trade begets more peaceful relations.88 One can 
see this logic in Qatar’s policies particularly in the early 1990s regarding the plans expansion 
of trading Qatari gas via pipelines around the Gulf and onto India and Pakistan.  
As the twentieth century progressed a whole new facet of ties – primarily economic – began 
“entangling states in a network of interdependencies,” thus questioning the crucial unitary 
importance of states.89 Thus new theories emerged that sought to answer these emerging 
issues.  
Constructivism, for example, is more sociological in nature and posits that goals, values, and 
policies are derived from – constructed from – within the state, which is in turn constructed 
from this ‘web of intersubjective understandings’ as Wendt quixotically puts it.90 Specifically 
for foreign policy, constructivists focus on how a certain interest is constructed, be that via 
socialization, norms (social, political, etc.) or the general socio political discourse.  
Vendulka Kubalkova’s work on foreign policy and constructivism eloquently explains how 
these concepts fit together.91 A constructivist analysis of foreign policy can be defined in 
three broad ways. First, constructivists, following on from FPA analysts, focus on 
bureaucracies. Instead of asking how a Foreign Ministry represents a country’s interests it 
explores “how interests are constructed through a process of social interaction.”92 Second, 
constructivists would argue that foreign policy actors do not make their decisions on the 
international stage in a vacuum. Instead, decisions are made in a communicative, bargaining 
process with other international actors. Third is the role of international society and states. 
For example, scholars have focused on human rights and posited that it is thanks to NGOs 
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and other pan-border organizations that domestic actors as well as governments come to 
learn and define their own levels and ideas regarding human rights. It is through the 
interplay, interaction, and discussion of these issues that, for example, a country may 
change its human rights policy.  
This approach is attractive and in vogue. Using it as an approach to Qatar’s foreign policy, 
however, would be difficult by itself. Crucially, Qatar’s foreign policy is made by such a small 
and essentially unrepresentative elite that any notions of, say, Qatar’s negotiations in Sudan 
stemming from any kind of domestic desire or discussion, is far-fetched. In essence, it is 
difficult to see how Qatar’s foreign policies are the result of some kind of intersubjective 
understandings with the Qatari people such is the degree to which they are atypical policies 
in the Qatari historical experience.  
Instead of using any one school of thought for this study, a broader, more complex 
approach is sought. Each theory has its merits and its concerns and each has aspects that 
can explain certain policies as briefly outlined. Following the ground breaking work of Gerd 
Nonneman, this study seeks to harness the advantages of each one to form a more 
comprehensive theory.  
Nonneman’s framework for analysing foreign policy has been specifically devised in a 
Middle Eastern context.93 It seeks to look both domestically, regionally, and internationally 
for a detailed examination of the factors that can contribute to a state’s foreign policy. Of 
the domestic determinants of foreign policy, for example, Nonneman focuses on the nature 
of the state (is it secure; are national identities consolidated?); on its capabilities (economic 
and demographic resources); on its decision making system and on the perceptions and role 
conceptions of decision makers.94 This facet of the analytical typology alone must take into 
account traits of various traditions from traditionally realist conceptions (base security 
concerns) to ideas traditionally associated with constructivism (national identities).  
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This thesis also makes tactical use of other theories such as state branding and soft power.95 
Both of these theories are relatively new emerging in the recent decades in their current 
form. Using the work of Van Ham, Olins, and the articles collected in a special issue of the 
Journal of Brand Management, this thesis will certainly add to the growing repertoire of 
case studies for state branding.96  
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Chapter 2: Methodology & Theoretical Framework 
Key Research Question 
Qatar underwent a vast and deep transformation in the 1990s. The history of Qatar from 
the mid-nineteenth century up to the 1970s and 1980s was of a country that fundamentally 
and explicitly sought to avoid the international lime-light, that was perennially behind its 
neighbours in most if not all metrics of development, and that was a traditional, 
conservative, state with goals commensurate to its small size.  
Qatar of the late 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s is the antithesis of this ‘old Qatar.’ Publicity and 
international notoriety was sought relentlessly and proactively. Qatar leapt forward in terms 
of development and began to be known as one of the most progressive Gulf States on 
numerous fronts. While its elite remained traditional in some aspects so too it promoted 
unabashedly liberal policies compared to its own history and compared to its region, 
particularly regarding emancipating women and promoting pan-religious understanding. 
Lastly the goals of Qatar exploded from seeking little more than a quiet, cosy, protective 
relationship with Saudi Arabia to the widest blue-sky thinking imaginable with, for example, 
building relations with America, Israel and Iran and taking the lead role in the Arab Spring. 
Fundamentally this thesis seeks to understand this remarkable transition. Why did Qatar 
change so starkly?  
The working hypothesis for this thesis is that these changes were devised and directed by a 
small cabal in Qatar’s elite with little active outside interference or domestically driven 
demands for fundamental change. The new, young elite are believed to have had a 
fundamentally different conception for Qatar’s outlook and orientation. Such new ideas 
were driven by an appreciation of Qatar’s history, which is a history of dependency and 
relative weakness, and a modern understanding of the importance of economic 
diversification. The creation and propagation of a new business-savvy, attractive, modern, 
and culturally sophisticated brand for Qatar was an intrinsic part of this whole plan which 
relied on boosting Qataris soft power. This would answer key security issues by boosting 
Qatar’s visibility and inculcating Qatar to ever greater degrees into the economies of the 
world’s leading states, while simultaneously improving Qatar’s business credentials; a 
centrally important aspect in Qatar’s quest to diversify its economy.   
Page 43 of 278 
 
Methodologies: Qualitative v Quantitative  
Understanding and evaluating the vast changes that took place in Qatar’s policies from the 
early 1990s is broadly a qualitative question. While there are quantities that could be 
evaluated (e.g. the number of mediatory forays attempted or the amount of money spent 
on foreign aid) there are several problems with basing conclusions on such points alone. 
Firstly, records kept in Qatar are sporadic and largely inaccessible. There is simply not a 
coherent or trustworthy body of statistical evidence available that could provide statistically 
significant data for conclusions. Secondly, even if such statistics were available ascertaining 
a link between, for example, a greater spending on foreign aid and a supposed overarching 
change in foreign policy, this is problematic. Without significant qualitative contextualisation 
knowing that the number of mediatory forays increased is not useful for this does not 
overtly speak to causation but merely denotes correlation. Overall, this topic is subjective 
and resistant to empirical explanation alone.  
Hence the key methods used in this thesis are qualitative in nature. Specifically, in addition 
to using primary source documents where possible and a range of secondary sources, 
personal interviews with a diverse range of actors forms the core of this thesis. There are a 
range of concerns that must be addressed when using interviews. Clearly, no one person is 
‘correct’ and everyone is imbued with their own biases, to say nothing of those with a 
particular agenda. Aware of these issues, the key to the success of this technique is 
triangulation.  
For example, after speaking to seven Ambassadors in Doha from smaller nations, the 
impression given was that the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs was so critically 
understaffed and so under pressure that it was almost incapable of performing its basic 
duties, such was the difficulty that these Embassies typically encountered when interacting 
with MOFA in seeking, for example, a meeting for a visiting dignitary. However, after 
conversations with the Russian Ambassador, two British, and three Chinese Ambassadors it 
became clear that while MOFA is certainly busy and stretched as an organisation, whether a 
diplomat gets an audience with a Minister is more a function of the perceived utility of the 
country: the more important the country, the easier to get an audience. While this is to be 
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expected, this one small example neatly highlights the importance of a diverse source of 
interviewees before conclusions are drawn.  
There are also specific concerns in the Qatari context to overcome. Firstly, in terms of 
cultural context, Qataris are, as a whole, reticent about discussing political and social 
matters. This reticence in Qatar is in stark comparison to Kuwait where – on the whole – a 
garrulous culture pervades, likely stemming for their decades living with a rambunctious 
Parliament, discussions on topical political and social questions are easy to initiate and 
opinions are typically free-flowing.97 Yet in Qatar, while there are notable exceptions, 
typically Qataris eschew discussing overtly political matters and will shy away from 
discussing matters which could be perceived as criticising the government. This is not due to 
an oppressive state security network or necessarily fears of consequences were these 
conversations to come to light, but instead due to the highly conservative social scriptures in 
Qatar that instil a hierarchical deference.98 
Secondly, there are basic problems to do with numbers: there are not many Qataris to go 
around. In the Foreign Ministry, for example, until 2012 there was one department for Asian 
and African Affairs; one Ambassador and head of department dealing with the ninety-nine 
countries in the two largest continents on earth, including pivotally important states like 
China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Sudan. Experience and interviews in Qatar suggests 
that no-one below the Ambassador’s level would be willing to speak to a researcher and the 
Minister has much to do other than speak to a researcher. Moreover, the simple fact is that 
Qatari policy is made much higher up the chain of command than Department head.  
Instead of interviewing Ambassadors in MOFA on the record, a broader range of 
interviewees was sought. As much time based in Qatar as possible was procured not only to 
establish a diverse set of relations but to establish trust to allow in-depth and detailed 
conversations. On this point in particular, this thesis is grounded strongly. By the conclusion 
of this PhD, it will have taken approximately twice as long as a traditional British PhD. The 
majority of this time has been spent in Qatar firstly on a nine month long Arabic course at 
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Qatar University and secondly running the Qatar office for the Royal United Services 
Institute for Security and Defence’s (RUSI). Four years living in the small town of Doha has 
enabled the researcher to embed himself in the expatriate and, to some degree, the local 
Qatar community. Being the Director of RUSI has enabled the author to work closely with 
key Government Ministries and a range of Embassies in Qatar. Furthermore, the nature of 
the work has facilitated interaction, conversation, and the establishment of business 
relationships with leading business people, diplomats, and experts both in Qatar and the 
wider region. The RUSI experience has significantly diversified the range of those 
interviewed for this thesis as well as simply adding vastly to the numbers concerned. 
However, there is also a careful distinction to be made. Much of the work undertaken with 
RUSI was done under strict terms of confidentiality and the position in RUSI has not been 
used as a stepping-stone to interview Qatari Ministers or to use parts of private 
conversations for this thesis. At the same time it is impossible not to develop opinions, have 
personal hypothesis tested, affirmed, and contradicted in the daily business of living and 
working in Qatar at a high level.  
Aside from these ethical issues of not using private and privileged conversations in the 
thesis there are also considerations to be pondered regarding potential limits of the 
author’s academic freedom given pre-existing and continuing links with RUSI in Qatar. 
Simultaneously, when working, studying, researching, and writing about a country that is 
undemocratic in nature, there are always concerns to be addressed. One must forcefully 
interrogate the potential concern of self-censorship by the author in light of said issues. 
While it is just and proper that these concerns are evaluated, it is contended that they are 
not of direct relevance to this specific case for four reasons.  
Firstly, RUSI is the world’s oldest think-tank and has been operating for over 180 years. Its 
reputation is by far the most important and valuable commodity it possesses. From RUSI’s 
perspective it is quite simply not worth jeopardising this long-established and centrally 
important reputation with the Director of its Qatar office authoring a book with a weak 
critique or which actively dodges difficult questions.  
Secondly, the author has written over fifty articles, book chapters, papers, opinion pieces, 
and hundreds of blog posts covering all aspects of Qatar many of which contain significant 
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criticism. In short, the author’s reputation as someone who stridently puts forth his opinion 
is available for public appraisal.  
Thirdly, over the years studying Qatar the author has had the chance to meet and interact 
with various members of Qatar’s elite by they in the public or private sector. Thus far the 
author is yet to meet a Qatari who would take offence at a book focusing in-depth on Qatar, 
which offers a reasoned, nuanced, and knowledgeable critique. As long as criticism is not 
levelled in an ad hominem fashion, it is liable to be received with equanimity (if it is read at 
all), or at least it is unlikely to be received in a hostile fashion. Moreover, on a literal level 
after five years of studying and writing on Qatar including several working for RUSI no Qatari 
official has ever voiced any concerns as to the author’s work and neither intimated nor 
explicitly noted red lines not to be crossed or issues to be avoided.  
Fourthly, this thesis is focusing on explaining key changes in Qatar’s foreign policy. Much of 
this is descriptive and explanatory. Certainly, opinions are voiced as to efficacy or suitability 
of policies, but the central question is not whether Qatar’s foreign policy is good or bad but 
what is Qatar’s foreign policy and why did it change.  
Interview theory 
The literature on interviewing suggests several factors are key to keep in mind when 
conducting all kinds of interviews. Though the literature is voluminous, the advice can be 
roughly divided into two broad topics: the interview questions themselves along with their 
interpretation and the behaviour of the interviewer during the conversation.  
Questions 
Cicourel notes that one must question the assumptions of the meanings of words: what is 
clear to one person may not be to another, or indeed, it may mean something else.99 In the 
Qatari context this is important where the language barrier must be considered at times 
too. Similarly, Kvale notes that questions “should be easy to understand, short and devoid 
of jargon.”100 Patton reminds the interviewer that people have a tendency to lump a number 
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of questions together, whereas it is likely to be advantageous – again, especially in an 
English as a second language context – if questions are asked one at a time.  
Moreover, such questions ought to be open-ended so as not to implicitly dictate a certain 
answer. A simple example of this would be asking “do you think that Qatar’s foreign policy 
changed after 1995?” as opposed to “why do you think Qatar’s foreign policy changed so 
markedly after 1995?” Even though the researcher in this case wants to know the answer to 
the second question, this can be ascertained by judicious use of follow up questions. Cohen 
and Manion, for example, discuss ‘funnelling’ where questions start off broad and general 
and get more specific.101 Such a specific notion is not necessary at times; indeed, seeking 
simple clarifications or elaboration to elicit more information, again, without leading the 
conversation, as suggested by Kvale102 can be crucial in getting to the interesting nub of an 
issue. 
Lastly, as Cicourel cautions, one must be sensitive to the sensitivities of the interviewee. 
This is of particular concern in Qatar where one must judiciously ask certain questions so as 
not to arouse fears of straying onto difficult topics.  
Behaviour 
Clearly, establishing a rapport with the interviewee is important, as noted by Kvale.103 
Directing the conversation in ways of relevance to the thesis while not over-riding the 
interviewee or ignoring what they are saying is key. Similarly, encouraging discussion of at 
times sensitive issues is a skill. Typically, this can only be done by establishing a relationship 
over a period of time, especially in Qatar. The use of the Arabic language can be useful in 
this regard. For almost all of the interviews, the introductions and opening statements were 
done in fluent Arabic (when needed). Indeed, there was often follow up in Arabic about 
where I learned the language and such conversation. Typically, the interviewee is pleased to 
see that significant time has clearly been taken to learn a key part of the Arab culture, the 
Arabic language, which, it must not be forgotten, stems – at least nominally – from the key 
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religious text. Subsequently the conversation was changed to English to facilitate deliberate 
and specific questioning strategies that may have become lost in translation.  
More generally, having lived in the Middle East and the Gulf specifically for approaching five 
years, the interviewer has a good idea of how to approach different types of interviewees. 
Aside from a cultural understanding of how to hold one’s self and conduct one’s business 
gleaned over the years, specific phrases were used with specific types of people. To Qataris I 
introduced myself as ‘David Roberts, a student from Durham University in the UK.’ To 
foreigners of all stripes I introduced myself as ‘David Roberts, a researcher from Durham 
University in the UK.’ The difference is subtle, but important nonetheless. Qataris feel less 
threatened by being presented with a student. Being instead presented with a ‘researcher’ 
or a ‘PhD student’, for example, presents a more formal front, which can provoke a more 
guarded response. Not forgetting the intrinsic Qatari reticence about discussing sensitive 
political or social issues, Qataris feel more in control when speaking to ‘just’ a student as 
opposed to a more authoritative ‘researcher’ who might ask more probing or difficult 
questions. Whereas foreigners, especially Ambassadors and their counterparts in the private 
sector (i.e. in high office), are far more likely to accept an interview if it is with a ‘researcher’ 
from a top UK University as opposed to just a student. Such people tend not to have the 
same concerns about ‘revealing’ any information being far more used to discussion and 
conversation of this type. Needless to say on all occasions I explicitly stated the reason for 
the interview as contributing either on or off the record to the research for a PhD and 
subsequent book on Qatar.   
Impediments 
Aside from the cultural difficulties inherent in interviewing Qataris, the key Qatar-specific 
difficulty is the lack of available primary material. The country’s records are sporadic and 
inaccessible. Even were these documents available, given the leviathan bureaucracy that 
tiny-Qatar manages to instil, gaining access would have proven to be problematic.  
Equally a lack of a true fluency in Arabic is also an impediment that must noted. While in 
Qatar on the Arabic course, conversations could be held without problems on most matters, 
if the inflections were sometimes lost. Yet when it came to reading, this could simply not be 
done at a feasible speed. What texts have been read in Arabic are a relatively small 
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proportion of those available. This hamartia is not a severe impediment as Qatar suffers 
equally badly in Arabic as in English for having been largely passed by as a topic for books 
for decades now.  
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Theoretical Framework  
This thesis employs two stages to its overall theoretical framework. First, a meta-theory 
explaining the genesis of foreign policies is created is outlined. Second, several tactical 
theories (soft power and branding) are used to elucidate the underlying motives behind 
several of the newer policies.   
Time Frame 
The study of Qatar’s history reveals that there were significant changes in tenor and 
practical changes in policy direction in Qatar beginning in the late-1980s that gathered 
speed as the 1990s and 2000s progressed. It is tempting to note the pivotal date as 1995 
when Hamad Bin Khalifah Al Thani and the other key instigators of these policy changes 
came to power, but there are important examples of policy changes in the early 1990s, 
particularly in the foreign policy arena. Cumbersomely, therefore, the thesis will refer to the 
changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s rather than plumb for a less accurate if more 
streamlined reference to 1995 as ‘the date’ when things changed.  
To highlight and ultimately explain the policy changes and their genesis, this thesis takes a 
historical approach, laying out the history of Qatar and the subsequent traits that emerged. 
Only with a plotted history of Qatar is it possible to discern the true level of changes that 
took place from the late 1980s onwards. This study will examine Qatar’s policies up until 
Qatar’s involvement in the Arab Spring, which signals a key development in Qatar’s foreign 
policy.    
Foreign Policy 
Most of the changes in policy that are the central concern of this thesis are changes in the 
foreign policy arena. A refreshed relationship with Iran as personified by Qatar’s attempts to 
import water by pipeline in the early 1990s being one clear example of a new foreign policy. 
Equally, however, there are other policies which are vastly different to their predecessors, 
which are of interest to this thesis that are not traditionally located within the foreign policy 
realm. Despite not necessarily falling traditionally under the banner of foreign policy, all of 
these policies have links to the international world, such as Qatar’s desire to foster itself as a 
meetings, conferences, incentives, and exhibitions (MICE) leader by investing heavily in its 
domestic tourism infrastructure. Similarly, Qatar’s education initiatives, while demonstrably 
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domestically orientated nevertheless act as a significant link to America (and to the UK and 
France to lesser degrees) and radiate one of the key fonts of Qatari soft power throughout 
the wider region: education. 
The definition of foreign policy for this thesis will be specialised to allow for the specific 
Qatari context, not that there is a simple definition of foreign policy, as Beach notes.104 Early 
in his work on the evolution of foreign policy, Christopher Hill offers the following basic 
definition: “the sum of official external relations conducted by an official independent actor 
(usually a state) in international relations.”105 Yet Hill soon nuances this view stating that 
“Foreign policy is...both more and less than the ‘external relations’ which states generate 
continually on all fronts.”106 
Following on from the diffusion of foreign policy that Hill alludes to, for the purposes of this 
thesis, foreign policy will be understood as ‘the actions and policies emanating from official 
Qatari Governmental organs aimed significantly at external actors.’ Such a definition has 
many advantages.  
Firstly, given the lack of clarity perennially associated with the Qatari Government such as 
their lack of press releases to adequately explain a policy, it is prudent not to limit one’s 
material to ‘policies’ alone. Other actions taken by official Qatari actors are of interest to 
this thesis too. If one relied solely on official policy statements regarding Qatar’s relations 
with Israel, for example, then one would place unnecessary and unworkable constraints 
when evaluating this relationship.  
Secondly, it is sensible not to limit the policies and actions taken as foreign policies solely to 
those emitted by the Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Not only does the Emir and Crown 
Prince ‘conduct’ aspects of Qatar’s foreign policy as they see fit, but other Ministries and 
entities engage in activities that can clearly be seen as building on existing Qatari policies. It 
would be foolish, for example, to ignore the commercial aspects of Qatar’s investments or 
its LNG deals from a discussion in this thesis.   
                                                     
104
 Derek Beach, Analyzing Foreign Policy  (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p.1. 
105
 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy  (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p.3. 
106
 Ibid., p.5. 
Page 52 of 278 
 
Lastly, foreign policy is not necessarily aimed at states. Not only in the Middle East are there 
definitional issues with concepts like statehood but a significant portion of Qatar’s policies 
are aimed at a much more diverse range of actors than states, such as sub-state actors,  
businesses, other countries’ populations, and potential customers of many varieties. 
Alternative approaches: the path not taken 
World Systems Theory & the Core-Periphery Dynamic 
There are a variety of theoretical approaches that could have been used by this thesis. Parts 
of the dependency theory literature and particularly the focus on the core and the periphery 
are potentially applicable to the Qatari context. In particular when Qatar in the early 1990s 
seeks American protection one can reasonably describe the two countries as entering a 
patron-client relationship according to a traditional understanding of the concept.107 
Certainly, the element of reciprocity is present in the Qatari-US relationship just as it is 
central to the client-patron relationship more generally.108  
Aside from theoretical issues with assimilating differing levels of analysis inherent with the 
client-patron concept, this theory is in no way nimble enough to help explain Qatar’s 
policies.109 Theories of how the dependent states’ foreign policies often come to reflect the 
key interests of more powerful nations focus on the bargaining model and on the 
dependency model.110 In other words, the weaker state adopts the policies of the suzerain 
due to the “use of reward and punishment…[whereby] ‘the foreign policy behaviour of 
dependencies is viewed as partial payment in exchange for the maintenance of benefits 
they derive from their economic ties to the dominant country.’”111 Alternatively the 
dependency explanation posits that the reliance of the weaker state on the stronger is so 
profound and structural that an elite comes to power in the weaker state “whose interests, 
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values and perceptions have more in common with the elites of the powerful nation than 
with the masses in their own country.”112 
While initially plausible, neither of these explanations can hope to explain Qatar’s foreign 
policy approach. Certainly, in the early 1990s Qatar was highly dependent upon America for 
its security, but it soon signed defence agreements with the UK and with France. But more 
fundamentally this whole core-periphery paradigm struggles to understand Qatar’s unusual 
diversification of its international relations. If Qatar was so dependent upon America why 
did it seek relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran much to the (often significant) 
annoyance of America? Nor is there subtle enough an understanding of the dynamics of 
regional relations on Qatar or an appreciation of the ‘black box’ of internal machinations 
within Qatar.  
Small state theory 
Recent advances in the small state literature provide many relevant and interesting 
concepts, which could conceivably be applied to the Qatar case study. Indeed, some 
scholars have already done just this.113 Elman for example argues against the consensus of 
small state foreign policy analysis and suggests that domestic level factors are not to be 
ignored at the expense of the typical focus on macro, structural and systemic concerns.114 
This kind of approach would be well received for looking at Qatar where the domestic level 
is so crucial. Equally the work of Wiberg and Neumann and Gstohl offer applicable 
theoretical understandings of small states.115  
However, small state theory was not chosen as the base theory for this investigation. One 
problem with small state literature is in the definition. At just over 11,500 km2 Qatar is 
undoubtedly a small country geographically. So too with a native population under 300,000 
it is small population-wise, though a non-native population of around 1.9 million as of 2013 
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complicates this basic metric. While measuring power is notoriously problematic, back in 
1990 it would have been uncontroversial to suggest that Qatar is most certainly a small 
state in terms of a lack of meaningful power. However as time progressed this calculation 
becomes much more difficult. As Qatar’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) business takes off Qatar 
becomes a significant world player. Equally as its mediation progresses Qatar developed 
significant relations around the wider Middle East region. From 2008 onwards when Qatar 
brokered a key settlement in Lebanon it displayed much more reach and persuasion than 
many expected. Again while tabulating this increase in Qatar’s power is difficult (if not 
impossible) it certainly increased in this time period. Yet including these notions of 
increasing abstract ‘power’ of a country potentially outgrowing its own theoretical 
framework and becoming decidedly not ‘small’ in certain crucial ways (political influence, 
financial clout, media strength [Al Jazeera]) not only complicates the analysis but at worst 
proves a distraction from the analysis.  
The Meta-Framework: The Goldilocks approach 
There are numerous ways of approaching the study of foreign policy depending on one’s 
theoretical persuasion. This thesis seeks to eschew any predisposed positions and beliefs in 
the all-encompassing importance placed on any one factor be it fundamental insecurity (a 
realist trope), control of productive goods (a Marxist trope) or international cooperation (a 
key trope in liberalism). While, for example, realism and neo-realism speak to the 
importance of power and fundamental security as key factors – worthy conclusions – such 
theories largely exclude, say, the constructivist’s focus on internal cultural factors and how 
they are reflected in the international system; something that has important lessons.  
This thesis seeks a more holistic approach that eschews the conceit of claiming 
understanding of international politics via a specific set of ideas emanating from one school 
of thought. Instead it will incorporate aspects of the various theories of foreign policies and 
apply them to the Qatari context.  
In the Middle Eastern context there are two sets of approaches in particular that seek to 
undertake such a task. One is authored by Anoush Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch and 
the other Gerd Nonneman. There are many similarities between these two frameworks. 
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Both seek to determine specific foreign policy methodologies for the Middle Eastern context 
and both seek to provide a multi-level analysis.  
Ehteshami and Hinnebusch seek to stick close to realism as a pillar, in the guise of a nuanced 
version of neo-realism.116 They keep many of the key definitions incumbent upon a broadly 
realist position (state as the central actor seeking to maximise its autonomy in an insecure 
international environment often through balancing power) but explicitly note that in Middle 
Eastern states the state itself is under construction and consolidation thus “the dynamics of 
the “system level,” per se, has less effect upon state behaviour than realism expects, while 
other levels, addressed by rival theories, have more.”117  
This is an eminently sensible conclusion to make and such conclusions are also found in 
Nonneman’s work. The only real concern with Ehteshami and Hinnebusch’s approach is that 
their initial starting point is strongly wedded to neo-realist concerns. While such a 
conception may well make sense in the Middle East given its nature as an area where 
security concerns and instances of power balancing are only too obvious, but this does not 
necessarily fit with the thrust of this thesis. This is not to say that Qatar escapes a neo-realist 
conception of security; indeed, it has the hardest of ‘realist’ security guarantees from 
America protecting its territory, but there is a sense that Qatar is striving for more than 
merely an optimal balance of power against regional adversaries. As Wright notes, 
neorealism has a hard time understanding the rationale behind significant intra-Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) wrangling in the face of a clear and present realist danger in the 
shape of the perfect cultural, religious, social, political, and military ‘enemy’ personified in 
Iran.118 Such incidents and such relations are fundamental to the nuanced understanding 
required to comprehend Qatar’s shift of policies. 
Evidence will be brought to bear indicating that Qatar is striving to significantly and 
systematically augment its soft power in such a way as to offer itself ways of matching and 
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countering serious security concerns in ways too nuanced for realism or neo-realism to 
ascertain and develop.  
Instead, this thesis adheres to a similar formulation but without the explicitly neorealist 
underpinnings; Nonneman’s “complex model of international politics” approach to 
analysing foreign policy.119 Following Nonneman’s typology, this study eschews the 
fundamental assumptions of the various schools of thought, but uses the key attributes of 
each. Therefore, a keen awareness informing this analysis stems from Foreign Policy 
Analysis’ insistence on the importance of delving into the state’s ‘black box,’ but its 
traditional ignorance of the world system ‘above’ will be eschewed. Indeed, Nonneman for 
one suggests that this approach is crucial in the Middle Eastern context given the 
changeability shown in foreign policies necessitating that “enquiry should be open to the 
range of possible determinants that different schools in IR theory and Foreign Policy 
Analysis have drawn attention to.”120  
The essence of Nonneman’s theoretical approach is to close the gap between the theory 
and the reality of international relations. It is a theory that resolutely seeks to accrue 
explanatory power and real world relevance. It does not judge which level of analysis is 
more relevant than another and does not seek to impose an ideological belief of the 
supremacy of the international context or domestic decision making or international 
commerce on the recipient of theoretical analysis. It instead provides a tailored scaffold to 
aid in the examination of the foreign policies of Middle Eastern states. On this point, as 
reviewer Samer Abboud notes, it seeks to “better integrate the Middle East region into the 
study of IR.”121 
It has a clear and concise approach, which is particularly useful for the comparative nature 
of this thesis. Divided into assessments of the domestic, regional, and international spheres 
it can be used to interrogate in a structured manner the key new foreign policies that an 
analysis of Qatar’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ foreign policy will reveal. Nonneman’s analysis of each 
level will aid in the examination of each foreign policy when held up against his framework. 
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This structured approach will make clear any repetitive themes that occur as instigating 
factors in the genesis of the foreign policy in question. In this way the conclusion can draw 
conclusions for the Qatari case as to the locus – domestically, regionally, or internationally – 
of the key thrust of the change in Qatari foreign policy. Aside from the ground breaking 
nature of the basic questions of this thesis heretofore unanswered in any depth, the thesis’ 
conclusions will make a significant contribution to the literature as to the origins of foreign 
policy change in the Gulf context.  
Domestic Level Determinants of Foreign Policy 
Early on in the development of his approach for analysing foreign policy in Middle Eastern 
states Nonneman notes the following sine qua non of international relations.  
The central pursuit of most MENA regimes remains that of domestic survival – and the search for 
legitimacy, acquiescence, and control to assure this, in turn supported by a search for resources to 
deploy in this domestic quest.
122
 
In pursuit of this central and abiding goal foreign policy is but one of many bows in the 
quiver of States looking to secure survival. On the domestic level contributing to Foreign 
Policy formulation Nonneman notes that there are several direct and indirect factors to 
consider including the nature of the state, state capabilities, the decision making system, 
and the decision makers’ perception of their role.  
Each of these points is applicable to the Qatari context but there needs to be a change of 
emphasis. Nonneman’s typology is an aggregate typology for states in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) but Qatar is far from the average MENA state. With a native population 
of only 200,000 at the Millennium, with the largest Royal family per capita in the world, as 
the 2000s progressed with a seemingly bottomless pit of money while having its basic 
security guaranteed by America, Qatar comprises an unusual set of circumstances: while all 
states are unique, Qatar is more unique than most.  
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Decision making systems & role perception 
In particular, one must emphasize the role of the Al Thani family. Not only does this fit with 
the overall historical approach of this thesis, but their role, as noted in subsequent chapters, 
has always significantly outweighed other factors in Qatar. This trend continued with 
Khalifah and Hamad Al Thani today, though the emphasis changed. Both tried with 
increasing success to cut loose from the Al Thani family and to increase their independence 
of action. Each did this by spreading their legitimacy wider and by seeking popular support 
to supplant Al Thani support. Hamad Al Thani in particular was successful at this. Yet this did 
not mean that the Qatari people then somehow began to have a say in policy. Instead 
Hamad Al Thani and a small coterie of advisors and confidants – Hamad Bin Jassem Al Thani, 
Sheikha Moza, Abdullah Al Attiyah, etc. – became supremely powerful and faced little 
institutional, familial, or other barriers to pursuing policies that they wished.  
The perception of the role of the leader is a critical element. Perhaps based on similar 
evidence, different leaders may draw different conclusions. Different upbringings, 
education, or values may be the root of different decisions. Though such information as to 
the thought processes of leaders is all but impossible to obtain, using what secondary 
information is available along with primary data in the form of interviews with experts, it is 
possible to paint a plausible picture of these obscure but crucial issues.  
The nature of the state 
Whether the state is fundamentally secure or not is the most basic concern that will impact 
upon Foreign Policy formulation. Any approach looking at Qatar in the context of the nature 
of the state would be compelled to narrow the distinction between ‘the state’ and the Al 
Thani family. Indeed, from the moment that Muhammad Al Thani is anointed the key 
interlocutor by the British in 1868, the Al Thani place in Qatar’s power structure was set. 
The security of the state became increasingly synonymous with the security of the Al Thani 
family at the top of the Qatari tree.  
The issue of ‘basic security’ takes on many forms from the physical security of borders, 
towns or the Al Thani family’s place in society to questions of the degree of economic 
independence and dependence to issues of legitimacy and how well or not it has been 
established.  
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Concerns as to issues surrounding physical security quite clearly transfer directly into 
foreign policy with the desire to bandwagon, ally, or confront other state entities. Such 
concerns also speak to the overall foreign policy tilting regarding international organisations 
(to join or not to join) and overall orientation (to follow the regional consensus or not).  
Questions as to the ‘nature of the state’ also require more esoteric notions to be analysed 
such as the level of consolidation of the national identity and of the legitimacy of the ruling 
elite. Ruling elites can bolster their legitimacy and help to consolidate national identity by 
overtly seeking to take charge and defend an issue of national sensitivity. This was the case 
in Morocco with the issue of the reintegration of the ‘Spanish Sahara,’ a deeply resonant 
concern for Moroccans: “By adroitly placing himself symbolically and politically at the head 
of the Saharan campaign, Hassan II saw both his legitimacy and that of the Monarchy as an 
institution rise substantially.”123 Following this example, particular of foreign policies will be 
highlighted in terms of their domestic effects specifically on emerging identity issues; an 
issue that emerges repeatedly.  
Similarly, linking back to an earlier point, much depends on the security of the elite. If they 
are weak and need overt public support then elites can be pressured into pursuing policies 
which they otherwise might not wish to follow. Hinnebusch highlight’s Sadat’s ‘risky war’ in 
1973 as being significantly promoted by public outrage over his ‘no war no peace’ policies.124 
One might expect such practices in a state like Qatar having received independence only in 
1971. Also, it only possesses a meagre history on which to draw with little experience of the 
Westphalian order and it finds itself in a homogenous region of fraternal states with either 
exactly the same or at least similar families, histories, economies, geographies, cultures, 
religion, and political orders making it increasingly difficult in an age of homogenising 
globalisation to differentiate oneself. 
Capabilities & Decision Making 
The capabilities of the state be these economic, demographic, or technological offer clear 
constraints upon the leadership. A lack of economic capacity to engage in a particular policy, 
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for example, may persuade the leadership to engage in policies to augment the capacity 
such as economic liberalisation. Yet such a decision does not occur in a vacuum and the 
decision will be keenly weighed by the leadership. Benefit to the elite itself and the country 
will be weighed against the costs of engaging in such a policy, such as the relative loss of 
financial autonomy if one engages in the quid pro quo of, for example, seeking World Trade 
Organisation status.  
Outwith the issue of capabilities, the issue of decision making not only encompasses issues 
of the decision making circle but of the perception of the decision makers. In the Qatari 
context this circle, as mentioned, is exceedingly small when it comes to executive decisions; 
Emir Khalifah’s insistence of signing all cheques over $50,000 being a quick but instructive 
example of the acute levels of centralisation of power under his signature.125  
Regional Level Determinants of Foreign Policy 
As Nonneman notes, the regional context refers not only to an actor’s immediate regional 
environment, but trans-geographical phenomena that are especially significant in a Middle 
Eastern context.126  
As for the former, the Gulf region as well as the wider Middle East has vacillated for decades 
to the ebb and flow of various currents of thought. Decolonisation, pan-Arabism and 
Islamism have waxed and waned. Each country has been affected by these (and other) 
waves in different ways; none have been immune. In particular, a small country like Qatar 
has, for most of its history, had to heed the flow and act accordingly. These factors present 
both constraints and opportunities for Qatar’s elite.    
Aside from pan-regional movements, Qatar has been acutely aware of its neighbours for 
they have supplied threats and opportunities to counter threats in equal measure. Even as 
Qatar obtained the US security guarantees, the exigencies of the region still prevailed and 
again constrained action.  
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Time and again the thesis will dwell on the importance of differentiation for Qatar. It finds 
itself next to city-states like Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Manama that are extremely similar to 
Qatar in a variety of ways as mentioned. The commensurate desire to differentiate Qatar is 
noted throughout key policies.  
Similarly, the importance of Qatari-Saudi relations will come to the fore repeatedly. The 
varying role perceptions of these two states, whether analysed religiously (differing versions 
of Salafi Islam) or basic power politics (a suzerain and a small state) are critical. Otherwise 
linked at the direct political level are relations with Iran, which are important on their own, 
but also resonate and effect Saudi bilateral relations.  
International Level Determinants of Foreign Policy 
The international level can be seen as a vast flow of policies, alliances, opportunities, and 
threats to which the state is subject. Traditional small state theory would suggest that 
smaller states are not capable of standing against the dominant flow at any given moment 
but because of their size are compelled to follow, for example, the regional consensus.127 
However, this kind of assumption has been questioned by scholars, at times explicitly in 
relation to Qatar.128 Given that there is no automatic expectation for how one might expect 
Qatar to react to the international system, the researcher must look for ad hoc effects.  
Pan-global events and phenomena such as the end of the Cold War, the ramifications of the 
11 September 2001 attacks, or the globalization-inspired communications revolution will 
affect Qatar deeply; whether they will affect Qatar more deeply because on some metrics it 
is a small state is an academic question of no significant relevance. Aside from esoteric 
notions of the international level, it will also refer straightforwardly to countries beyond 
Qatar’s regional perimeter. Hence, for example, Japan’s growing demand for gas having a 
direct effect on Qatar’s gas policies 
These large-scale occurrences will be factored into to the explanation of the development of 
Qatar’s policies, foreign and otherwise, in terms of how they interact with on-going changes 
in the other levels.  
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Tactical Theories: State Branding & Soft Power 
Below the strategic theoretical underpinnings of this thesis are several theories that 
contribute to explaining various Qatari policies. One of the basic theories of this thesis is 
that there was an overt, explicit plan to foster a new, publicity-attracting brand for Qatar 
from the mid-1990s onwards. This claim can be evidenced with a range of policies which 
differ profoundly from their predecessors, but still one must rigorously explain why such 
policies are being entertained and pursued. Enter the literature on state branding. In 
judicious conjunction with theories of soft power, it is possible to fit these tactical theories 
into the strategic picture that is created on the back of the key theoretical underpinning of 
this theory; the Goldilocks theory adapted from Gerd Nonneman.  
State Branding 
Branding as a concept for products and services, from Coca Cola to FedEx shipping, has a 
long and illustrious history. Only recently, however, has this concept been explicitly 
transferred to the state level. For this concept, Shrimp et al use the term ‘country equity’129 
while Peter Van Ham uses the term ‘brand states.’130 Academic study of state branding and 
associated concepts of country equity and public diplomacy has increased significantly 
recently; indeed in 2005 the New York Times listed nation branding as among “the year’s 
most notable ideas.”131  
Van Ham, one of the recent pioneers of this topic, describes it as follows: “A brand is best 
described as a customer’s idea about a product; the “brand state” comprises the outside 
world’s ideas about a particular country.”132  
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While the academic study of place branding is relatively new, this is not to say that it is a 
new topic. Indeed, Olins notes that France, for example, has undergone numerous 
rebranding exercises from Louis XIV via Bonaparte’s Empire to the Fifth Republic today.  
The Tricolour replaced the Fleur de Lys, the Marseillaise became the new anthem, the traditional 
weights and measures were replaced by the metric system, a new calendar was introduced, God was 
replaced by the Supreme Being, and the whole lot was exported through military triumphs all over 
Europe. In other words the entire French package was changed.
133
 
As Olins concludes, “you may not like the term, you may prefer to talk about a new or 
reinvented nation or state, but if revolutionary France was not a new brand I do now know 
what is.”134  
Particularly in the Gulf context, where there are numerous small states or city-states all of 
which are remarkably similar in terms of language, history, culture, geography, economics, 
politics, and society, it important to find ways to differentiate one’s self from the 
homogenised crowd. Adopting “strategic marketing and management tools [to undertake] 
conscious branding” is one key way that this can be done.135 Aside from a banal desire to ‘be 
different,’ put simply, every dollar of foreign direct investment (FDI) and every engineer that 
goes to Abu Dhabi is one dollar and one engineer that does not go to Doha. 
Van Ham also notes that a country’s “culture, political ideals, and policies” are a key part of 
brand creation.136 Another way to focus on what can be used to create a brand is what kinds 
of attributes are attractive to businesses. Kotler notes that when businesses are scouting for 
possible locations they have certain criteria particularly in mind.  
A country’s image results from its geography, history, proclamations, art and music, famous citizens 
and other features...Most country images are in fact stereotypes, extreme simplifications of the 
reality that are not necessarily accurate.”
137
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More specifically, Kotler et al note that for companies looking for a new location search for 
the following set of concerns: 
 Local labor market 
 Access to customer and supplier markets 
 Availability of development site facilities and infrastructure 
 Transportation 
 Education and training opportunities 
 Quality of life 
 Business climate 
 Access to R&D facilities 
 Capital availability 
 Taxes and regulation [clarity]138 
It is possible to discern that numerous policies pursued by Qatar since 1995 can be seen as 
targeting these attributes suggesting that, implicitly at least, one of the key reasons behind 
Qatar’s unusual sets of policies from the early 1990s onwards can be understood in terms of 
creating and boosting a brand for the country to add to its attractiveness to international 
commerce. This is not an option for a modern state, as Van Ham cautions. 
One has to recognize that the unbranded [italics in original] state has a difficult time attracting 
economic and political attention. Why would we invest in or visit a country we do not know, and why 
would we pay attention to its political and strategic demands if we have no clue what the country is 
all about and why we should care?
139
  
While endowing one’s state with a distinct brand to obtain advantage has always been 
important, arguably as the twentieth century progressed it became even more important. 
The internationalisation of commerce, while having numerous positive impacts, has also 
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resulted in, as Olins put it, “a very harsh and turbulent commercial environment [where] 
The nation that makes itself the most attractive wins the prizes – others suffer.”140  
Globalization and the harmonizing effects of European integration put further pressures on territorial 
entities to develop, manage, and leverage their brand equity. To stand out from the crowd and 
capture significant mind share and market share, place branding has become essential. 
141
 
For European integration in the Qatar context there are clear analogies with the Gulf, which 
will be explored below. Moreover, many of these concerns are more acute for a small state 
like Qatar.   
Rockower states that niche diplomacy, a concept which is often involved in a symbiotic 
relationship with state branding, “is often associated with the pursuit of small and medium 
states to raise their public diplomacy profile by wedding their image with a certain cause as 
a way to magnify their influence within global civil society.”142  
Qatar’s status as a young state can be both advantageous and disadvantageous. It means 
that Qatar must start from little to no brand identity and a commensurate struggle to firstly 
define its space and then to propagate its brand in a world of more established competitors. 
Equally, it means that Qatar does not have a negative brand perception to counter and a 
blank state from which to start.143 Indeed, Tarek Atrissi the designer who was tasked to 
develop a new “corporate” identity for Qatar, noted that “Qatar did not have an existing 
national identity [something that] made [my job] easier.”144 
Lastly, it must be noted that, as with Olins’ French example, a significant audience for the 
rebranding exercise is in fact internal. Here there is an interesting confluence of the ‘foreign 
policy’ aspects of the thesis and the other parts of the puzzle that have both an external and 
an internal dimension.   
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Soft power  
Inextricably linked to state branding is the concept of soft power. First espoused by Joseph 
Nye in the early 1990s (though its antecedents go back centuries),145 it was a notion used to 
explain that the power of America rested not only on its superior hard power facilities 
(primarily its military) but on its soft power too; its ability to persuade states to follow an 
American path as opposed to threatening or coercing them to do so. Nye identified three 
broad fonts of soft power as stemming from culture, political values, and foreign policies.146 
Under this rubric he identified American educational institutions teaching numerous foreign 
leaders and future business people as well as American culture (via Hollywood, for example) 
familiarising people with American traits as two key fonts of US soft power.147 
In the Qatari context it is suggested that many of the post-1995 policies can be seen as 
boosting Qatar’s soft power. Indeed, two of Qatar’s flagship undertakings post-1995 are the 
establishment of Al Jazeera satellite channel and the promotion of education through the 
establishment of US Educational Institutions in Doha, both mirroring America’s twin 
traditional key fonts of its soft power: education and media projection. Moreover, sporting 
ventures are a central way for Qatar to not only publicise itself but to “reiterate its adhesion 
to the universal values of democracy, solidarity, and human rights,” as one scholar put it 
regarding part of Qatar’s reasons for hosting the 2006 Asian Games; a direct echo of Nye’s 
point on the promotion of values and political culture as sources of soft power.148 
For Qatar to pursue a soft power approach is an obvious if not necessary policy, for with a 
population of approximately 250,000 native Qataris, to pick just one limiting factor, Qatar 
will always struggle to project hard power. Yet Qatar can invest in activities and policies that 
boost another aspect of power and this is the context of, for example, Al Jazeera; a savvy, 
asymmetric use of financial power augment Qatar’s soft power.  
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Not only has soft power become a fixture of the international politics lexicon in recent 
decades despite difficulties in defining this intrinsically nebulous issue, but the concept of 
Qatar building its soft power capacities has become something of a trope in public writings 
on Qatar. Indeed, a wide variety of articles and analysis pieces in recent years have focused 
specifically upon Qatar’s various fonts of soft power.149  
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Chapter 3: Qatar in Historical Context 
The Local Milieu  
Before the mid-18th century there are few specific records of activity on the Qatari Peninsula 
with one Arab historian concluding that “its inhabitants led a peaceful life and confronted 
no major events thought worthy of historical recording.”150 The modern history of Qatar 
begins with the emigration of Utub tribes from Kuwait to the Qatar Peninsula in the 
1760s.151 Initially led by the Al Khalifah tribe, they planned to settle in Bahrain for its rich 
pearling beds but were prevented by tribes loyal to the Shah of Persia. Instead, they settled 
on Qatar’s west coast. At this time the Al Musallam tribe held a “preeminent, though not a 
paramount position”152 across Qatar, as Lorimer put it, while paying tribute to the Bani 
Khalid tribal conglomeration who controlled much of Hasa (eastern Saudi Arabia).153 The Al 
Musallam demanded a tribute but were rebuffed and the Al Khalifah quickly built walls and 
defences, taking over the town of Zubarah.154 As there was no recorded Musallam reaction 
one surmises that realising that they were outnumbered, the Al Musallam did not pursue 
this slight and retired to Huwailah and then Khor Hassan.155  
Soon a dispute emerged among the Utub in Zubarah when the Al Jalahimah who followed 
the Al Khalifah from Kuwait began to ask for a larger share in profits.156 The Al Khalifah 
refused and the Al Jalahimah retired to Ruwais east of Zubarah from where they successfully 
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and persistently attacked Utubi shipping.157 A battle ensued and the Al Jalahimah were 
comprehensively defeated.158 
Zubarah developed incrementally until the great port of Basra was closed first by a 
devastating plague in 1773 and then by a Persian blockade from 1775-1779, which diverted 
traffic to other Gulf ports including Zubarah. With no taxes Zubarah blossomed. Persians, 
their proxies in Bahrain, and other local tribes attacked several times from 1777 to 1801. 
The Utub settled their differences and successfully defended Zubarah and then turned from 
defence into attack.  
In conjunction with indigenous Qatari tribes the Utub evicted the Persians and those 
supporting them (the Qawasim and other local tribes) from Bahrain in 1782-3.159 The Al 
Khalifah took control in Bahrain, but continued to rule from Zubarah, and apportioned out 
the loot. The Al Jalahimah felt slighted (again) at their allotted booty and, now twice 
spurned, became implacable enemies of the Al Khalifah. They returned to Qatar, settled at 
Khor Hassan and under the leadership of the notorious pirate Rahman bin Jabir attacked 
Utub shipping becoming “the scourge of the Al Khalifah.”160  
Aside from these emerging disputes, as with much of the rest of the region, Qatar was beset 
with intra-tribal belligerency. Much of this fighting followed the age-old hadar-bedu nexus; 
with the settled hadar suffering from “continual marauding inroads from their Bedouin 
[plural: bedu] neighbours, the Menaseer and the Al-Morrah [sic]” to name but two such 
tribes.161  
Elsewhere in Eastern Arabia, the Wahhabis, hailing from deep within central Arabia, were 
overcoming the Bani Khalid, exposing the Utub to marauding raids from 1790 onwards. Not 
only did the Wahhabis want to control the rich town and spread their religious doctrine but 
Zubarah was developing a reputation as a refuge for those escaping Wahhabi domination 
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such as the Bani Khalid leaders.162 With Al Jalahimah help and after attacking numerous 
towns across Qatar, the Wahhabis forced the Utub to relocate from Zubarah to Bahrain 
around 1797.163 Qatar was left to “total subjugation...by the Su’udi state.”164 
The Utub were not safe in Bahrain, which was attacked in 1799 by the Sultan of Muscat. 
According to Warden, this prompted the Al Khalifah to pay a tribute to the Persians, 
presumably to elicit some kind of protection.165 This was not successful and Muscat took 
Bahrain in 1800. Those that could escape fled back to Zubarah where they sought assistance 
from their erstwhile enemies, the Wahhabis, to regain control of Bahrain. Pleased to be 
offered the opportunity to extend their influence and attack their perennial enemy, 
Wahhabi forces joined the Utub to retake Bahrain. The Al Khalifah were reinstalled in 
Manama under a Wahhabi “tribal commonwealth” by 1802.166  
In 1803 when the son of the Sultan of Muscat tried and failed to overthrow his father he 
sought refuge in Zubarah. Two years later with Wahhabi and Utub support he gained the 
throne in Muscat. Aside from this military aid, the Al Khalifah were far from diligent 
Wahhabi subjects.167 They chafed under Wahhabi overlordship and sought ways to extract 
themselves from the relationship, including (unsuccessfully) seeking British help 1805.168 
After this failure the Al Khalifah refused to join the Wahhabi raiding party against Basra in 
1809 and began to renege on sending tribute.169 The next year the Wahhabis reasserted 
their control appointing Abdullah bin Ufaysan as wakil (deputy) deputy of Bahrain and Qatar 
reinforcing him with troops.170 The Al Khalifah rulers were summoned to Diriyah, the 
Wahhabi capital, for reprimands as Ibrahim Pasha, the Ottoman General, advanced further 
into Wahhabi territory forcing the removal of Wahhabi troops from Hasa to reinforce 
against the Ottoman advances.  
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The Al Khalifah heirs, shorn of practically all powers, went to Muscat for help. Always eager 
to attack Wahhabis, Muscat took advantage of Egyptian advances down the Wahhabi 
western flank and destroyed Zubarah and took Bahrain in 1811, expelling the Wahhabis.171 
The Utub and the Sultan’s forces held Ufaysan hostage to ensure the release of the Al 
Khalifah from Diriyah who were released on the optimistic understanding that they still 
acquiesced to Wahhabi overlordship. Additionally, Khor Hassan, a sanctuary for Qawasim 
pirates, a “gathering place for all anti Al Khalifah forces,”172 and the lair of Rahman bin Jabir 
who was allied with the Wahhabis against the Utub and Muscat, was destroyed prompting 
him to flee to Dammam.173   
With the Al Khalifah restored once again to the throne under Muscati aegis and the 
withdrawal of troops back to Oman, the ruling Utub enjoyed reasonable independence, 
despite nominal overlordship by both the Wahhabis and Muscat.  
Following the set pattern, soon Muscat sought to re-exert more direct power over Bahrain. 
Rahman bin Jabir, always eager to side with an actor antagonistic to the Utub, joined in the 
Sultan’s attack on Bahrain in 1815-6, yet their combined forces were defeated. This meant 
that “from this period forward the Utubis [sic]...maintained their rule over the islands.”174 
Rahman’s fort at Dammam was destroyed by the Wahhabis for his desertion and he fled to 
Bushehr.175 By 1818, however, the first Wahhabi state was finished. The Ottomans from 
Egypt swept down sacking the Wahhabi capital (Diriyah) and extinguishing the Wahhabi 
threat to Qatar for nearly a century. 
This detailed examination of half a century of Qatar’s history continually highlights the 
constantly shifting nature of external alliances. To achieve their central goals the Al Khalifah 
and the Al Jalahimah, for example, quickly and frequently shifted alliances: an ally one day 
became the enemy the next and vice versa. As weaker actors in a region of larger, predatory 
powers, this was the only alternative open to them. Though the Al Thani were yet to emerge 
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in Qatar, this is the milieu in which they were brought-up, socialised, educated, and in which 
they lived. One of the few notes in Arabic or English on Muhammad Al Thani, one of the first 
mentioned Al Thani sheikhs, notes that he “was aware of the balance of power in the 
eastern part of the Arabian peninsula,” according to one Qatari scholar.176 This kind of 
alliance-swapping to which this is referring was not unique to Qatar but is a feature of the 
politics on the Peninsula. What is relatively unique to Qatar is the combination of the 
number of actors seeking influence on the Peninsula and the initial lack of any hegemonic 
figure in the Peninsula itself. As Palgrave evocatively noted, this meant that Qatar’s hadar 
towns were continually subject to harsh depredations of wanton, vicious and frequent bedu 
attack.177 Also this lack of authority meant that Qatar developed a well-earned reputation as 
a haven for exiles, pirates, and undesirables of all sorts.  
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The British and the Ottomans 
Prompted by rising piracy threatening commercial shipping interests and a desire to protect 
Britain’s Indian ‘frontiers,’ Britain increased its interaction in the Gulf as the 19th century 
progressed.178 In addition to suppressing what Britain considered to be piratical attacks in 
the early 19th century, the UK instituted a series of maritime truces, which were first 
formalised in 1853. At this stage Qatar was assumed to be under the control of the Al 
Khalifah in Bahrain.179 The first significant British interaction with Qatar occurred in 1821 
when the East Indian Company’s brig Vestal destroyed Al Bida (the nominal Qatari capital) 
for harbouring piratical elements.180 When Lieutenant Macleod visited Al Bida in 1823 he 
discovered that those there knew “very little of the conditions of the treaty” though he still 
considered Qatar to be “entirely a subject of Bahrein [sic].”181  
Despite Macleod explaining the treaty to those in Al Bida and reminding the Al Khalifah of 
their duties, absconding elements, fugitives, and pirates continued to reside in Qatari towns. 
Disaffected Sheikhs from Abu Dhabi,182 the deposed Abu Dhabi leader Muhammad bin 
Shakhbut,183 the notorious outlaw Jassem bin Jabr Raqraqi, numerous pirates,184 and 
countless manoeuvring Sheikhs from Bahrain185 all sought protection or at least boarding at 
towns in Qatar.186 Eventually, despite sporadic attempts by individual Sheikhs to curb such 
characters, Qatar’s continued renegade reputation led to the British bombardment of Al 
Bida in 1841.187 Clearly, there was no kind of meaningful overarching authority in Qatar; not 
only could the British not find such an authority with whom to discuss the situation but had 
there been one it would seem logical that they would have used their control to avoid 
incurring the wrath of the powerful British. Similarly, the apparent abrogation of practical 
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responsibility by Bahraini leaders suggests that they too had, in effect, little control over 
Qatar.   
The first time that an Al Thani is mentioned in British records is on 27 March 1841 when 
Muhammad Bin Thani is requested not to host absconding or criminal elements in his town 
of Fuwairit.188 At this time the Al Thani were nominally the ruling Sheikhs over parts of 
eastern and northern Qatar who collected tribute from local Sheikhs and passed it to the Al 
Khalifah.189 However, as per the norm in the region, Al Thani leaders were perpetually 
struggling for increasing independence of action and playing one ruler off against the other. 
In this case, Muhammad Bin Thani sought protection from Amir Faisal of Najd against the Al 
Khalifah. In reaction to these moves, Muhammad Bin Khalifah of Bahrain and Sheikh Zayed 
Bin Khalifah of Abu Dhabi launched an attack on Al Bida and Al Wakra in 1867, breaking 
their covenant with the British not to undertake such attacks.190 
The British political resident, Colonel Pelly, reacted strongly to this violation of British 
Treaties. He removed Muhammad bin Khalifah from power in Bahrain for undertaking the 
attack and demanded reparations for the victims. On 13 September 1868 Pelly formally 
signed a treaty with Muhammad Bin Thani as the leader of “all residing in the province of 
Qatar” but still under Al Khalifah rule.191 A complex series of tribute payments was then 
arranged. Essentially, the Al Thani would collect local tribute and pay the Al Naim tribe in 
Qatar (who were loyal to the Al Khalifah) not to attack Al Bida from the west in addition to 
paying the Al Khalifah who would in turn pay the Wahhabis not to attack from the south.192  
This arrangement lasted barely two years and examples of perennial hadar-bedu conflict 
and of the desire to forever jockey for greater autonomy far too numerous to mention here 
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continued unabated.193 Even the arrival of the Ottomans, a land-based power, did little to 
interrupt this immutable fact of life on the Qatari Peninsula.  
The Ottomans had two eras of interaction with the Arabian Peninsula. The first was 
prompted largely by Portuguese expansion and began in 1517 with the taking of Mecca and 
Medina.194 By 1538 they reached Aden and by 1550 exercised power over Hasa, Saudi 
Arabia’s eastern province. Technically, Qatar was under Ottoman jurisdiction at this time, 
though there is no evidence of any actual interaction or control being exerted.195  
By the mid-seventeenth century the Ottomans were becoming ever more marginalised as 
pressure on other flanks of their Empire forced them to remove troops from the region. 
Yemen and Hasa were lost though the maintenance of fortifications along the Syria-Hajj 
route maintained vestigial notions of “an active policy of retaining...[a] hold on territory.”196  
The second era of Ottoman interaction began in the 1870s, precipitated by fear of the 
expanding British role in the region.197 In 1871 the Ottomans expanded control from the 
Hijaz to Asir, north of Sana’a, and the Vali of Baghdad sent an expedition south occupying 
Hasa. The Ottomans decided to bring Qatar under their control as in addition to Qatar again 
being used as a safe-haven for trouble-makers (on this occasion the Wahhabi leader), 
“hordes of Bedouins” were harassing the Ottoman troops stationed in adjoining Hasa.198  
A deputation was sent to Qatar in 1871. Qasim bin Muhammad Al Thani (hereafter known 
as Jassim199), had taken over from his father Mohammed who had retired, accepted four 
Turkish flags as a sign of loyalty to the Porte in July 1871. One flew above his house, 
Muhammad Bin Thani (grudgingly) flew another and the last two went to the furthest 
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reaches of their power, to Khor Al Shaqiq in the north and Khor Al Udeid in the south. The 
acceptance of Ottoman suzerainty was primarily a way for the Al Thani to sever their tribute 
relationship with the Al Khalifah in Bahrain and to loosen Britain’s control of their maritime 
matters.200 
Additionally, at the request of Jassim and Muhammad Bin Thani, in January 1872 100 
Ottoman troops and a field gun were dispatched to Al Bida to defend against Wahhabi 
forces that without being paid a tribute were liberated to raid Qatar once more.201  Some of 
these troops were replaced by just fifty gendarmes after only two years, perhaps because 
Qatar was too impoverished to pay for their upkeep.202 By 1875, only four years after the 
Ottomans arrived, the Assistant British Resident in the region, Lieutenant Fraser, noted that 
the Al Thanis were already chafing under the Ottomans, but too afraid of deportation to 
Constantinople to voice their concerns.203   
Aware of these feelings through their administrative staff in Doha, the Ottomans made 
Jassim Kaymakam (governor) of Qatar in 1879. This honorary title conferred status and 
enhanced his position in Qatar but also fostered problems. Some tribes denounced him and 
left Doha to start other settlements nearby, while sporadically harassing or attacking Doha. 
While there had never been any kind of peace in Qatar, for tribes were always skirmishing 
and there were perpetual conflicts with Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, the pace of altercations 
increased in the 1880s with raids, counter-raids, and piratical attacks.204 The British sought 
to cajole Jassim to take a firmer line with piracy in his waters to which he replied that he 
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only controlled Wakra and Doha and could not be held responsible for other towns in 
Qatar.205 A convenient excuse, for sure, but with an element of truth to it.   
Subsequently, the Ottoman relationship with Jassim ebbed and flowed. While their goals 
occasionally coalesced such as with their desire to extend Jassim’s control over towns on 
the south east and the west of the Qatar Peninsula, relations soon soured particularly after 
the Ottomans refused to support Jassim to avenge the death of one of his sons who was 
killed in battle. 206  In protest, Jassim attempted to resign the title of Kaymakam and allowed 
– if not encouraged – Doha to fall into disrepair.207  
Indeed, Jassim was becoming increasingly difficult for the Ottomans. After receiving a 
number of substantiated complaints about his “abuses and oppression” in Qatar and his 
apparent encouragement of unrest in Doha and Hasa, in 1893 the Wali of Basra went to 
Doha to confront Jassim and to remind him of his duties as a subject of the Porte.208 On the 
arrival of the Vali with a support column of 900 troops and 100 cavalry, Jassim retreated to 
the desert three days journey from Al Bida fearing he would be deposed.209 He refused to 
return to Doha for talks, which were instead conducted through his brother Ahmed. In the 
meantime Jassim asked the British for protection, but was rebuffed. He even asked his 
recent enemy, the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, for some kind of protection, proving once again just 
how quickly alliances changed.210  
After a month of waiting, the Vali imprisoned Ahmed and a score of Doha’s leading nobles 
to punish Jassim and to scupper any ideas of a surprise attack on him and his troops.211 He 
sent Ottoman troops to Wajbah, the village where Jassim had retreated, but the troops 
were surprisingly defeated by Jassim’s forces. After retreating to Doha the Ottomans were 
surrounded in the keep and had their water supply cut off. Only after Jassim humiliated the 
Vali by forcing him to appeal for the safe return of his men and the cancellation of all 
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outstanding charges and debts were the troops allowed to leave the fort unharmed. Today, 
this is understood as a watershed event in Qatar’s history, cementing Jassim’s status as a 
great leader of Qataris.   
In the aftermath of the improbable defeat of the Ottomans at Wajbah in 1893, Britain saw a 
chance to intervene and advance their cause. Initially, British representatives tentatively 
sought the local Vali’s permission to act as an intermediary but were rebuffed. The British 
resident, always somewhat bolder than Whitehall, nevertheless went to see Jassim 
personally. Jassim asked for British protection to remain in Qatar, the right to abdicate from 
his role as leader and for his brother Ahmed to take over.212 Ahmed as the proposed new 
ruler even suggested they would be willing to pay off the Ottomans if they demanded 
reparations for leaving Qatar. The British took this suggestion to Istanbul but it was rejected.  
At the very end of the 19th century a crisis emerged between the two Empires which nearly 
ended in a direct confrontation and which precipitated a clear expansion of Al Thani 
territory to the west coast of the peninsula. In 1895 some agitating tribes from Bahrain – a 
British territory – along with Jassim decided to rebuild the destroyed town of Zubarah. The 
British reacted quickly and angrily to what they perceived to be a direct threat to Bahrain. 
Despite severe warnings to desist from building any such development, Jassim, with 
Ottoman support, ignored the British even saying, “if I do not get from you the assistance 
and cooperation...I shall leave Katr [sic] to its owners [the Ottomans] and save myself the 
troubles [from preserving security].”213 Clearly, this is a stark example of Jassim trying to 
manipulate overtly the British into supporting him.   
A small settlement was built, manned by six Ottoman soldiers with their flag fluttering 
overhead; the Ottoman goals being momentarily aligned with Jassim’s. The British 
despatched their nearest gunboat to the area to demand that it be destroyed. After some 
retaliatory confiscating of boats by the British and Ottomans, when the British commander 
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feared that an invasion of Bahrain was imminent, he destroyed all boats in the harbour. 
Despite fierce threats to retaliate, the Ottoman and native forces in Zubarah did nothing.214  
One result of this conflagration was that the British restated their demand that forces of the 
Al Khalifah must desist from interfering with Zubarah: “an implicit recognition of the rights 
of the Al Thani in Zubarah.”215 Also, Jassim was able to convince members of the Al Naim 
tribe in that area to switch their allegiance from the Al Khalifah to him, further 
strengthening the Qatari claim to Zubarah.216 Lastly, angry at the Ottomans for their inaction 
in Zubarah, for a third time Jassim sought and failed to receive British protection against the 
Ottomans. These incidents prompted the Ottomans to reinforce their fort in Doha, to send 
another gunboat to local waters, and provoked the British to appoint a permanent political 
resident to Bahrain. Nevertheless, by this time, specifically after their humiliation in 1893, 
Ottoman rule was clearly in its decline. The murder of an Ottoman official in 1894 and 
rioting killing several more in 1898 demonstrably signalled a severe lack of respect for the 
Porte.217  
Around this time a battle was emerging to the west. The Al Rashid house, which was trying 
to resurrect something approximating the defunct Wahhabi state, clashed against Wahhabi 
descendants. In 1897 Abdulrahman, the latest pretender, fled from the Wahhabi capital in 
Riyadh to Kuwait with his son Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdulrahman Al Saud. This son – Ibn Saud – as 
he would be known recaptured Riyadh by 1902 and began to regain former Wahhabi 
territory. These moves heaped further pressures on the Ottomans across Hasa. Though the 
Ottomans sought to reinforce their numbers by sending representatives to Wakra, Zubarah, 
and Udaid in 1902 and 1903, though one did arrive, the British persuaded Istanbul to 
withdraw them: again, this seems like a token gesture by the Ottomans with little 
conviction.218 Istanbul continued to attempt to install governors to towns in Qatar to solidify 
and extend their control. However, these attempts were notable, as Anscombe notes, for 
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their “total lack of effect.”219 The British Secretary of State summed up the Ottoman position 
in Qatar when he noted in a secret communication that: 
although they [the Ottomans] maintain a garrison at Bida, [they] appear to have practically no hold on 
the country. So long as they do not move beyond the limits of the town, the nominal suzerainty of the 
Porte is recognised; but any attempt to extend Turkish authority is resisted.
220
 
When in 1902 the Wahhabis consolidated their rule for the third and final time, Jassim 
welcomed this development, even embracing their stricter religious stance “by conviction” 
and sending them tribute.221 After victory over Ibn Rashid in Riyadh, Ibn Saud immediately 
contacted the Ottomans to assure them that he only wished to regain his heritage lands and 
his desire was not to then begin attacking Ottoman positions.222 He felt that the Saudi 
position still fighting the Rashidis was tenuous and feared an Ottoman attack which had, 
after all, ended his ancestors’ kingdoms. Moreover, Ibn Saud sought British help against the 
Ottomans and Goldberg notes eleven such overtures to the UK in twelve years.223 
The British, not wanting to involve themselves in inner Arabia, ignored many such overtures. 
Ibn Saud therefore became bolder. In 1905, while visiting Qatar on a tour to “explore the 
country belonging to my [sic] father and grandfather” he affected a resolution of a dispute 
between Jassim and tribes residing within Qatar; the Al Murrah, the Bani Hajir, and the 
Ajman.224 As Goldberg notes, in doing so he clearly assumed “the role of a 
sovereign...[treating] them as his subjects.”225 Ibn Saud also addressed a letter to the Trucial 
chiefs “announcing his visit to Qatar and expressing his intention of visiting the sheikhs’ 
territories in the spring of 1906 “to look into certain affairs.”226 Clearly, Ibn Saud was 
tentatively seeking to assert his authority over the coastal Sheikhdoms and waiting to see 
what the British reaction would be.  
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The British were perturbed by these events. After some deliberation and consultation, via 
Mubarak the Great in Kuwait, they sent a stern message to Ibn Saud warning him not to 
interfere in the coastal Sheikhdoms. Neither wanting a war with the British nor losing them 
as an Ottoman ‘counter-balance,’ Ibn Saud backed-down.227  
At this stage, regarding Qatar, the British Government was still unwilling to offer Jassim 
protection even though Jassim was seeking assurances given the growing Saudi pressure. 
Though discussions took place, the Foreign Office still refused to offer protection for fear of 
irritating the Ottoman status quo.  
As the first decade of the twentieth century progressed, the inevitable Saudi-Ottoman clash 
began to increasingly go in favour of the former. By 1907 Ibn Saud managed to evict 
Ottoman forces from Nejd. By 1913 he occupied Hasa in the hope that this would finally 
induce enough interest from the British to come to some workable agreement for 
coexistence. Even though the Government in Bombay and local residents pressed London to 
deal with Ibn Saud, with the Political Resident musing that “I have not a doubt that Bin Saud 
could eat up Qatar in a week and I am rather afraid that he may do so,”228 the cautious and 
conservative “brick wall” of the Foreign Office refused.229 Therefore, in July 1913 Ibn Saud 
sought to further apprise the British of the new realities in Eastern Arabia when he 
demanded that Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani, who took over following the death of his 
father, evict the Turkish garrison in Bida if he were to retain his ‘friendship.’230  
Concurrently in 1913 the Ottoman Grand Vazir, Hakki Pasha, had been in London finalising 
negotiations for the Ottoman withdrawn from Arabia. On 29 July 1913 the Anglo-Ottoman 
Convention was signed - though never ratified - which allowed for the withdrawal of 
Ottoman troops from Qatar. A brief attempt by Bahrain to reinstitute a tribute from the 
Qatari Sheikhs was quickly put down under Article 10 of the treaty.  
Now with more room to manoeuvre, Britain instituted friendlier relations with Ibn Saud, not 
least because the Foreign Office was belatedly aware of his latent potential. After difficult 
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negotiations during which Ibn Saud tried to coerce if not outright threaten the British into 
supporting him against the Ottomans, he finally agreed to:  
Refrain from all aggression on, or interference with the territories of Kuwait, Bahrain, and of the 
Sheikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast, who are under the protection of the British Government, and 
who have treaty relations with the said Government.
231
 
A new era was dawning for Qatar. Gone were the Ottomans and the controlling hand of the 
Al Khalifah. Now the resurgent Wahhabis and the British were the two actors of prime 
importance once again as the Al Thani continued their perennial search for suitable 
suzerains to offer security guarantees without overly onerous attached conditions.  
The beginning of the Great War ended negotiations with the Ottomans and allowed the 
Foreign Office to make an offer of a protection treaty to Qatar. The flight of the Turkish 
garrison from Al Bida by 19 August 1915 removed any lingering difficulties and the half-
century Ottoman occupation was over.  
After negotiations Qatar was enveloped into the web of British Protectorate Treaties on 03 
November 1916, joining the Trucial States. It is interesting to note, however, that several 
articles (VII, VIII & IX) were omitted from the Treaty that Abdullah Bin Jassim signed 
including one regarding the ruler’s necessity of protecting British citizens in his charge as he 
felt that he did not have sufficient control of Qatar to make such guarantees.232  
No delineation of Qatar’s territory was included at this stage, as the pro-Bahrain historian 
Jawad Al Arayed demonstrates.233 He notes that up until 1934, the Qatari leader assumed 
that the Treaty only covered control of the coastal areas of Qatar, clearly insinuating that he 
had little (if any) control of the interior: a reasonable conclusion.234 Additionally, Al Arayed 
quotes numerous British officials showing exceedingly little confidence in the Sheikh’s ability 
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to exert control outwith Doha-Bida or even in the likelihood of Qatar surviving at all, such 
was the threat they feared from the proto-Saudi Arabia. 
I [the British Political Resident] think it would be a pity if Qatar disappeared as a separate entity; from 
our point of view it is convenient to have the rulers of the coastal districts on the coast, but I do not 
see any practical means of preventing peaceful penetration of the country by…Bin Saud’s 
adherents.
235
 
The Qatari-British 1916 agreement, therefore, nominally went further than others. Thanks 
in part to Abdullah Bin Jassim’s laborious negotiations he was offered ‘good offices’ should 
be he attacked. However, there were subsequent disagreements as to what this meant. This 
apparent ‘extra’ offered by London along with Abdullah Bin Jassim being accorded the title 
CIE in 1919 and being the only Trucial State Sheikh to receive a seven gun salute, led 
Rahman to deduce Abdullah Bin Jassim was “the most important ruler in the region...after 
the First World War.”236 This, however, is clearly not the case.  
Qatar at this stage still had no intrinsic worth to the British, aside from that fact that if it was 
nominally under the control of the British it was not under the sway of someone else. 
Indeed, it is questionable whether Abdullah Bin Jassim could even marshal support along his 
coastline to prevent piracy: the fundamental reason as to why the British involved 
themselves with the local proto-states in the region in the first place.  
As Abdullah Bin Jassim was to discover when he sought clarification, not only were the 
British concessions relatively minor, but their guarantees were in fact disingenuous. The 
notion of the British offering ‘good offices’ transpired to mean relatively little, as an India 
Office Memorandum made clear: “[the pledge on offices]...did not...in practice impose any 
very serious liability on His Majesty’s Government.”237 This lack of substantive support in the 
event of an attack was made clear in 1921 with a discussion with the Political Resident.238 
Nor would the British intervene were an Al Thani challenger to usurp Abdullah Bin Jassim, 
something that was looking increasingly likely. Indeed, not only was Ibn Saud “courting” 
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disaffected Al Thanis but various coastal villages were reneging on paying tribute to 
Abdullah Bin Jassim at the behest, and the Political Resident believed, of Ibn Saud.239 
To these pleas for support in the face of serious pressures, the British would not supply 
Abdullah Bin Jassim with guns; permit him to attack recalcitrant coastal villages; guarantee 
that his son alone would be recognised as his successor or promise any sea-borne 
protection: hardly the way to treat their ‘most valuable ally in the Middle East.’ The weak 
state of Abdullah Bin Jassim and the lack of any meaningful British protection meant that he 
paid a tribute of some Rs.100,000 (approximated $30,000) per year to Ibn Saud to stay his 
hand.240 Even then Ibn Saud reputedly only accepted that the towns belonged to Qatar; the 
desert belonged to him.241 
When Britain asked for the Royal Air Force (RAF) to open an emergency landing-strip in 
Qatar, a chased and obstreperous Abdullah Bin Jassim demanded meaningful protection 
assurances in return. When a tentative agreement was reached, he pulled out at the last 
minute citing that as the agreement was not signed by the Viceroy of India, he would not 
agree. As Zahlan notes, clearly he was wary of signing an ineffectual agreement, just as he 
had done in 1916.242 It is as this point when, as mentioned earlier, the British Political 
Resident noted that it would be “a shame” were Qatar to cease to exist. This accurately 
sums up the official attitude towards Qatar: CIE and seven-gun salutes notwithstanding – 
nice baubles to impress a local Sheikh – it just was not that important. There were no 
strategically important bases, towns, commodities, markets, or people present.  
This calculus was to change in the 1930s with the dawning of the age of oil on the Gulf’s 
Western shores, some thirty years behind the first Middle East oil concession granted by the 
Persian Government to William Knox D’Arcy in 1901.243  
In Persia it took another seven years and an injection of funds from the Burmah Oil 
Company for commercial quantities of oil to be found. This resulted in, as Longrigg 
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somewhat bombastically puts it, “one of the most significant events in all Persian history.”244 
This find led directly to the founding of the Anglo-Persian Oil (APOC) in 1909. Under the 
auspices of a range of companies, concessions followed in Iraq (1925, 1932 & 1938), Saudi 
Arabia (1933), Kuwait (1934), Bahrain (1934), and Qatar (1935).245 The Qatar agreement was 
many years in the making. 
In 1930 a representative of APOC acting on behalf of Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) arrived 
in Doha and secured rights for a geological examination of Qatar.246 Now, however, Abdullah 
Bin Jassim was more aware of the position he was in after hearing about agreements 
between Ibn Saud and American oil company Californian Standard Oil Company (SOCAL) 
which offered better financial terms. This newfound confidence and his continuing mistrust 
of the British – or the fact that he was “senile and suspicious” according to Longrigg – led to 
long-winded negotiations.247 
By May 1935 a new 75-year agreement was finally signed giving exploration rights to ‘all’ of 
Qatar even though its borders were not set. Abdullah Bin Jassim secured from APOC/IPC 
Rs.400,000 for his signature then Rs.150,000 every year rising to Rs.300,000 after five years 
plus royalties.248 Indeed, he was described as a ‘Pearl King’ and “one of the richest Sheikhs in 
the world” by the Daily Express, commenting on his visit to London for the Silver Jubilee.249 
From the British Government he procured explicit agreements of protection from the RAF, 
extra weapons, an armoured car, and acknowledgement of his son as the legitimate heir.  
Due to Qatar’s profound state of underdevelopment, it was some time before drilling could 
begin with the first well being spudded in October 1938. Oil was found at the very end of 
1939 and the first well completed in 1940. A second well 10 miles south found oil soon after 
but the Second World War precluded any exports as the wells were cemented up and 
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equipment was moved to Bombay and Basra for fear that “enemy war activity might 
envelop the Persian Gulf.”250 
With the lack of oil exports, the decimation of Qatar’s traditional pearling industry in the 
1920s and 1930s, food shortages causes by Japan overrunning fertile, rice producing areas 
in South East Asia and warfare spreading to sea routes sinking food-carrying ships, Qatar 
struggled severely. Indeed, some estimates suggest that up to a third of the population 
emigrated from 1939-1945 leaving only 10,000 on the Peninsula.251   
After the war painstaking rehabilitation was needed. Again, all equipment (100,000 tonnes 
of it) and expertise and most of the surrounding infrastructure had to be imported before 
exports could begin.252 This nascent industry was almost the only meaningful employer in 
Qatar such that “almost everyone who had any significant income at all in the later 1940s 
drew it from the oil company; for five days of the week the entire life of Doha seemed to 
drain away to Dukhan, the oil-company town on the other side of the peninsula.”253 Oil did 
not flow until late 1947 from the newly named Dukhan Field and was not exported until the 
end of 1949 aboard the President Meny after the construction of a cross-Qatar pipeline to 
Doha and a sea-loading terminal.254 Further exploration of Qatar ensued. At this early stage 
Qatar’s oil reserves were estimated to be some 1.5 billion barrels of oil.255  
It is important to note that the Qatari Peninsula was encroached upon “at least once” by 
ARAMCO geologists under Saudi guard to test for oil.256 By the 1930s Ibn Saud’s power was 
consolidated and he was the assured King of a country the size of Western Europe. Just at it 
had done regularly throughout its history, Saudi Arabia, as it was known, towered over 
Qatar and strove to dictate events on the Peninsula.  
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Ibn Saud used close relations with the Al Murrah tribe some of whom lived in central Qatar 
yet from whom he still received a tribute as one way of interfering with Abdullah Bin 
Jassim’s rule to the extent that Ibn Saud saw “Al Murrah country as necessarily his” as the 
Political Resident noted.257 Abdullah Bin Jassim also feared “more subtle methods” of Ibn 
Saud’s influence such as inciting numerous small rebellions in villages whereby they would 
refuse to pay tribute or ignore his summons. 
The British, despite being preeminent in their Gulf Lake continued their pessimistic take on 
Qatar and Ibn Saud with one Resident noting that “We [the British] hold the front door to 
these principalities...but we do not hold the back door.”258 In short, Abdullah Bin Jassim’s 
continued rule and control in Qatar was largely due to his on-going tribute payment and Ibn 
Saud’s acquiescence and fear of potential British reprisals were he to act aggressively 
against Qatar.  
As Qatar and Saudi Arabia were represented by different oil companies, tensions to draw 
their boundaries necessarily increased. This was a novel problem. Oil concessions marked 
the first time in the region’s history that specifically demarcated ‘Westphalian’ borders had 
to be agreed upon. Previously one’s territory was simply as far as one could extract tribute 
from roaming or settled tribes: it moved.259 Though physical features such as oases or rivers 
were nominally used as defining features, the notion of borders; fixed, somewhat arbitrary 
imaginary lines on a putative map are simply not traditionally found in the Arabian lexicon. 
Before this scramble for borders ensued, Sir Olaf Caroe predicted the key future zero-sum 
problem:  
This uncertainty of frontiers will lead to trouble should oil be found in Trucial limits of east Qatar. 
There will be a scramble to assert and establish rights over land which may be disputed between two 
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or more Sheikhs or tribes...[which] may have been worthless up to that point. The worst instincts of 
the tribesmen may then have full play.
 260
 
When it came to delineating the borders between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud was 
predictably vehement. He refused the first British overture suggesting the adoption of what 
became known as the 1913 blue line. The Saudi Foreign Minister Fuad Hamza counter 
proposed a Red (or Fuad) line incorporating more of what today is Qatar and the UAE, but 
this was rejected out outright. The British Minister in Jeddah, Sir Andrew Ryan, proposed 
the Green line. This was rejected by Saudi Arabia. At a 1935 conference on the topic a 
revised Ryan line was proposed which offered concessions to Ibn Saud. Despite interim 
agreements, no delineation was made until much later in 1965.  
Though these issues were tense, they did not result in open war, as they did in the case of 
the Bahraini border. Specifically, the town of Zubarah and the Hawar Islands were fought 
over repeatedly. In 1937 Abdullah Bin Jassim sent a force of nearly 4000 men to crush a 
burgeoning rebellion among the Naim tribe of the area who still had a nominal loyalty 
towards the Al Khalifah. On their defeat, when the leader of the Naim swore fealty to 
Abdullah Bin Jassim, Hamad Al Khalifah declared a devastating economic embargo on Qatar. 
“War declared between two Arabian states” was the title of the Al Nida newspaper in Beirut 
on 23 July 1937.261  
Abdullah Bin Jassim promptly built a new fort at Zubarah, much to the annoyance of the Al 
Khalifah.262 The notion of a ‘neutral zone’ for all to save face was then explored, but rejected 
by Abdullah Bin Jassim.263 Proposals and counterproposals interspersed with see-sawing 
tensions continued throughout the 1940s until relations were reduced to a sporadically 
flaring but simmering mutual-dislike for much of the rest of the century. The issue of 
Zubarah and the Hawar Islands was only decided in 2001 thanks to the International 
Criminal Court adjudication.  
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The Bahraini blockade of Qatar along with the crash of the pearl-market and Qatar’s 
intrinsic lack of industry, laid waste to the small proto-state’s economy prompting the 
aforementioned exodus. Only with the beginnings of oil rent in the late 1940s did Qatar’s 
fortunes revive and even then it was decades before ordinary Qataris saw any real benefit. 
Hamad bin Abdullah Al Thani was appointed Crown Prince in 1935 and ruled with his father 
until his (Hamad’s) death in May 1948 whereupon Abdullah Bin Jassim resumed the full 
duties of Sheikh.264 Yet he remained in power only one more year. Not only was he 
something of an irascible old man, but he had entrenched favourites, which angered people 
in his family. Couple this with the increasing royalties flowing to the Sheikh, the lack of its 
distribution all the while other Qataris were putting up with “several hundred fold increases 
in the price of basic commodities,” and there was serious discontent.265  
Abdullah bin Jassim’s first off-shore royalty payment in July 1949 acted as a catalyst for 
trouble. The next month various Al Thanis petitioned Abdullah Bin Jassim (again) for a 
greater share in the oil income. They were (again) rebuffed. This time, however, knowing 
that he was still weak politically, in addition to robbing Indians and Pakistanis in Doha and 
instigating a “small shooting war”266 his family threatened to “cause a riot in the bazaar”267 
unless their demands were met. Abdullah Bin Jassim, under British guidance, acquiesced 
and gave a monthly stipend of Rs.110 to young members of the Al Thani family, Rs.500 to 
unmarried and Rs.1000 to married Al Thanis, which continues to this day.268  
Nevertheless the relationship between Abdullah Bin Jassim and his extended family had 
broken down almost completely after decades of acrimony leading him to seek British help 
in guaranteeing his safety and to allow him to abdicate. The British agreed but demanded 
that all clauses in the 1916 Qatar-Britain agreement be implemented (for example, station a 
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Resident in Doha, ban slavery, which was still prevalent in Doha).269 Abdullah agreed. “Thus” 
concludes Sanger, “bringing to an end the first revolution in the Arabian Peninsula to be 
caused by oil.”270 Yet one must not over emphasize Abdullah Bin Jassim’s fall from grace as 
he continued to be actively involved for years to come in seemingly every decision of 
importance in conjunction with Ali Bin Abdullah Al Thani, his son who succeeded him on 20 
August 1949.271 
Initially, there were two options for the next Sheikh. Hamad’s son Khalifah Bin Hamad Al 
Thani was 18 years old and thought too young to assume leadership, especially at such a 
fractious time. This left Abdullah Bin Jassim’s second son Ali Bin Abdullah – described by the 
Political Agent in Bahrain as a “half-wit”272 – who was not thought to have the necessary 
skills. Still, with not much option, Ali Bin Abdullah was agreed to be the new Sheikh. 
However, under duress from Hamad Bin Abdullah’s side of the family, Ali Bin Abdullah 
signed a document agreed upon by notables promising to install Khalifah Bin Hamad as his 
Crown Prince.273 This bringing of the extended family into the politics of agreeing upon the 
new Crown Prince further strengthened their hand when it came to demanding a greater 
share in profits.    
The British, well aware of the antagonistic history of intra-Al Thani machinations, presided 
over Abdullah Bin Jassim’s abdication ceremony – the first public ceremony in Qatar’s 
history – involving a gun salute and a warship.274 It was designed specifically to instil some 
kind of formal British authority in Ali Bin Abdullah and to act as an implicit threat to those 
that might seek to overthrow him. Britain also began to discuss the logistics of sending a 
small detachment of the Arab legion and a permanent Political Resident in Doha as ways to 
prop-up Ali Bin Abdullah against the machinations of Al Thani discontent.275  
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Though the British acquiesced to the decision, the Political Resident prophetically 
recognised that naming Khalifah Bin Hamad as the Heir Apparent would sow problems for 
the future given that Ali Bin Abdullah had at least ten sons himself.276 Duly, when the time 
came for Ali Bin Abdullah to step down he was replaced with one of his sons and not 
Khalifah Bin Hamad.   
When Ali Bin Abdullah took over he was immediately beset with problems as his father had 
“thoroughly sacked the treasury...[and taken] the 700,000rs advance from Superior Oil…the 
palace cars, furniture, and anything else he could move.”277 Clearly, there was no separation 
in Abdullah Bin Jassim’s mind between his and the state’s property. This issue would crop up 
again and again over the next half a century.  
However, the agreement to implement all the 1916 Trucial agreements meant that Britain 
intervened and began to instil something of a modern professional bureaucracy. Hay, the 
Political Resident, noted that “before 1949 there was, practically speaking, no 
administration and Sheikh Abdullah’s rule was entirely patriarchal.”278 The new British 
officers assigned to Qatar - Wilton the Political Officer, Cochran the Security advisor, and 
Plant an advisor – thus began to establish rudimentary institutions and processes.  
The British struggled at every turn to implement reforms. Aside from various Al Thani 
groups continually trying to extort and cajole money out of Ali Bin Abdullah, the Darwish 
brothers, the most prominent merchants in Doha, who were very close to Abdullah Bin 
Jassim, “harped continually on the idea of the Sheikh [Ali] setting up a proper office in which 
business could be transacted systematically.”279 The Darwishs and Abdullah Bin Jassim 
sought to fill this office with Syrians and Lebanese, who would, it is clearly intimated, act for 
them and divert somehow a good proportion of profits to them away from the State. 
Yet soon Ali Bin Abdullah fell under the spell of the Darwish too, if only because he needed 
to loan money off the increasingly wealthy and influential family. A report in December 
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1949 eloquently sums up Abdullah Darwish and the extent of his control over the hapless Ali 
Bin Abdullah. 
Once again I found it difficult not to be impressed with the great energy and multifarious activities of 
this man. His name features in the reply to almost any question concerning Qatar. He seems to have 
control of nearly all the necessities and of all the luxuries of life in Doha – food, water, transport, and 
building are practically his monopolies. His influence over Sheikh Ali seems to be supreme and to have 
been acquired by making gifts which one would think would be more likely to impress a stupid 
woman rather than an apparently mature man – cheap pictures carpets, garish furniture and the 
like...His acquisitions of land and property in Doha and building thereon seem to be increasing and his 
control over the Customs to be absolute.
280
 
By now, the Darwish family were arousing significant anger in various chastened and jealous 
Al Thani factions (notably in the Bani Ahmad) who felt that they deserved a greater share of 
profits.281 The success of the Darwish family was founded on close ties to the British (for 
contracts), but this proved to be their undoing with the anti-British, pan-Arab sentiment 
from 1956 onwards.  Labour disputes expanded out of control and Ahmad Bin Ali Al Thani, 
Ali Bin Abdullah’s son looking to make a name for himself against his rival for power Khalifah 
Bin Hamad, nominally supported the popular move against the family. These disputes which 
sometimes became mini-riots pitted Qatari workers against the mostly foreign policy force, 
putting the ruler in a difficult position.282 
A key faction was the Bani Ahmed, their patron being the brother of Jassim, Qatar’s revered 
leader. As Crystal notes, Ali Bin Abdullah stood against this powerful family section with only 
the Darwish and his son, Ahmad Bin Ali for support. In 1952 with a new set of agreements 
with oil companies, the family banded together to demand a quarter of the state’s 
revenues. After acrimonious bickering, Ali Bin Abdullah acquiesced. Yet still the demands 
and truculence increased. It was around this time that Ali Bin Abdullah petitioned the 
Political Resident to be allowed to banish particularly recalcitrant Qataris to Aden instead of 
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to Saudi Arabia where “they are given a good time by the Saudis and are very soon allowed 
back as a result of Saudi intervention.”283 
In 1956 when the family demanded a 150 per cent increase in allowances, Ali Bin Abdullah 
had had enough and joined his father in seclusion. The Political Agency in Doha opined that 
this was primarily because of “the absence of Abdullah Darwish on whom he used to rely so 
much.”284 Ahmed took over the day-to-day matters.   
Towards the late 1950s the methods of distribution began to change. In part to try to 
regularise such efforts and part to quell issues, particularly troublesome or important 
members of the family were employed by the State. Ministries or other sections were hived 
off and given over to Al Thanis for their forbearance. For example, Nasir Khalid of the Bani 
Ahmad section of the family became the new municipality Minister to assuage his family’s 
demands. Although this satisfied (temporarily) the Bani Ahmed, in the small and delicately 
balanced world of Doha’s politics, this prompted another faction – Ali Bin Abdullah’s brother 
Hasan and his supporters, for example – to object. So while such a policy could work 
intermittently, given the sheer number of Al Thanis –the largest Royal family in the region as 
a percentage of the population – this policy could only go so far.  
Qatar’s continually increasing oil revenues facilitated allowances for the family to be 
increased, temporarily placating them. Yet, as the Political Resident in Doha noted, “such a 
regime of feudal patronage and intrigue cannot be expected to survive. Sooner or later it is 
bound to crash and the state of affairs in Qatar today is such that a relatively minor incident 
could precipitate the process.”285 This sentiment was behind British backed efforts to 
introduce some kind of constitutional reform in Qatar, or at the very least to form more 
Ministries to broaden the government to apportion “some responsibility to those natural 
leaders who have at present no outlet for their energies except the purely destructive 
occupation of fomenting disorder.”286 
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Another method used for control was the distribution of land. Nasir Khalid, therefore, as 
Municipalities Minister had enormous power as distributing land in such a fast-developing 
country was as good (if not better with appreciation) as handing out cash. Al Thanis also 
began to simply mark out land with stones which they then claimed as their own. Though he 
initially disagreed, Ali Bin Abdullah, who retained vestiges of power, – again – soon caved to 
this method. Land prices rose so much that by the 1970s a new suburb grew up – West Bay 
– which was wholly built on reclaimed land from the sea as this was cheaper than buying 
existing land.  
Qatar’s international affairs were typically concerned with its immediate region, though 
there were increasing foreign visits from the mid-1950s onwards. For example, Colonel 
Anwar Sadat of Egypt visited Doha twice in 1955 as did King Saud of Saudi Arabia.287 
Interestingly, though no desire to get rid of the British protective agreements could be 
discerned, the Resident noted that Qatar’s foreign policies often “closely reflected the 
reaction in Saudi Arabia.”288 The next year saw a rash of pro-Egyptian demonstrations in 
Qatar where the protestors, angry at the UK’s intervention against Egypt in Suez, threw 
stones at the Political Residency. There was also a “partial strike in sympathy with the 
Algerians, the sabotage of oil installations…and a general increase in the strength of 
Egyptian propaganda and of its local agents.”289 
Ali Bin Abdullah spent nearly six months of 1958 out of the country, visiting Saudi Arabia, 
Persia, Egypt, Iran, the UK, and Switzerland leaving Qatar to be ruled in an uneasy coalition 
of Khalifah Bin Hamad and Ahmed Bin Ali.290 Further exacerbating intra-Qatari issues was the 
context of assorted ‘outside influences,’ specifically from the United Arab Republic (UAR), in 
which the two rivals jockeying for position over succession acted as “a cancer on the body 
politic, impinging on virtually every aspect of Qatar’s social and economic life.”291  
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In 1958 and 1959 oil companies unilaterally announced a price cut.292 This reduced Qatar’s 
revenues from QDR287 million in 1958 to QDR253 million in 1959 which only recovered 
slightly in 1960 to QDR260 million, hastening the formation of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) group.293 Domestically, protests at the cut in 
allowances from the family unsurprisingly erupted including an attempted assassination of 
the Sheikh in Lebanon.294 Long tired of family problems and increasingly ill, Ali Bin Abdullah 
abdicated in 1960.  
Khalifah Bin Hamad was in direct competition with Ahmad Bin Ali for leadership. Though it 
was already technically agreed that Khalifah Bin Hamad would take over, in reality Ali Bin 
Abdullah had devolved significant power and decision making capabilities to his son and 
even sought British guarantees that he could take over.295 With British backing and Khalifah 
Bin Hamad’s eventual acquiescence, Ahmed Bin Ali became the new Sheikh and visited the 
UK in July 1961 for an official state visit.296 
Ahmed Bin Ali chose not to face down the new demands from the Al Thani and divided up 
Qatar’s oil revenue 25 per cent for himself, 20 per cent for the Sheikhs, 2.5 per cent each for 
Ali Bin Abdullah and the Heir Apparent (Khalifah Bin Hamad) and the remaining half for the 
state’s coffers.297 It was around this time that Ali Bin Abdullah and his son Ahmed were 
reputed to own four hundred and fifty two cars between them.298 Even though Qatar 
“probably has [sic] the highest per capita income of any country in the world (over £20 
million for about 50,000 inhabitants)” a combination of “the extravagance of successive 
Rulers and their failure to curb the veracity of the Ruling family” and “the lack of any regular 
organisation of State finances or budgetary control” meant that ordinary Qatar’s were 
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unimpressed when development projects had to be cut back in order to grant the Al Thani 
their cut.299 
Ahmed Bin Ali’s profligacy and Al Thani greed reached such a level that not only did the he 
need to take out a loan of £1 million from the Ottoman Bank but in the face of repeated 
British requests for increased fiscal reasonability H.B. Walker of the Arabian Department 
wrote a note considering removing the U.K.’s protection from Qatar.300 To this, E.F. Given, 
his superior, replied that “I agree with H.B. Walker; if you allow the Al Thani to go on spitting 
in our eye for too long we shall become a laughing-stock in the Gulf and our influence will 
decline.”301 
As these ideas ruminated in Whitehall, key foreign policy decisions continued to be taken in 
protracted consultation with London. On the border issue of Halul Island with Abu Dhabi, 
Ahmed Bin Ali, for example, brought it up in conversation with the British Secretary of State 
and the Lord Privy Seal on his visit and reportedly stated that “he realised the matter was 
complicated, but the British had been in the Gulf a long time and know how to settle these 
problems better than any of the Rulers themselves.”302 Flattery this may well be, but there is 
a kernel of truth here: none of the smaller Gulf rulers could implement any policy without 
the acquiescence of the British, nor were they technically allowed to have foreign relations 
without London’s knowledge. At this time relations with Saudi Arabia were considered to be 
positive with the rulers exchanging visits, but still their border was not wholly settled.  
Even when Ahmed Bin Ali went on trips abroad, such as to Kuwait and Jordan, not only was 
there often a British presence throughout the meetings, but the visits themselves appear to 
have been ceremonial at best with little to no political ‘content’ whatsoever.303 While 
Ahmed Bin Ali did seek positive relations with London, he simultaneously needed to show 
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some kind of ‘distance’ too to avoid the worst of the Egyptian-inspired pan-Arab sentiment. 
For example, Qatar was not ready to support the outward manifestations of the British 
presence such as allowing RAF training exercises in Qatari territory.304 This exact sense of 
logic pervades Qatar’s foreign policy to this day. 
There are also examples of Ahmed Bin Ali following a well-established Qatari policy of 
hosting exiles. Specifically, two men wanted for questioning on terrorism charges after an 
explosion of a Shell petrol station in Matrah, Oman in March 1961 as well as the sinking of 
the British ship Dara. The Sheikh initially refused to arrest and extradite the two demanding 
suitable evidence. Not only did he not want to be seen as ‘anti-rebel’ in an age of 
revolutionary zeal but domestically, he did not want to appear less nationalistic than 
Khalifah.   
In April 1963 the union formed by Egypt, Syria, and Iraq prompted popular demonstrations 
and a strike. These events were amplified after an Al Thani shot into a crowd. Opposition 
quickly coalesced into a ‘National Unity Front’ which organised a general strike. Their 
demands were – as even the British noted – “not radical”: they sought, for example, to 
assure the place of Arabs and Qataris in society; equality for all before the law; settlement 
of Al Thani debts domestically and demanded that the Ruling family pay electricity and 
water rates.305 Within a few weeks and with vague promises of reforms, the strike fizzled 
out.306 Around 50 key Qataris behind this organisation were jailed and others exiled but 
some improvements were made. Ahmed Bin Ali modestly reduced his allowances 
(temporarily) and beseeched Al Thanis to respect the law and pay their debts. Also in 1964 
he introduced, as Crystal notes, some popular measures including subsidised or free homes 
and loans for poor Qataris as a ‘quick’ way to deflect criticism.  
In contrast to Ahmed Bin Ali, from early on Khalifah Bin Hamad appeared to understand the 
longer term importance of placating ordinary Qataris. During labour unrest in the 1950s he 
nominally acted as their champion. Similarly he put himself forward as a pan-Arabist, 
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though remaining privately cordial with the British. In 1957 he again aligned himself with 
Nasserists and became Education Minister replacing Jassim Darwish and allowed the 
Ministry to (further) become something of a bastion of Pan-Arabist sentiment. Also in this 
post he used this “sphere of activities...[to deal] with matters which really impinged on 
foreign affairs and certainly should have been dealt with by the Acting Ruler and not the 
Minister of Education.”307  
In 1962 Khalifah Bin Hamad was given a large portfolio by the Sheikh to perform (Deputy 
Ruler, Minister of Finance “responsible for the general conduct of economic, social, cultural, 
administrative and ‘other’ policy”308), further increasing his role and importance. Under his 
watch the number of schools increased significantly from only one in 1961 to sixty-seven in 
late 1962 and the “number of pupils enrolled at these schools is [sic] increasing annually by 
about 30 per cent.”309 
Like Ahmed Bin Ali, he sought to assert a certain distance from the British by abolishing the 
post of advisor and two assistant advisors, lessening British control and oversight.310 In 
addition to bolstering his notional ‘anti-Imperialist’ credentials, this also allowed him to 
extend his own interest further in Government. Yet he still sought British advice specifically 
to help curb the exorbitant allowances of members of his own family.311 So bad had the 
family’s continual demands for more money become that when it was suggested raising 
production levels from 8 to 8.5 million tons in 1961, both ruling Sheikhs demurred believing 
that “the extra income derived from so small an increase would not compensate for the 
demands from the family for extra money which would inevitably follow the news the Ruler 
had accepted increased production.”312  
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When Ahmed Bin Ali assumed leadership he “displayed no particular desire to rule, 
preferring Europe, Asia, indeed anywhere to Qatar, leaving Khalifah de facto ruler.”313 
Indeed, a telling number of British documents conversing with him are routed through the 
Qatar Embassy in Geneva. As Prime Minister, Heir Apparent and with his wide portfolio, 
Khalifah Bin Hamad was running Qatar from the mid-1960s onwards. Ahmed Bin Ali’s 
delegation of power to Khalifah Bin Hamad meant that he had a free hand to speak for 
Qatar internationally.  
In June 1965 Khalifah Bin Hamad and Hassan Kamal went to Riyadh to negotiate the Qatari-
Saudi border agreement; something that was encouraged by the British even though 
technically all foreign relations ought to have ran through London.314 The agreement that 
was reached with the Saudi Minister of Petroleum Affairs Ahmed Zaki Yamani was surprising 
and concerning for the British. Riding roughshod over existing understandings of the border, 
the new agreement gave Saudi Arabia previously unclaimed land giving the Kingdom access 
to the Gulf south of the Qatar Peninsula. This land was firmly believed by London to belong 
to Sheikh Shakhbut, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, which was also under British protection at that 
time.315  
Though Khalifah Bin Hamad gave up vestigial Qatari claims to Khor Al Udeid, the land at the 
centre of the issue, the agreement gave Qatar a generous swathe of land nearby, while also 
significantly benefitting Saudi Arabia by giving it access to the Gulf and breaking up any 
contiguous land passage between Qatar and Abu Dhabi. Indeed, the American Consul-
General in Dhahran informed the Qatar Political Resident that the new agreement 
effectively gave Qatar 75 square miles worth of land “previously…regarded as falling within 
the Aramco [Saudi oil] concession.”316 
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Additionally, off-the-record interviews in Doha with protagonists aware of these 
negotiations suggest that there was more at stake here than simply land. Khalifah Bin 
Hamad, while Crown Prince and in charge of most portfolios of Government, still held some 
understandable fears about being usurped (for the third time) when it came to being 
appointed Emir. According to one source, part of the 1965 agreement included 
understandings from Saudi Arabia to support Khalifah Bin Hamad’s ascension to Emir in 
Qatar and his continued rule.317 
Such a deal makes sense and is backed up by an understanding of the context. Khalifah Bin 
Hamad and Kamal would have been under no illusions that they were, by giving Saudi 
Arabia Khor Al Udeid, angering not only Abu Dhabi but Britain too. Indeed, a later letter 
from the Political Resident in Qatar notes that Ahmed Bin Ali “realises that the Deputy Ruler 
[Khalifah Bin Hamad] has gone too far (in addition to breaking the assurance given to the 
Political Resident).”318 Unless this was a simple mistake, which is not a believable 
proposition, it would be logical to conclude that Khalifah Bin Hamad received something in 
return for making this concession. It would also make sense for Khalifah Bin Hamad to seek 
some personal guarantees from the Saudi elite regarding his own position and for Qatar 
more generally. Qatar’s history is nothing if not a history of its elite seeking agreement to 
secure security. Moreover, the historical record of Khalifah Bin Hamad’s rule in Doha (more 
of which below) was of a distinct reliance and deference to Saudi Arabia.  
Despite British protestations, Ahmed Bin Ali signed the agreement in December 1965 
however the bill itself was not ratified. British pressure likely played a part in this as Britain 
did not announce its withdrawal from the Gulf until 1968 and Qatar was thus contentedly 
reliant on Britain’s protection. However, when the matter came up for discussion in 1971 
when Khalifah Bin Hamad and Kamal visited Riyadh, the Saudi reaction was vociferous 
leaving Khalifah Bin Hamad “severely shaken” according to the British Resident in Qatar.319 
With the British having left the same year within months of the disagreeable Riyadh meeting 
the agreement was officially recognised and ratified. 
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Independence 
In 1968 the British informed the Trucial States and Qatar that it would withdraw from its 
role in the Gulf and by 1971 Qatar became an independent state. Initially, it was assumed 
that Qatar and Bahrain would join with the Trucial States in one federated state. Yet aside 
from the differences over deciding on the key roles on-going fundamental problems 
between Bahrain and Qatar precluded them joining the putative UAE. 
In 1970 the Qatari constitution was written. This formally delineated a Government 
structure for Qatar including the establishment of an Advisory Council to assist the ruler and 
the creation of Ministries. In September 1971 Qatar became independent and the 
celebrations were led by Khalifah Bin Hamad in Doha. Ahmed Bin Ali, who was on holiday in 
Switzerland at the time did not even return home. By 1972 Ahmed Bin Ali still had not 
installed an Advisory Council, some two years after its official promulgation. Moreover, his 
son, Abdul-Aziz Bin Ahmed Al Thani was placing himself to take over from his father at 
Khalifah Bin Hamad’s expense. Not only did Abdul-Aziz Bin Ahmed do “everything he can to 
provoke, annoy and where possible, humiliate the Deputy Amir [Khalifah Bin Hamad]” but 
he was, in the words of the British resident at the time, “a boorish horror and the kindest 
diagnosis is to conclude that he is mad.”320 Of direct relevance to Khalifah Bin Hamad was 
Abdul-Aziz Bin Ahmed’s squandering of the state’s revenue transparently buying support in 
Doha and his hoarding of as much arms and munitions as the Qatar Army in his palaces.321 
The exorbitantly expensive lifestyle and impunity with which Ahmed Bin Ali and Abdul-Aziz 
Bin Ahmed conducted themselves contributed to Khalifah Bin Hamad being immediately 
recognised as a worthy Emir when he took over on 22 February 1972 when Ahmed Bin Ali 
was on one of his many foreign excursions. Saudi Arabia too recognised Khalifah Bin 
Hamad’s ascension quickly, potentially as per the agreement he fostered in 1965. After a 
modicum of caution from the British, Khalifah Bin Hamad was soon accepted as a legitimate 
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ruler if for no other reason than the British were long since tired of dealing with Ahmed (a 
“singularly useless individual”322). 
Indicating an appreciation of the importance of the wider world and his direction of 
thought, Khalifah Bin Hamad issued an advert in The Times of London in May 1972 titled 
‘The Era of Reform.’323 His first issue was the perennial problem of Qatar’s Sheikhs: the Al 
Thani family. Unlike his predecessors and true to his conversations with the British in the 
1960s, he opted to control and reduce their allowances. He did this by changing his base of 
support. Instead of the Al Thani cabals supporting his rule for a share of profits as had been 
the case for previous Sheikhs, Khalifah Bin Hamad broadened his appeal. He reinstated the 
link between the Sheikh and his people using the 1970 constitution.  
The professionalization of the state, the emergence of Ministries and bureaucracies and the 
increasingly busy Sheikhly role had significantly fractured the traditional line of 
communication between the ruled and the ruler. Legitimacy and acquiescence for the 
Sheikh’s continued rule was traditionally derived from his role not only as protector and 
provider for his people but also from his accessibility for arbitration or patronage: walking 
up to his abode in the 19th century for an audience was a relatively straight forward matter; 
not so as the 1950s and 60s wore on (particularly so when Ahmed Bin Ali was ever more out 
of the country). This break contributed to the ever greater reliance that the Qatari Sheikh 
had on his extended family: replacing traditional popular support with the powerful but 
niche support of the Al Thani.  
Khalifah Bin Hamad had a history that he could call on of supporting ‘popular’ movements 
and policies. He quickly bolstered his reputation as a Sheikh for all Qataris and not just for 
the Al Thani: he cut Al Thani benefits; transferred his stipend of the budget (25 per cent) to 
the state’s coffers; increased social aid by 30 per cent; old age pensions by 25 per cent; 
armed forces and civil servant pensions by 20 per cent; cancelled outstanding housing 
payments and built 2500 free housing units within a year; implemented an amended 
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provisional Constitution; established an Advisory Council; further sought to secure state jobs 
for Qataris and continued to “pour large amounts of money” into all social services.324 
In addition to these direct distributive policies and attempts to include swathes of Qataris in 
the emerging bureaucracies as a form of indirect distribution, Khalifah also sought to 
engender a civic myth. This proved to be difficult. Not only was there significant competition 
for ‘belonging’ (such as pan-national, familial and tribal identities as well as the notion of 
belonging to one Islamic umma)325 but there were not many ‘civic resources’ on which to 
draw: Qatar had neither a glorious battle for independence nor any other overly auspicious 
historical moments.  
Therefore, Khalifah sought to find Qatar’s history. A British archaeological team was 
dispatched in 1973 following on from a less successful expedition in the 1950s. In 1975 a 
museum was established, furnished with artefacts from the digs and accounts of ordinary 
Qataris that placed Qatar in its historical context with the Al Thani family suitably 
benevolently ruing throughout. The Information Ministry from 1972 onwards continued to 
control and add to Qatar’s nascent historical narrative.  
Linking to the desire to establish legitimacy and the typical trappings of statehood, Khalifah 
Bin Hamad’s Qatar was relatively active internationally in terms of receiving delegations and 
establishing diplomatic missions. While this activity followed the regional pattern at that 
time of newly enriched Gulf States seeking to support regional causes to become bona fide 
members of the international community and was in no way as unusual as the post-1990s 
foreign policies, it is important to note this burgeoning of Qatar’s international relations.  
Diplomatic relations were established, the first Ambassadors hosted, and delegations (often 
Presidential or Prime Ministerial) were received from Belgium, Brazil, Burundi, the Comoros 
Islands, the Congo, Egypt, Finland, Gabon, Indonesia, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Palestine, North 
Korea, Senegal, Switzerland, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda in 1974, 1975, and 
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1976 alone.326 This is not to mention the millions of dollars that Qatar donated to a variety of 
causes from UNESCO to struggling countries to the Arab Peace Force in Lebanon.327 
These international relations, civic myth building ventures, and the vast increase in the 
state’s bureaucracy were funded by rising oil prices. In 1971 oil revenue was $300 million. In 
1973 it doubled to $600 million and then it rose to $2 billion the next year with essentially 
flat production.328 
Khalifah nationalised the oil industry in 1976 and changed concessions into contracts. 
Production peaked in 1979 and, despite prices being temporarily elevated by the Iranian 
Revolution, oil was considered to be in its twilight years in Qatar. The fall of oil prices in 
1982 and 1983 led to the first national deficit in years. With Qatar’s oil future looking bleak 
and Qatar’s previous half-hearted economic diversification attempts foundering against 
regional competition, domestic cuts were made, charges for health care, water and 
electricity were introduced and 3000 government employees were laid off.329  
Khalifah was forced to turn to gas, which at the time was seen as little more than an 
annoying by-product of oil exploration and certainly not a key product in and of itself. Thus 
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far only relatively small amounts of gas had been exported from the Dukhan field.330 This 
was despite the discovery of huge quantities of gas to the north of Qatar in the early 1970s 
when Shell was looking for oil. Yet new priorities altered this logic. By 1984 BP, Total, and 
Qatar General Petroleum Corporation (QGPC) banded together to invest in what was 
dubbed The North Field. Arguably the central champion of the new gas agenda was Crown 
Prince Hamad Bin Khalifah, who saw the potential clearly and did not suffer from either a 
lack of ambition or from the deep lethargy of action that characterised his father’s 
generation.  
Yet these negotiations were occurring at a time of severe regional tensions. In the aftermath 
of the 1979 Iranian Revolution the Gulf became polarised then militarised with the outbreak 
of the Iran-Iraq war. Further adding to the tumult in the early 1980s were security incidents, 
such as the Libyan-sponsored attempted assassination of either Khalifah Bin Hamad himself 
of a GCC Ruler due in Doha in 1983.331 Nevertheless, Qatar, like its fellow GCC States, 
attempted to tow a vaguely middle line between Iran and Iraq. For sure, they were 
financially supporting Iraq to the tune of, for example, $250m in 1982, but they nevertheless 
strove to maintain a certain evenness for fear, as much as anything else, that Iran would 
actively target the GCC States.332 Similarly, though the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was 
established in reaction to the Iranian Revolution, it was covered with a veneer of economic 
cooperation and was not as nakedly military in its orientation as, for example, NATO.  
The riots in Mecca that led to the deaths of several hundred pilgrims in 1987, widely if 
controversially and simplistically blamed on Iranians, was one of the key catalysts that 
prompted the change in the GCC states’ perspectives. Qatar followed this trend initially at 
least and increased its support of Iran, though its emerging leadership were wary of simply 
following the prescribed GCC-line.  
The Iran-Iraq war and the multitude of issue surrounding it caused the gas talks to stall and 
the obvious risks initially put off would-be investors. Eventually the Qatari government 
mortgaged the country against future income and raised the necessary investment. Further 
                                                     
330
 "Q.P.C's Liquid Gas Project," Middle East Economic Digest (MEED) 10th March 1971. 
331
 Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Persian Gulf States: Country Studies, 3rd Edition ed., Area Handbook Series 
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p.190. 
332
 Pelletiere, The Iran-Iraq War : Chaos in a Vacuum, p.72. 
Page 106 of 278 
 
beset with technical difficulties and problems, all of which were exacerbated with the 
exodus of contractors from the region with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it was not until 03 
September 1991 that gas production began for phase 1: domestic consumption from the 
North Field.333 
Phase two was scheduled to come on-line in 1996. It consisted of a regional system of pipes 
to other GCC countries and received a warm reception at the GCC annual meeting when it 
was first proposed in November 1989. On paper this plan was attractive to Qatar. Not only 
would it further integrate the GCC but, if Qatar was a (or perhaps the) regional gas supplier 
it would increase their power and prestige. Furthermore, the costs, at around $2 billion, 
were more manageable than a global LNG hub and spoke system that would be much more 
expensive. Yet these plans soon foundered. 
First, in the early 1990s Saudi Arabia found its own not insignificant gas supplies. Riyadh 
refused permission for Qatari pipes to traverse the Kingdom’s maritime boundaries fearing 
competition. Indeed, Saudi Arabia also tried, with questionable geographical merit, to 
refuse permission for an undersea pipe from Qatar to the UAE. These decisions also 
occurred at a time of worsening relations with Saudi Arabia more generally. Second, Kuwait 
was in no state after the Iraqi invasion to negotiate any gas contracts. And third, a deal with 
Bahrain, which only represented a small market in any case, could not be undertaken thanks 
to lingering and sporadically flaring issues over the Hawar Islands.334  
Rebuffed by its regional allies Qatar instead pursued phase 3: forging ahead with LNG plans. 
With significant financial and technical backing not to mention long-term guaranteed 
contracts from various Japanese and South Korean consortiums, the huge levels of 
necessary investment were procured. This plan was to be of central importance for Qatar to 
deal with a perennial concern: Saudi Arabia.  
Historically, as noted above, Saudi Arabia has long loomed over Qatar. Relations were often 
highly fraught as the Qatari leadership sought to preserve as much of their own power and 
autonomy as possible, while balancing Saudi Arabia or at times using it as a counterweight. 
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For most of the twentieth century, Qatar sought good relations with Saudi Arabia. Not only 
were they the only two Wahhabi countries on earth, but for Qatari leaders the notion of 
‘keep your friends close, and your enemies closer’ prevailed. This stemmed from practicality 
as much as anything else. Not only was Saudi Arabia exponentially more powerful that Qatar 
but Saudi tribes extracted taxes from people often far inside the Qatari Peninsula, such as 
those at the Qatar Petroleum Company’s camp at Dukhan and Murrah tribes people near 
Zubarah, as late as 1949.335 These tax extractions highlight not only the lax Qatari control of 
their borders but the impunity and strength of the Saudi authorities.    
The contention that in 1965 Khalifah Bin Hamad sought to assure harmonious Qatari-Saudi 
relations by allowing Saudi Arabia to claim Khor Al Udeid fits with the logic of seeking to 
ameliorate this key regional power. With or without this understanding after the British left 
in 1971, various experts have noted it was natural for Qatar to operate under the auspices 
of Saudi Arabia’s leadership.336 As well as following Saudi Arabia’s lead in various “regional 
and global issues” Metz notes that Qatar was the only other country to observe the full forty 
days of mourning after the death of Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal in 1975 and King Khalid in 
1982.337 In later years as the Saudi-US relationship became ever closer with increasing 
training and supplying of weapons an in-depth, special report in The Times of London 
describes Qatar as being “glad to accept the Saudi military umbrella, facilitated by the 
United States, particularly in the summer of 1984.”338 A bilateral defence agreement was 
also signed in 1982 and Riyadh often acted as an interlocutor for Qatar in regional 
disputes.339  
A 1974 Abu Dhabi-Saudi border agreement made public in 1995 further ate away at Qatar’s 
territory near Khor Al Udeid to the tune of 15 littoral miles.340 This highlights Riyadh’s 
disregard for Qatar’s autonomy and bolsters the notion of Qatar operating as “but an 
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adjunct to Saudi Arabia.”341 Moreover, Kelly even noted that now that Qatar was isolated, 
Saudi Arabia was in a position to “should the political occasion arise – outright absorb the 
sheikhdom within their domain.”342  
Qatar’s precarious state in international relations did not need to be explained to Khalifah 
Bin Hamad. Former British Ambassador to Qatar Colin Brant (1978-1981) recalled a 
conversation with where he noted that “Qatar being a small country, he [Khalifah Bin 
Hamad] has to discern the path that the other Gulf countries are treading, and follow it after 
them.”343 Khalifah Bin Hamad and other Qatari leaders were willing to sign up to the 
Kingdom’s protection as long as, firstly, there was no alternative for securing their state and, 
secondly, the protector could actually offer some kind of protection. Both these factors 
were soon to change significantly. 
The tanker wars in the late 1980s when Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States were forced to 
seek American help to reflag their ships to avoid Iranian attack was the first inkling that 
Saudi Arabia was not necessarily all that powerful. Such concerns were confirmed with the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and Saudi Arabia’s decision to ask the Western coalition to 
form Operation Desert Shield to protect the Kingdom. If they could not protect themselves 
no Qatari leader could seriously expect Riyadh to protect Qatar should the need arise. 
Clearly, a change in Qatar’s foreign policy orientation was in the offing, for in a region which 
averaged a serious military conflict every ten years in the twentieth century, finding a 
suitable leviathan to protect Qatar was essential.  
Notionally, Qatar could have taken some comfort in the collective regional body, the GCC. 
Yet in reality it was and is today a deeply dysfunctional organisation that provides no 
effective military support. This supra-national club comprising Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, the UAE, and Oman, was established on 25 May 1981.344 The primary spark for its 
inception was security orientated in relation to the growing Iranian threat. But the GCC was 
also envisaged to be an economic and political union.  
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From the very beginning to today most of the achievements of the GCC have been rather 
prosaic. For example, a common system of measurements was introduced by empowering 
the Saudi Arabian Board of Standards and Measurements to act across the GCC.345 While 
more substantive agreements were subsequently made, it is tempting to agree with Twinam 
who suggests that nothing concrete that the Council would achieve would ever “match in 
importance the simple fact that it had been created.”346 
In terms of defence, more theoretical cooperation took place. Many agreements culminated 
in October 1983 with the first ‘Peninsula Shield’ joint exercises. This event proved to be a 
harbinger of numerous such joint military exercises of the years, even if the GCC Peninsula 
Shield Force “has amassed a less than spectacular record of performance.”347 Indeed, the 
force has never been anything other than a paper tiger and is acknowledged as a military 
failure.348 
In the Qatari context, the GCC led by Saudi Arabia sporadically sought to intervene between 
Qatar and Bahrain to calm the escalating tensions over the disputes. The 1986 dispute over 
the Fasht Al Dibal reef, claimed by both sides and which sparked minor skirmishes, was 
innovatively settled by Saudi Arabia when they dredged the entire reef.349 
The notion that the GCC could in a meaningful way provide Qatar or its other member states 
with some kind of security blanket is illusory. Its approach to military matters and especially 
issues of interoperability are still resolutely bilateral with America, to choose one key 
concern. As long as America is providing the overriding security for the Gulf States, the GCC 
will not be able to – and nor will it need to – evolve into anything like a tight-knit, effective 
organisation.  
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A New Era Emerging 
A Domestic Focus 
On 31 May 1977 Hamad Bin Khalifah Al Thani was appointed Heir Apparent and Minister of 
Defence. But it was not until the mid-1980s that he began to exert a significant impact on 
policy when he led a new generation in the elite who found, as the decade progressed, their 
hands ever more on the tiller. 
After over a decade on the throne, Khalifah Bin Hamad Al Thani, like his predecessors, began 
to delegate more power to the Heir Apparent. One commentator suggests that by the mid-
1980s “Hamad had become the prominent figure in Qatari politics and was largely 
recognised as the effective ruler of Qatar.”350 Defining exactly when Hamad Bin Khalifah 
became particularly influential is difficult to judge, but the intrinsic policy disposition of the 
two men is clear and is instructive. When Khalifah Bin Hamad was clearly in charge in the 
1970s he operated quietly under Saudi Arabia’s auspices. While he enlarged Qatar’s foreign 
relations, he seldom conducted any unusual or surprising policy ventures, and never 
conducted any that would undermine his close Saudi relations. Hamad Bin Khalifah, by 
contrast, when he became unquestionably in charge displayed a pervasive desire to shock, 
court publicity, and undertake policies unilaterally with little or no consultation of regional 
neighbours. For example, the Emir’s 1985 decision to phone UN Secretary General Javier 
Perez de Cuellar beseeching him to visit both Tehran and Baghdad amid the extreme Gulf 
tensions at that time, appears to have more in common with a typical Hamad policy than a 
Khalifah policy.351 While it may be too big a jump to suggest that Hamad was the force 
behind this incident, the consensus was emerging that Hamad was accruing power quickly, 
as the British Ambassador’s confidential annual report for 1986 notes:  
A further decline in Sheikh Khalifah’s drive and decisiveness in 1987 seems almost inevitable. The days 
when he was the sole arbiter...are apparently over. Sheikh Hamad, the Crown Prince, takes more and 
more decisions without first obtaining the approval of his father. He will gain increasing prominence 
here.
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The British Ambassador’s annual review for 1987 refers to Hamad continuing to 
“consolidate his authority, especially over the North Field project and military procurement, 
through his small network of relatively competent and honest young Qataris executives who 
face a difficult task in clearing up the inefficient administration.”353 The next year’s report 
continues noting that this delegation of authority to Hamad had reached “an apparently 
irretrievable extent....Speculation is now even heard about Sheikh Khalifah’s own 
position.”354 
Aside from prosaic changes such as the change from the Islamic lunar calendar to the 
Gregorian tax year calendar, deeper change benefitting Hamad Bin Khalifah was crystallised 
in 1989 in a Cabinet reshuffle.355 Growing difficulties between Khalifah Bin Hamad and his 
brother Khalid Bin Hamad, the Minister of the Interior and one of the most important 
Qataris, prompted this first wholesale Ministerial shake up since 1972. Hamad Bin Jassem Al 
Thani, the Crown Prince’s closest confidant, became Minister of Municipalities, a position to 
which was soon added control of water and electricity. This position meant that Hamad Bin 
Jassem was the key Minister for deciding who received what land. In the oil era land was 
one of the key ways wealth was transferred from the state to the individual. Given that all 
Qataris are entitled to be given land on which to build a house, this land can technically be 
in downtown Doha or in the depths of Qatar’s inhospitable hinterland. The power to weigh-
in on this decision gave Hamad Bin Jassem significant influence. Indeed, a former 
Ambassador based in Qatar in the 1980s noted that the bargaining that Hamad Bin Jassim 
took place during these years set up support for Hamad Bin Khalifah’s subsequent coup in 
1995.356  
Hamad Bin Jassem was joined by a number of younger Ministers in the 1989 cabinet 
reshuffle, which also saw the creation of the Supreme Council for Planning under Hamad Bin 
Khalifah’s control.357  This 1989 Ministerial shake up is best summed up as Crown Prince 
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Hamad taking more power from the older generation and using the appointment of a new 
generation of Ministers to add some dynamism to an arcane and corrupt system.358 
‘Supreme Councils’ were to be a feature of Qatar under Hamad Bin Khalifah where power is 
centralised under the control of one small council. Preeminent in their fields (planning but 
later health, education, judicial etc.) control of these councils rested with Hamad Bin 
Khalifah or a trusted advisor or family member and was another way he could consolidate 
and expand his power. Such actions in the late 1980s set the stage for the next decade with 
Crown Prince Hamad and his coterie of advisors, relations, and allies being secreted ever 
more into the elite as he formalised and consolidated power. Initially, concerns over Qatar’s 
basic security needed to be settled.  
Regional and International Relations 
US-Qatari relations before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 are best described as 
uneventful and cordial until 1988 as American oil and economic interests were limited while 
Qatar looked mostly to France and the UK on military matters.359 However, in June 1988 
someone at the US Embassy in Bahrain watching coverage of the Qatari National Day parade 
noticed several Stinger anti-aircraft missiles on parade.360 It transpired that Qatar had 
bought twelve such missiles off the black market. US authorities, concerned about this 
illegal activity and proliferation, pressured to Qatar to return the weapons to America and 
pass on the details of their origins. Several protests from the US Ambassador Joseph 
Ghougassian and a visit from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs Richard Murphy were unable to resolve this issue. With no economic or 
military aid going to Qatar, America had no leverage.  
It is not surprising that Crown Prince Hamad, the Minister of Defence, refused to hand over 
the weapons. While the Qatari elite will not have liked America’s demands, crucially they 
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were angry at America’s willingness to sell seventy such missiles and fourteen launchers to 
Bahrain in December 1987 and none to Qatar.361 
Qatar’s defence for their procurement of the Stingers stated that they needed them against 
any Iranian threat (the motivation which Bahrain used). Yet this cut little ice in Washington 
given that it was widely believed that the Qataris bought the weapons from Iran in the first 
place. With an impasse reached, relations remained frosty until Iraq invaded Kuwait and the 
second Gulf war ensued.  
Qatar played a role in the Gulf war commensurate to its size and military capabilities. The 
only action of consequence for the Qatari military occurred at the Battle of Khafji in late 
January 1991. Supported by US air power, Qatari and Saudi land forces retook the Saudi 
town of Khafji which had been taken by Iraq mechanised forces in a night-time attack. This 
victory was important at the time in terms of restoring Arab pride and morale in obtaining a 
victory and it continues to this day to be a source of some Qatari pride. Indeed, as Rabi puts 
it, “for the first time, Qatar had a military victory of its own to its credit...The media glorified 
the “crushing defeat” dealt to Iraq...[the] Qatari myth was in the making.”362 Yet in reality 
this battle was “pre-eminently an [American] airpower victory.”363  
Overall, it is difficult to place enough importance on the invasion of Kuwait as a driver for 
the subsequent actions of Qatar; a notion related to the British Ambassador at the time who 
noted “The Amir and the Crown Prince have made much of the way in which the invasion of 
Kuwait has changed permanently Qatar’s political alignments.”364 The analogy between 
Kuwait – a small, intrinsically defenceless, hydrocarbon-rich country surrounded by larger 
states with whom they have sporadically antagonistic relationships – was not lost on Qatar’s 
elite.  
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In the aftermath of the Gulf war the GCC States recognised the failure of the GCC as a 
security structure. But while the Qatari Foreign Minister Mubarak Ali Al Khatir noted that 
that they needed to “modernize [Qatar’s] defence means and coordinate…military 
structures” nothing came of this.365 After the idea of stationing Syrian and Egyptian troops in 
the GCC – the Damascus Declaration – predictably wilted, Qatar like Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, and the UAE turned to America. 366 After allowing the US to use Qatari territory in the 
run-up to Operation Desert Storm, Qatar’s opening of relations with Israel convinced 
America to enter negotiations with Qatar for security agreements.367 
On 23 June 1992 Qatar and America concluded the agreement “that provided for U.S. access 
to Qatari bases, pre-positioning of United States material, and combined military 
exercises.”368 The Qataris subsequently built the Al Udeid military base at a cost of $1 billion 
by 1996 to allow for the expansion of US forces of up to 10,000 troops and at least 140 
aircraft. Al Udeid also served as “the region’s main combat air-operations centre” for Iraq 
and Afghanistan operations.369 A second important base – Camp As Sayliyah – was 
completed in August 2000, costing more than $100m and is the “largest pre-positioning 
facility of U.S. equipment in the world” and is the command centre for US Central Command 
(CENTCOM).370 
These US ties came at a critical moment. Not only was Qatar’s Saudi relationship 
deteriorating rhetorically, but on 30 September 1992 Saudi troops or tribes loyal to Saudi 
Arabia attacked a border post at Al Khaffus in Qatar territory killing one Qatari soldier, one 
Egyptian soldier in the Qatari army, and capturing a third.371 A Saudi tribal Sheikh was also 
killed according to some reports. Qatar immediately and publically cancelled its 1965 border 
agreement with Saudi Arabia and withdrew 200 Qatari soldiers from the GCC Peninsula 
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Shield force.372 Egyptian mediation calmed the situation, but only temporarily. In 1993 and 
1994 more deadly border clashes took place and Qatar boycotted the GCC Annual Summit in 
1994 and refused to sign a mutual security pact.373 Okruhlik and Conge note that these 
Saudi-Qatar tensions 
were less about the land itself and more symptoms of the multi-layered tension between the two 
countries. It gave Qatar a pretext for expressing its bitterness over the Saudi Arabian hegemony 
within the GCC and Saudi Arabia a chance to express its displeasure over Qatar’s independent 
manoeuvres.
374
  
Relations remained bitter for decades. Al Jazeera’s relentless sniping at Saudi Arabia was 
one of the factors that led to Riyadh removing its Ambassador, Hamad Al Tuwaimi, from 
Doha in September 2002.375 The Ambassador returned in 2008 during a period of détente. 
Subsequently, the bilateral relations have improved markedly particularly with Al Jazeera’s 
coverage of Saudi Arabia having been toned down.376  
In addition to seeking US security guarantees, Qatar sought to vastly increase its 
international relations; a plan significantly motivated by its acrimonious Saudi relations. 
Moreover, beginning in the early 1990s, Qatar developed new international alliances that 
were starkly at odds with its previously predictable politics. Aside from the newly 
invigorated and deepened relations with America, contact was augmented with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and the State of Israel. Trade deals, bilateral visits, military cooperation 
agreements, and discussions of importing water from Iran characterised the Iranian 
relationship. A thawing of frozen relations, discussions on selling LNG to Israel and opening 
of trade offices, signing aviation pacts, and elite visits were discussed with Israel.377 
Neither relationship progressed as far as envisaged at the beginning. Neither the water nor 
the LNG deal went through and the plans were eventually dropped. Subsequently, relations 
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ebbed and flowed. With Israel after the triumph of a trade office opened in Doha in 1996, 
there were precious few successes. Qatar was immediately and consistently pressured to 
close the office by its allies who wanted to maintain the boycott of the Jewish State. 
Eventually, after the Israeli invasion of Gaza in 2008 in Operation Cast Lead, which drew 
withering Arab criticism, Qatar cut relations and the office was technically closed.  
Iranian-Qatari relations have not been as dramatic. Defending wider Iranian interests in the 
UN Security Council, signing various trade agreements, and inviting Iran to the GCC Annual 
Summit in Doha in 2007 highlight Qatar’s desire to ameliorate its Iran relations. Until the 
start of the Arab Spring the relationship remained relatively stable despite occasional crises 
such as when Iranian Revolutionary Guards attacked and looted Qatari rigs in its gas field in 
the mid-2000s.  
Both sides derive benefit from maintaining a public facade of a strong, working relationship. 
For Iran it shows domestic and international communities that America and Saudi Arabia 
have failed to contain the Islamic Republic, while for Qatar it pays to keep Iran on side given 
their proximity and the fact that they share the world’s largest gas field, a source of great 
wealth and concern for Qatar. Such logic overcomes deep perhaps even insurmountable 
differences on key issues and a latent fear and suspicion on both sides. In 2009 Qatar’s then 
Foreign Minister, Hamad Bin Jassim Al Thani, summed up the bilateral relationship 
succinctly when he noted that “they lie to us and we lie to them.”378 Even taking into 
account concerns of one politician telling another what he wants to hear (and certainly the 
Americans would have been pleased to hear this from the Qatari Foreign Minister), these 
sentiments ring true.  
It was not just Iranian relations that began evolving in the 1980s. A sign of things to come 
occurred in 1988 when Qatar established relations with the Soviet Union and China. 
Interestingly, Qatar did not wait for Saudi Arabia to recognise these countries as one might 
expect, but took a unilateral course of action. The British Ambassador at the time summed 
up this curious example as follows: 
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I detect the Crown Prince’s hand behind surprising shifts in Qatar’s relationship with the superpowers. 
Most observers had expected Qatar to wait for a Saudi lead before establishing diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union and China. The decision to go ahead alone at this time probably reflected 
Qatar’s concern at the dangers of appearing too closely identified with the high profile policy of the 
United States in the Gulf.
379
  
Two factors stem immediately from this statement, which fits in perfectly to the thrust of 
emerging Qatari domestic political realities and long-term foreign policies. Firstly, at this 
stage Qatar was not that outspoken an American ally. If, therefore, the elite felt that even a 
modest association or imbalance whereby Qatar was overtly associated with America ought 
to be corrected, this has potentially huge implications for Qatar in the 1990s. For then when 
Qatar became one of the central locations for American forces and there were real, evident, 
and widely known commonalities of interest and relationships between Qatar and America, 
if one uses the same logic, namely that Qatar must diversify its interests to avoid being too 
overtly seen as in one camp, this offers a powerful explanatory factor for Qatar’s foreign 
policy explosion as the 1990s progressed.  
Secondly, it is all but certain that this decision to recognise China and the Soviet Union was 
Hamad Bin Khalifah’s decision and not his father the Emir’s. Khalifah Bin Hamad’s 
disposition became ever more cautious as the 1980s progressed to the point of a deep lack 
of inertia, a problem that Hamad Bin Khalifah was to counter with various ministerial 
changes. Moreover, Khalifah Bin Hamad’s own foreign policy motives were, as identified by 
a former British Ambassador, to follow the GCC lead. It would be highly unlikely for him to 
have broken out of his train of thought for no apparent reason. Indeed, the next year’s 
British Ambassadorial report notes that while the Soviet and Chinese Ambassadors are 
“charming” they essentially made no impact, so it is not even as if they were brought to 
Qatar with a particular discernible policy in mind.380 Indeed, the timing is suspicious and 
these agreements were - if not initiated by the US Stinger missile debacle - at least speeded 
up because if it. In a different context in 1990 Qatar was similarly outspoken when it 
became the first GCC country to condemn Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.381 While this may seem 
a sensible reaction for Qatar, perhaps seeing worrying analogies in the invasion, it is 
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nevertheless another indicator of a sea-change in their foreign policy. Far from their 
traditional ‘wait and see’ approach, Qatar was becoming far more forthright with its own 
opinions.  
Qatar also reinvigorated its support for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the late 1980s. 
A member of the organisation since 1971 and a generous contributor to this and other 
causes when oil revenues allowed, Hamad Bin Khalifah attended the NAM summit in 
Belgrade in 1988.382 This move was to reiterate Qatar’s position as part of a wider group of 
states and thus not necessarily beholden to, for example, Saudi Arabia. 1989 also saw a rash 
of states being recognised by Qatar including Cuba, Peru, Poland, and Yugoslavia and in 
1990 Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. Lastly, following Kuwait’s lead, Qatar forgave the 
debts of several African and Arab countries (Cameroon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Somalia, Tunisia, Uganda) in 1989; another effort aimed at boosting Qatar’s non-aligned 
credentials.383  
While opportunity accounts for many of these occurrences – particularly the opening of 
relations – it is difficult to disagree with the UK’s Ambassador to Qatar who described these 
actions “as a signal of its [Qatar’s] wish not to appear beholden to the West or subservient 
to Saudi leadership, Qatar established diplomatic relations with a curious range of countries 
of no relevance to its needs.”384  
Though Crown Prince Hamad – the de facto leader as the 1990s wore on – was pursuing 
new, modernising strategies, this did not prevent an unenlightened reaction to the 
presentation of a petition to the ruler in May 1992. Fifty-four prominent citizens presented 
a petition demanding “free parliamentary elections, a written constitution, and the 
expansion of personal and political freedoms” to Emir Khalifah Bin Hamad.385 The reaction 
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was to ignore their demands, arrest some of those involved, stop them from travelling 
abroad, and tap their phones according to the New York Times.386  
It is difficult to analyse this reaction because of a lack of sources of analysis on this incident. 
Certainly by 1993 Crown Prince Hamad was ever more “entrenching” his power and his 
closest confidant, Hamad Bin Jassem was “the third most powerful man in the state.”387 Yet 
with a petition directly addressed to the Emir himself and given his conservative tendencies, 
it is tempting to conclude that the reaction stems more from Emir Khalifah Bin Hamad than 
Crown Prince Hamad. This is not to say that at this stage the Crown Prince would necessarily 
have engaged in a much more enlightened policy but that some kind of appeasement would 
fit more closely his overall thrust of policy; moreover, as soon as he came to power he did in 
fact undertake some of these demanded actions including instituting Municipal elections.  
The Cabinet reshuffle in 1992 got rid of “those Ministers who had long ceased attending 
their offices” and, like the 1989 reshuffle, was to breathe new life in the Qatari Government 
and for Hamad Bin Khalifah to install key allies.388 Abdullah Bin Hamad Al Attiyah played a 
key part in Qatar’s evolution expertly shepherding the evolution of Qatar’s gas industry. A 
close friend of Hamad Bin Khalifah, he was given charge of the new Industry and Energy 
Ministry and made head of the board for Qatar General Petroleum Company (QPGC), as it 
was then known.  
When Crown Prince Hamad Bin Khalifah assumed power in June 1995 things began to 
overtly change. When Emir Khalifah Bin Hamad was in Tunisia, he received a phone call from 
Doha informing him that his son was planning to seize power. Scoffing at this highly 
plausible event, he chose to continue with his plans and flew on to Geneva. When he 
landed, he was informed that his son had been successful.  
Immediately, Khalifah Bin Hamad began to rally support in the Gulf. All regional leaders 
initially supported his case, none of them wanting to set the precedent of a son successfully 
usurping his father in a Monarchical region. Hamad Bin Khalifah was initially not recognised 
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as his father was ostentatiously received with full honours in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi where 
he decamped taking over seventy rooms in Abu Dhabi’s Intercontinental Hotel as a 
temporary headquarters “until he returned to power.”389  
At least two coups were attempted to restore Khalifah Bin Hamad. Saudi Arabia is suspected 
to have been involved in both coups. In the first attempt in late 1995 it is rumoured that the 
Syrian Government sought to use Lebanese Druze launched from Saudi Arabia to topple the 
new Emir. 390 If indeed this attempt occurred, it failed. A more sizable coup allegedly took 
place the following year. An estimated force of two thousand mercenaries led by a former 
French Special Forces commander of Khalifah Bin Hamad’s personal guard were accused of 
being supported and supplied by Saudi Arabia and other local powers. On 20 February 1996 
over one hundred people including army officers and police were arrested in Doha, the 
Emiri guard was mobilised, and the farcically-organised coup was put down.391  
After becoming Emir, like those successful coup plotters before him - notably his father - 
Hamad Bin Khalifah sought to placate the citizenry though he did far more than his 
predecessors. Indeed, he consciously began to remake ruling politics in Qatar with a more 
progressive slant. He decoupled the position of Prime Minister from the position of Emir and 
separated the state and ruling family’s finances; no doubt a pointed move considering his 
father retained an estimated $3 to $12 billion of Qatar’s finances in his personal accounts in 
Europe.392 The Doha Stock Market was established in June 1995 and opened in May 1997 on 
the IMF’s advice, the ‘liberalising’ tenor of which chimed with the thrust of Qatar’s 
policies.393 Moreover, new legislation was introduced facilitating foreign investment and 
state assets were privatised beginning with the creation of the Qatar Electricity and Water 
Company taking control of power generation and desalination plants in February 1998.394 
No Minister for Information was appointed in the 1996 Cabinet reshuffle and the Ministry 
that was responsible for censorship was officially disbanded in March 1998. Al Jazeera, the 
satellite TV station, began broadcasting in 1996 as a further sign of a new era of openness. 
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Indeed, it is difficult to over emphasise the ground-breaking role of Al Jazeera. Never before 
in the Middle East has such an open news source been allowed to operate. The BBC attempt 
to start BBC Arabic was based in Saudi Arabia and predictably soon failed (though this 
fortuitously gave Al Jazeera a BBC-trained cadre of journalists). Bahrain TV, which showed 
one hour of CNN per night in the early 1990s, while allowing citizens to see balanced reports 
on Israel for the first time, had no overt focus on the Gulf or Middle East.395 
He announced that the Municipal Council, until then directly appointed, would be an 
elected body. More surprisingly, it was announced that woman could vote stand for office; a 
first in the Gulf.396 Its mandate was not immediately set and the date for the election slipped 
from 1996, to early 1997, to 09 March 1998; International Women’s Day (though this date 
too was missed). Eventually in 1999 two hundred and eighty candidates registered, eight of 
whom were women, for the twenty-nine seats. It is estimated that between 79 per cent and 
95 per cent of registered Qataris voted. No women were voted into office.397 Lambert 
continues to note that this election spurred “a countrywide phenomenon of government 
officials replacing appointed bodies with elected ones” including direct elections for the 
Chamber of Commerce.398  
An Overt International Focus 
These progressive policies were mirrored internationally. While there were sporadic 
attempts by Qatar to mediate with Iraq and Kuwait; in Palestine; and with American-led 
Iraqi sanctions in 1993 and 1999, it was not until after the new millennium that Qatar 
engaged systematically in public mediation.399  
In 2003 the former Qatari Foreign Minister Hamad Bin Jassem noted that Qatar sought to 
mediate between the US-led coalition and Iraq as well as between the UK-led international 
community and Libya concerning its weapons programme.400 This was far from the last time 
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that Qatar would involve itself with Libya. Qatar partnered again with another Western 
nation (primarily France, in this case) in 2007 with mediation with Libya to secure the 
release of six Bulgarian nurses accused by Colonel Gaddafi of infecting hundreds of Libyan 
children with AIDS.401 The deal involved the establishment of a $460m fund to which Qatar 
contributed.402 It was revealed in 2007 that the Qatari Government lobbied Scotland’s First 
Minister Alex Salmond for the release of the Lockerbie bomber, Abdelbaset Al Megrahi. This 
was on behalf of the Gaddafi Government during discussions with the Hamad Bin Jassim-led 
Qatar Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF), the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA).403 Also with 
support from Libya, Qatar mediated sporadically successful accords to normalise relations 
between Sudan and Chad in 2009404 and Qatar’s good offices and a Qatari airplane 
facilitated the release of 100 Moroccan prisoners captured in the Polisario conflict in 
2004.405 
In addition to a brief mediation effort between Eritrea and Sudan in November 2008, the 
longest mediation that Qatar has engaged in has been in Darfur, Sudan. Started in 2008 and 
on-going to this day, Qatar has spent a reputed two billion dollars and considerable time in 
attempting to find some kind of mediated settlement to this issue.406 No resolution has been 
affected as yet and talks are technically on-going with ‘Darfur Protocol’ signs seemingly 
perennially adorning the lobbies of five star hotels in Doha. Lastly in Africa, Qatar mediated 
a border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea in 2010, though it is interesting to note that 
Qatar’s building of relations with Eritrea and Al Jazeera’s reporting was one of the factors 
that caused Ethiopia to cut diplomatic ties to Qatar in 2008.407 
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In 2006 Qatar donated $50m to the newly elected Hamas-led Government.408 This was a part 
of improving Qatari-Hamas relations, which stemmed from close elite-level relations 
between the Qatari Emir and Hamas leader Khaled Mishaal. Qatar sought to use this 
relationship later in the year to attempt to broker a unity government, but was 
unsuccessful.409 Similarly, Qatar used its relations with Israel to attempt to mediate with 
Hamas, but this too failed with Tzipi Livni, then Israel’s Foreign Minister, refusing to 
negotiate until basic preconditions were met by Hamas.410 Also in late 2012 the Qatari Emir 
became the first international leader to visit Gaza since Hamas’ takeover; a startling move 
even for Qatar’s energetic and surprising foreign policy.411 
Qatar’s best known mediation success occurred in the Levant with Lebanon. Qatar 
succeeded where scores of interlocutors failed and managed to secure an agreement ending 
18 months of political deadlock that some feared was teetering towards a new civil war.412 
Many view the Qatar-shepherded agreement as being favourable to Hezbollah. Not only 
was Hezbollah given eleven portfolios in the Government giving them veto power over 
legislation, but their militia was not disbanded as some wanted but left intact in the guise of 
perennial resistor to Israel.413 Yet these empirical facts need context. Before the agreement 
Hezbollah quite clearly had power exceeding its officially sanctioned remit. The fact that it 
could so quickly and with relative ease bring swathes of Beirut to a complete halt 
outmuscling the police and even the Army at times in the run up to the Doha-led initiatives, 
demonstrates that with this agreement Qatar brought their de jure power in line with their 
de facto power.  
Elsewhere in the region, Qatar sought to mediate in the Houthi-Yemeni civil war beginning 
in May 2007. Qatar’s intervention and promise of significant aid for reconstruction secured 
a quick ceasefire within two months. A peace treaty was signed on 02 February 2008. Yet a 
closer look reveals the seeds of its eventual failure. The declared ceasefire was never really 
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implemented by either side and, as Kamrava notes, the rebel movement was never a 
monolithic block with whom agreements could be agreed and monitored.414 Fighting 
eventually escalated with a full Government assault taking place in mid-2009 just after 
Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh declared the Qatari mediation to be dead.415 Another 
agreement was signed a year later in mid-2010, but this too was short lived. Thanks in no 
small part to this acrimonious history of agreements, promises, and failures, Qatar pulled 
out of the GCC-led mediation in mid-2012, seemingly no longer able to put up with Saleh’s 
duplicity.  
Aside from widespread changes in traditional Qatari foreign policies, the new elite also 
undertook a raft of new approaches in a range of spheres including commerce, energy, and 
in terms of what could be described as softer policies.  
Qatar’s economy changed significantly with the advent and consolidation of power by the 
new elite. Their decision to focus on Qatar’s gas reserves took over a decade to come to 
fruition, but eventually paid dividends. Qatar became the world’s biggest LNG exporter in 
2006 and remains far and away the world’s largest LNG supplier.416 The gas-derived revenue 
was one of the central factors allowing Qatar to undertake the diverse and expensive range 
of new policies examined in this thesis. For example, it was after nearly a decade of LNG 
revenues that Qatar established its SWF, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) in 2005. This 
fund quickly became one of the most recognisable funds in the world and in the late 2000s 
and 2010s became famous for taking often large stakes in blue chip companies such as 
Volkswagen and Porsche, Harrods, and Shell. With vast amounts of money coming into 
Qatar from LNG, the QIA was a necessary mechanism to spend this cash. Whether through 
property or equity, its two main concerns, the QIA plans to invest Qatar’s earnings as a 
safety net and as a form of economic diversification. Compared to other SWFs the QIA is 
unusually publicity-hungry and can be seen as contributing to the business-savvy brand for 
Qatar; seeking to boost its positive notoriety and speak to Qatar’s business acumen in key 
financial capitals of the world.  
                                                     
414
 Kamrava, "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy," p.550. 
415
 Ibid. 
416
 For a more detailed look at Qatar’s gas ventures see the Gas Policies section in the Analysis chapter.  
Page 126 of 278 
 
The QIA is but one of the mechanisms that can be understood as adding to and propagating 
a new brand to boost Qatar’s soft power. Such power rests on the power of attraction, 
according to soft power’s modern intellectual father, Joseph Nye.417 In this light, various 
other Qatari policies can be seen as key fonts of Qatar’s soft power. Facilitated by LNG 
revenues, Qatar’s relentless desire to host a range of world-level sporting events (football, 
athletics, golf, tennis, etc.) is a primary method of boosting Qatar’s attraction across the 
world. Even those sceptical about the notion of soft power cannot deny that such sporting 
events are an effective method for Qatar to publicise itself in what is usually a positive and 
effective manner.418 Similarly, Qatar’s pursuit of international acclaim in the world of culture 
with the hosting of film premieres, film festivals, and world-class museums aims similarly 
aims to publicise Qatar in a positive manner.  
Of more recognisable relevance to building a brand is Qatar’s pursuit of the international 
business market. As well as the QIA being a leader of the brand, billions of dollars have been 
sunk into boosting Qatar’s development of Doha as a centre for the MICE industry. In 
addition to the tourist infrastructure such as top-class hotels and recreation areas, Qatar has 
built two world-class conference centres, and a world-spanning and award winning airline, 
Qatar Airways. An almost bottomless budget to host the largest and most prestigious 
conferences in the world means that Qatar’s recognition has increased significantly 
alongside the traffic coming through Doha. Indeed, Qatar has attracted some of the largest 
conferences in the world including the 2001 World Trade Centre talks and the 2012 COP 18 
conference held in Education City’s conference centre. 
Aside from being the location of one of Qatar’s large conference centres, Education City is 
the location of several America and British University campuses. These Universities based in 
Doha are, alongside New York University in Abu Dhabi, indisputably the best Universities in 
the Middle East. These institutions are part of the plan to encourage and facilitate the 
transition to a knowledge-based economy in Qatar. Other parts of the Qatar Foundation 
(QF), the overarching body behind Education City, include Qatar Science and Technology 
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Park (QSTP), a centre for innovation, research and design designed to provide an outlet for 
Education City students and to burnish Doha’s image as a hub of innovation and 
opportunities for businesses.  
The QF also has charitable side with various aid programmes run by its ‘Reach out to Asia’ 
programme and it funds educational innovation at its WISE Awards, which are often 
referred to as the Nobel Prize of education.419 Outwith QF the Qatari State has given aid to a 
variety of causes over the years. Perhaps most famously, Qatar gave $100 million to various 
institutions in and around New Orleans to help with the aftermath Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
including Xavier University, America’s first black Catholic University.420  
Such aid programmes and initiatives follow a long line of similar programmes throughout 
the Gulf initially led by Kuwait in the 1960s and 1970s.421 As noted, donating aid is no 
stranger to Qatar’s foreign policy repertoire as with the uptick in such activities after 
Khalifah took power in 1972. Yet under Hamad Bin Khalifah Qatar had significantly greater 
financial resources and its aid spending increased accordingly. While detailed figures going 
back to Khalifah Bin Hamad’s rule are unavailable, from 2005-2011 Qatar’s overall aid grew 
over 2000 per cent from $121 million to over £2.5billion.422   
While the energy, sporting, education, cultural, and MICE policies evolved over time, Qatar’s 
foreign policy stance in the Arab Spring changed swiftly. Whereas previously Qatar had a 
reputation that it courted as something of an inoffensive state – a facet that proved useful 
for its mediation – in the Arab Spring it quickly became a partisan state, clearly and proudly 
supporting one side over others. This support was most clearly evident in the Libyan 
revolution where Qatar supported the anti-Gaddafi rebels in a variety of ways.423 Qatar like 
other states such as the UAE were hailed by many for their support as the international 
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community largely came together to support the ouster of Colonel Gaddafi. Qatar took a 
similarly partisan if not as aggressive approach to supporting anti-Assad forces in Syria.424  
Elsewhere in the aftermath of the regime-changes Qatar sought to expand its support by 
whatever means possible. Particularly in Tunisia and Egypt this meant funnelling cash and 
material support to gain influence via the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar’s ties with the 
Brotherhood are mostly tactical; the Qatari elite have no great ideological affiliation to 
pursue. Qatar has used long standing links via key members of the Brotherhood being based 
in Doha to support the wider group, but the reality of the political situation is that given the 
fragmentation of politics, the Brotherhood are the single biggest, most cohesive party. 
Initially, Qatar established particularly strong ties with the Egyptian elite, led by former 
President Morsi. Yet such overt support has proven to be divisive. In addition to burning 
Qatari flags and increasing anti-Qatari rhetoric, Al Jazeera’s share of viewers began slipping 
because of its perceived pro-Brotherhood tenancies.425 This is an unwelcome turn of events 
for Qatar, a country that is more used to being feted for its support than jeered.426 
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Chapter 4: Analysis 
The central concern of this analysis is to understand the reasons for the significant changes 
in key Qatari policies - most of them externally-focusing in nature - that became increasingly 
evident from the early 1990s onwards. Now that the context of Qatar’s politics, both 
internal and external, has been explained it is possible to focus on specific policies that can 
be described as being ‘new’ and a significant departure from their predecessors.   
A careful reading of Chapter 3 highlights that a number of policies emerging from the 
beginning of the 1990s are demonstrably quantitatively and qualitatively different. 
 The emergence of an American security umbrella 
 Engaging in international mediation 
 Seeking new, controversial international alliances and investment opportunities  
 Founding and supporting Al Jazeera 
 Significant support for new MICE industries, sporting events, cultural initiatives and 
educational policies 
 Undertaking profoundly new gas policies 
 Taking a leading role in the Arab Spring 
A broadly qualitative approach for choosing the seven policies was used using the context 
provided in the historical analysis chapter, though there are evidently quantifiable aspects 
to some of the new policies. Each policy will be addressed in turn and the rationale for its 
place in this analysis clearly explained in terms of how each one unequivocally counts as an 
overtly ‘new’ policy. To do this the policies will be fleshed out in greater detail than in 
Chapter 3 to facilitate a deeper laying out of the ideas at play. Subsequently, using 
Nonneman’s framework, these policies will be analysed in terms of their domestic, regional, 
and international determinants.  
There are various ways that these policies could have been categorised. For example, the 
MICE Industries, sporting events, cultural and educational policies are dealt with under one 
title: ‘soft policies.’ The guiding rubric for this was that, firstly, while not identical, the 
fundamental rationales for why these policies were undertaken are similar, if not identical in 
certain ways. And secondly, to deal with each of these issues in separate chapters analysing 
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domestic, regional, and international factors determining why each one was pursued would 
have led to significant repetition.  
Taken together these policies form a new canon of foreign policy devised and pursued by 
Hamad Bin Khalifah Al Thani and his coterie of allies and provide the evidence of the 
systematic changes that occurred in Qatar’s recent history. They are the stark examples that 
provide the proof of the hypothesised change in tone, style, and content of Qatar’s foreign 
policy, which emerged from the early 1990s. The analysis thus arrives at its crux: identifying 
the underlying motives and rationales for the changes.  
Lastly, it must be noted that the State of Qatar has written down in one document a plan for 
the future of the country. The Qatar National Vision 2030 is based on four pillars: human 
development; social development; economic development; and environmental 
development.427 Many of the factors evaluated below stem from the breadth of the 2030 
vision, particularly in terms of the domestic development of the state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
427
 "Qatar National Vision 2030".  
Page 131 of 278 
 
The American Security Umbrella  
The American Security Umbrella that Qatar sought and received in the early 1990s was a 
profound change for two reasons. Firstly, not since the British left in 1971 had Qatar 
enjoyed such explicit guarantees of protection that included a foreign presence in Doha.428 
Qatar’s decades under Saudi Arabia’s suzerainty, which included understandings of tacit 
protection from the Kingdom, cannot compare to the British or US guarantees. The military 
capacity of Saudi Arabia despite its outlay on weapons and training over the decades 
remains questionable and was not of the required standard in the 1980s tanker war or in 
the face of Saddam Hussein’s army in 1990. That Qatar acquired guarantees from the 
world’s sole superpower gave its elite a comfort and a confidence that had not been known 
in Qatar for a generation.  
Secondly, a relationship of this type with America was wholly new. In the 1970s and 1980s 
their relationship was characterised by apathy bordering on hostility because of America’s 
Israeli stance and the late 1980s severing of diplomatic relations over the Singer missile 
debacle. Subsequently, Qatar became one of the most important American allies in the 
region if not the world as the prominence of the Gulf increased in the 1990s and 2000s. US 
guarantees of Qatar’s basic security released Qatar from concerns over its small size and 
were a sine qua non of facilitating its diverse and controversial policies that were to come.  
The American role in Qatar is governed primarily by two agreements. One covers the 
strategic bilateral relationship (“the US-Qatar Defence Cooperation Agreement”) and 
another the mechanics of the working relationship (“Al Udeid Implementing Agreement”).429  
Doha International Air Base (or Camp Snoopy, as it came to be known, for people were 
forever peering into the base as it was so close to downtown Doha) was based at Doha 
International Airport from 1991 to 1993 and again from 1996 to 2003. After signing 
defensive agreements with America in 1992, Qatar built the Al Udeid air base at a cost of 
around $1 billion when Qatar did not even have a meaningful Air Force; clearly the base was 
built (finished in 1996) as a way to entice America into deeper cooperation even if it remains 
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officially a Qatari Air Force base. In an example of overt military cooperation after Hamad 
Bin Khalifah took power, at the end of 1995 a joint Qatar-US exercise was pointedly 
undertaken “not even a dozen miles from the Saudi border.”430  
Al Udeid (or Camp Andy as it sometimes known) expanded significantly over the years, 
particularly after US access to the base was formalised in 2000.431 Initially with only one 
runway (though it was the longest in the Middle East at 15,000 feet) the Qataris agreed in 
the late 2000s to pay for a second runway and a $400 million “state-of-the-art regional air 
operation centre” taking extra Qatari spending on the bases for America’s use to at least 
$700 million.432 The importance of the base increased in April 2003 when US Combat Air 
Operations moved from Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to Al Udeid and it became the 
central headquarters for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, it was regarded as “the 
principal power projection node in US plans to defend the Gulf” and 10-15 per cent of staff 
were relocated from Florida to Qatar.433 
Opened in August 2000, Camp As Sayliyah was America’s largest prepositioning hub in the 
world.434 The base soon became the forward operating headquarters of the US Central 
Command, making it one of the most important US military bases in the world. Indeed, were 
MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, where Central Command’s headquarters is based, to be 
struck by a natural disaster the temporary headquarters of CENTCOM would not move to 
another base in America but to Qatar.435  
Qatar does not charge America for the use of these bases and has historically paid one of 
the highest proportions of US costs. According to the US Department of Defence’s ‘Allied 
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Contributions to the Common Defence’ reports, through direct and indirect means, Qatar 
paid 43 per cent of the US costs of stationing its troops in Qatar in 1999 and 61.2 per cent in 
2004.436  
Domestic 
Qatar has never been able to indigenously guarantee its own security. Its early history is a 
tale of rotating alliances and agreements under which the Sheikh in Qatar sought to 
guarantee his place in power, his descendant’s rights to power, and some notion of 
territorial security with as little external interference as possible. Initially local powers such 
as the Al Khalifah from Bahrain or the Wahhabis from modern-day Saudi Arabia were sought 
out as a suzerain until the status quo shifted – as it frequently did – and the relationships 
were reorganised accordingly. The entrance of the Ottomans and the British Empire lent 
some stability to Qatar and the constant shifting of alliances slowed.  
One effect of this pattern of seeking protection externally was that barring skirmishes with 
local tribes reasserting dominion over a reluctant village, a notable military victory at 
Wajbah, and sporadic skirmishes with local forces, rarely was a Qatari military force called 
on to defend the motherland. From the beginnings of the modern Qatari state in late 
eighteenth century through to the turn of the twentieth century, no regular, professional, 
trained military forces existed in Qatar. Subsequently, the Qatari police and then armed 
forces came into being under British tutelage in the late 1940s and early 1950s but at no 
time in the twentieth century was a Qatari meaningfully charged with the existential duty of 
protecting his country. Instead, while the British were dominant in the Gulf, claims and 
counterclaims were made to the British resident who wielded enormous power and would 
demand and receive reparations or unseat a tribal leader as he saw fit. After the British left 
in 1971, while there may have been some vestigial hope that the British may have returned 
in an emergency as they had after Kuwait’s independence in 1961, by seeking such a close 
relationship with Saudi Arabia, Qatar removed the key source of potential concern, even if it 
did this at the expense of a degree of autonomy. 
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Central to this decision was the personal proclivity of the Emir. For Khalifah Bin Hamad Al 
Thani who was content to sit under the auspices of Saudi Arabia, there was little problem. 
Without the capabilities to defend Qatar stemming from its small population, its larger 
neighbours, and a lack of an ethos of a professional military, Khalifah Bin Hamad decided 
come to an arrangement with Saudi Arabia. 437 However, Hamad Bin Khalifah repeatedly 
demonstrated that he could and would not rest under Saudi Arabia’s aegis. His role 
perception as an emergent leader of Qatar could not be squared away with such a reliance 
on Saudi Arabia. Whether this intrinsic desire came from a man of a younger generation not 
willing to have his country and his rule be tethered to some degree by Saudi Arabia, a 
different appreciation of Qatar’s security situation because his military background, or 
because of the increasing tensions in the early 1990s, for Hamad Bin Khalifah the result was 
the same. Unlike his father whose track record suggests he would have sought 
accommodation with Saudi Arabia, with no solution to Qatar’s existential security concerns 
to be found in the domestic realm, Hamad Bin Khalifah resolved to acquire external 
guarantees.  
Regional  
Khalifah Bin Hamad took power within six months of independence having already 
established an understanding with Saudi Arabia concerning Qatar’s security.438 During the 
1970s and 1980s, as noted, he displayed deference to Riyadh and followed its policies 
closely. Evidently he was not perturbed by his and Qatar’s relative lack of autonomy in 
perennially following Saudi’s line. His stewardship of Qatar was energetic at the beginning 
when he sought to alter the ruling bargain in Qatar to alleviate himself from the stifling 
pressure of the Al Thanis. But despite hints of Nasserist-popularity in his past, he was a 
typical Gulf ruler: solid, slow to change, patriarchal, and conservative. 
None of these things could be said about his son, Hamad Bin Khalifah. He too inherited a 
basic need to seek Qatar’s security externally but it became increasingly obvious that he 
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would not kowtow to Saudi Arabia. Yet before the split with Saudi Arabia became evident, 
the 1990-1991 Gulf War was to have a deep effect upon Qatar.  
When on 02 August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and took over the small Gulf state within 
forty-eight hours, Qatar, like the rest of the region looked on in astonishment. For Qatar the 
parallels were obvious and deeply concerning. Qatar too was a small, energy rich country 
with a small native population. It was also flanked on two sides by much larger neighbours 
with whom it had a memory of belligerence and against whom it could not hope to offer any 
resistance.   
Historically, the Qatari-Iranian relationship is not overly antagonistic bar a few proxy 
skirmishes centuries ago and sporadic threats emanating from Tehran. Nevertheless, Qatar 
like all Arab Gulf States harboured concerns about Iran, especially after the 1979 Revolution. 
This was, after all, a fervently anti-Monarchical, anti-Sunni, Revolutionary Shia regime, 
which stood accused of exporting terrorism and unrest to the Gulf States in the 1980s. Iran’s 
military capabilities were also manifest. Worse still, Iran and Qatar shared the world’s 
largest gas field together and by plumbing it Qatar opened another vector of concern in that 
it could potentially be accused (as Kuwait was) of extracting more than its fair share of the 
field. Indeed, the hugely expensive investment in the field would fundamentally change the 
dynamic of the Iranian relationship with Iran being contiguously joined to the source of 
Qatar’s future wealth. In such a precarious position, Qatar understandably sought backup.   
Other than Iran, aside from a few decades hiatus, Qatar’s historical relations with Saudi 
Arabia were far from harmonious given the marauding Wahhabi raids in the eighteenth, 
nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. While concerns for Qatar’s security vis-à-vis Iran 
and Saudi Arabia would have to be termed low probability, high impact events, that is 
exactly how one would have characterised the chances of Iraq invading Kuwait. Moreover, 
given the slow deterioration in relations in the early 1990s and the increased tensions 
around the border at Al Udeid culminating in the border skirmishes of the early 1990s, 
clearly the odds of some larger Saudi-Qatar conflagration were shortening. The Emir himself 
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notes this in an interview with Lebanese newspaper As Safir in 2009 where he describes 
Qatar as “not ready to face the burdens” of confronting Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s.439  
Even were Qatar content to remain under the aegis of Saudi Arabia, between the Tanker 
Wars and the humiliating request for foreign troops for Operations Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm, it was evident that Saudi Arabia could not protect itself sufficiently. Also, prosaically 
but importantly, it must also be noted that as well as Qatar being open to hosting 
increasingly important US bases, simply put, the US had to leave Saudi Arabia in 2003. 
Indeed, the US-Saudi bilateral relationship was becoming deeply strained by the US troops 
based in the Kingdom.440 In other words, this was another example of the regional situation 
facilitating a key feature of Qatari foreign policy.  
As for the GCC Peninsula Shield, given the lack of interoperability, the problems with 
command and control, the poor training, and issues with control at elite levels, it too, like 
any Saudi guarantees, was of no meaningful use for Qatar. 
Lastly, any notion that Qatar could use its oil and future gas wealth to buy support via 
foreign aid or such support was routed with Kuwait’s invasion. Exactly these kinds of 
understandings had underpinned Kuwaiti foreign policy for decades yet this did not save it 
from a devastating invasion. The Palestinians in particular in the form of Yassir Arafat, 
despite being significant recipients of Kuwaiti largess, turned their backs on Kuwait and 
supported Hussein’s invasion. This was a bitter blow for Kuwait and instructive for any other 
state who had faith in such reciprocity.  
International  
In the 1970s President Nixon employed the twin pillar policy towards the Gulf. This meant 
that security of the region was delegated to the regional policemen Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
This allowed America to support these local client states but remain aloof until the Iranian 
Revolution emasculated this policy.  
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Subsequently, America needed a new strategy for the security of the region. Not only did it 
need to replace its now defunct policy, but with the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan the Soviet 
Union came to within a few hundred miles of the Gulf. In the fever of the Cold War, such a 
move caused agitation in Washington.441 Also, the region itself was ever more critical to the 
world economy and the supply of oil; from 1985 onwards after a period where the risk had 
been shared more equally, the world once more became significantly more dependent on 
oil from the Gulf.442 
Largely in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan President Carter inaugurated his 
eponymous doctrine which declared that the US would defend what it saw as its national 
interests in the Gulf region with force. This laid the ground work for an increasing foothold 
in the region as the 1980s developed. Already at least $3.2 billion worth of services had 
been sold to Saudi Arabia in the 1970s, but the Iraq-Iran war from 1980 onwards augmented 
fears in the Kingdom allowing America to increase its support. Eventually, America sold a 
further $50 billion worth of a (theoretical) Gulf-wide air defence system including the 
stationing of five AWACS planes in Saudi Arabia, which allowed for $14 billion worth of 
bases to be established and augmented throughout the Kingdom. Overall, around 10,000 
civilian and several hundred military advisors were present in Saudi Arabia by the end of the 
decade.443 As noted in US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger’s classified 1984-1988 
‘Defence Guidance Report,’ this was all a part of a concerted plan to facilitate the 
introduction of US forces to the region if needed to defend Saudi Arabia and maintain 
regional stability.444  
These arrangements were secret and there was little official commentary regarding the 
development of US-Gulf State relations. Though difficult to imagine after over two decades 
of cheek-by-jowl relations between America and the Arab Gulf States, in the 1980s few Gulf 
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States were disposed to cooperate with America.445 As ever, perceived US favouritism 
towards Israel was a part of this animosity. Kuwait was considered by some to be an overt 
ally of the Soviet Union and even a “conduit” for the Soviet Union to showcase the benefits 
of friendship.446 The invasion of Afghanistan, a Muslim country, cooled Kuwait’s relations 
with the Soviet Union and it moved to a position of superpower non-alignment. Qatar was 
not disposed to either superpower and positively anti-American with the fall out of the 
Stinger acquisitions debacle in the late 1980s.  
It took the Kuwaiti threat of seeking Soviet assistance to reflag its oil tankers during the 
Tanker War and the realisation that the Americans could do a far better job in providing 
protection before America finally engaged significantly. Indeed, by then America had been 
building up its forces in the Indian Ocean based in Diego Garcia and duly sent an armada of 
around fifty ships into the Gulf to reflag tankers, project its power, and make a statement of 
intent.447  
The invasion of Kuwait further provided America with the reason it needed. Up to this point 
Saudi Arabia in particular wanted to keep their ever closening relations quiet and would 
only countenance an overt relationship if they encountered an unprecedented challenge. 
The Iraqi invasion presented such a challenge. 
Qatar was, at this point, a passive actor. It took America’s slowly increasing focus in the Gulf 
region and the Kuwait invasion-induced paradigm shift in the international relations of the 
Gulf for both America to become a palatable actor with whom to engage and for Qatar’s 
leadership to feel the need to call for US help. Indeed, the Iraqi invasion not only asked new 
existential questions of Qatar but provided the answer at the same time.  
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International Mediation 
As with any such all-encompassing term mediation can be defined widely, for example, “by 
the sought outcome (settlement, end to hostilities...); against other forms of dispute settling 
(arbitration, litigation...) or according to sought attributes of a mediator such as neutrality or 
impartiality.”448 Following an earlier study of Qatari mediation, a broader definition will be 
used with mediation being seen as “a form of conflict management in which a third party 
assists two or more contending parties to find a solution without resorting to force.”449  
The question then arises of how does the mediator mediate, for there is a continuum of 
involvement ranging from facilitation450 through formulation to manipulation.451 Typically, 
facilitation is more passive with the mediator relaying massages and arranging meetings as 
opposed to manipulation where progress is theoretically maintained through “the 
‘introduction of an element of power’ and overall being far more active, dynamic and 
‘forceful’ in the process.”452 In between these two poles the mediator is involved with 
suggesting ways to proceed, reframing the question, offering proposals but not in coercing 
or cajoling the disputants to move. 
Qatar’s forays into mediation throughout the Arab World, the Horn of Africa, and North 
Africa run the gamut of these definitions. In Lebanon Qatar was an overt ‘manipulator’ 
leading, cajoling, and pressuring the sides to get to an agreement using whatever carrots 
and sticks were available. In Darfur Qatar took a more reserved position. Primarily it acted 
as a facilitator for the warring parties, while upgrading its role when agreements were to be 
made to shrewd and overt manipulation. In Mauritania, from what evidence is available, it 
appears that Qatar acted as a trusted, impartial intermediary with the resources to secure 
the release of the prisoners. 
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The theory of mediation offers possible explanations as to why actors engage in mediation.   
The motives for initiating individual mediation may include (a) a genuine desire to change the course 
of a long-standing or escalating conflict and promote peace, (b) a desire to gain access to major 
political leaders and open channels of communication, (c) a desire to spread one’s ideas and enhance 
personal standing and professional status.  
Where mediators represent an official government...motives...may include: (a) a clear mandate to 
intervene in disputes [i.e. state is constitutionally mandated to do so] (b) a desire to do something 
about a conflict whose continuance may adversely affect their own political interests, (c) being 
approached directly by one or both parties... (d) the wish to preserve intact a structure of which they 
are a part... (e) viewing mediation as a way of extending and enhancing their own influence and 
gaining some value from the conflict.
453
 
In the Qatari case where politics is so elite-dominated and where a group of no more than 
three of four people formulate and put into action new policies, one must consider the 
‘personal’ motivations alongside ‘state’ motivations. Nevertheless, many of these other 
motivations apply to the Qatari examples, as will be discussed, but the importance of 
“enhancing their own influence” as the literature describes a typical motivation, is a 
reoccurring theme.  
Qatar’s various mediation attempts starting in the 1990s bare no comparison to previous 
policies in Qatar. While Khalifah Bin Hamad had countless meetings with key regional 
leaders, there is no evidence of any systematic attempts to make Qatar a state known for its 
mediation. Therefore, both quantitatively in terms of number mediations attempted and 
qualitatively in terms of the depth of interaction and the controversial nature of some of the 
mediations, it is clear that Qatar’s mediation initiatives are a policy of the new era.   
Domestic 
Historically, the Qatari Peninsula never suffered from centralised control. The vast majority 
of the Peninsula was inhospitable, unsettled, and uncontrolled. This situation did not change 
significantly until well into the twentieth century. Throughout the nineteenth century 
though control was sporadically extended to the more major settlements around the coast 
under various authorities in conjunction with various external powers, these settlements 
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remained small in number, small in population, and relatively small in importance (aside 
from a brief moment in the sun for Zubarah in the late 18th century). As late as the 1940s 
Qatar’s territorial integrity was still not under central control with Ibn Saud sending 
expeditions of geologists into the depths of Qatar clinically highlighting the lack of central Al 
Thani control.  
This history whereby Qatar developed something of a reputation as a relatively ungoverned 
space meant that the Peninsula frequently attracted all manner of exiles and those fleeing 
authority. This did not make the Qatar Peninsula unique in the region but this trait reoccurs 
in Qatar’s history until today. While it is unlikely that Hamad Bin Khalifah sought to actively 
build upon this historical trait by expanding from hosting exiles – a ‘light’ version of offering 
good offices – to fully fledged facilitation, formulation, and manipulation, he would not be 
the first leader who sought to hark back to a trait exemplified in the country’s past to forge 
some kind of a link of historical continuity to the present even if that link was tenuous. 
However, that Qatar traditionally hosted a variety of exiles proved to be useful both in 
mediations and in Qatar’s Arab Spring policies. Hamad Bin Khalifah built up a close, personal 
relationship with Hamas’ Secretary General Khaled Mishaal over many years of him residing 
sporadically in Doha. This personal link proved to be useful in inculcating Qatar into aspects 
of the politics in the Levant, culminating in the Emir’s trip in 2012 as the first Head of State 
to visit Hamas-controlled Gaza.  
Along with this tactical issue facilitating Qatar’s mediation are equally prosaic concerns. 
Before Khalifah Bin Hamad took power, Qatar was little more than a village developing 
quickly with leaders at the helm who spent as much time in Geneva as in Doha. There was, 
therefore, no capacity and no elite desire to involve Qatar in any kind of international 
mediation. Though Khalifah Bin Hamad engaged in a wider gamut of foreign policies than his 
predecessors, he was mostly preoccupied with developing the Qatari state to solidify and 
extend his support. Also his conservative disposition militated against any kind of risky 
international manoeuvres. In short, that he did not engage in any significant wider 
mediatory forays is not surprising and in keeping with his character and ruling 
temperament. 
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The same cannot be said for his son Hamad Bin Khalifah for foreign mediation can be seen 
as an archetypal ‘Hamadian’ policy. It projected power abroad giving Qatar greater sway 
internationally; it did this in an inoffensive capacity as a ‘neutral’ arbiter of conflicts; it 
slowly built up Qatar’s reputation as a state willing to bear costs to facilitate peace 
internationally, highlighting Qatar’s burgeoning international statesmanship; and it – along 
with the finance that typically came with Qatari mediation – increased Qatar’s international 
popularity.454  
When Hamad Bin Khalifah took over in 1995, like his father before him he immediately 
began to vigorously seek to popularise himself and his rule. His father started by sharing the 
Qatari wealth to a far greater degree as noted in Chapter 3. Hamad Bin Khalifah used rentier 
policies of distributing wealth for support; he also took steps towards the dispersal of 
power, the enfranchisement of women, and significant opening up of debate with the 
removal of censorship. These policies pointed the direction in which he sought to take the 
country; on a clearly more liberal tack. In this context, fostering a reputation for Qatar as a 
state that seeks to bring peace where possible around the wider region has progressive 
echoes of his domestic direction of travel. Indeed, Hamad Bin Khalifah sought to indelibly 
inscribe these progressive notions towards foreign policy into Qatar’s constitution. Article 
seven of the constitution drawn up under Hamad and voted into effect by popular vote in 
2003, notes that 
The foreign policy of the State is based on the principle of strengthening international peace and 
security by means of encouraging peaceful resolution of international disputes; and shall support the 
right of peoples to self-determination; and shall not interfere in the domestic affairs of states; and 
shall cooperate with peace-loving nations.
455
 
Just as policies notionally directed domestically can have impact abroad, so too foreign 
policies can be designed to have resonance domestically; as former Speaker of the United 
States House of Representatives Thomas O’Neill noted, ‘all politics is local.’ From Qatar’s 
role supporting the Palestinian cause via Hamas to Qatar’s wide-ranging mediation, the 
state was undertaking policies that usually resonated well domestically.  
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Finally, a prosaic but crucial point is that Qatar began to accrue more money than it could 
spend, particularly during the 2000s. With such a situation comes not only a search for ways 
to spend the excess but a lower threshold for deciding whether to engage in a particular 
activity or not. In this context mediation became a luxury item that Qatar could easily 
afford.  
Qatar’s financial strength facilitated mediation in the same way that the US-led security 
guarantees facilitated it by releasing Qatar from the mundane concerns of securing the 
realm. Similarly it gave Qatar trust that if the mediation were to go badly wrong – not an 
insignificant concern when negotiating with Gaddafi’s Libya or potentially Iranian-backed 
Houthis – Qatar’s security was still secure with US backing.  
Given the nature of Qatar and the personal way that decisions made, there are important 
links between individuals and policies. In the case of the Qatari decision to mediate in 
Lebanon (and in Sudan and Yemen), Gulbrandsen seeks to draw links between Qatari 
business interests and Qatar’s mediatory intervention.456 He rightly notes that in 2007 when 
the crisis was at its worst, Qatar was the fourth largest investor in Lebanon.457 He also notes 
that Qataris are known to have personal property and business interests in the country, 
while Lebanon’s proximity to Syria where Qatar also had significant investments further 
suggests that ‘business diplomacy’ driven by a desire to secure Qatar’s investments may 
have been a motivating factor.   
It is likely that the investment that the Qatari elite had tied up in Lebanon and Syria affected 
the decision but splitting the vexatious issues of correlation and causality in this case is 
difficult. It is certainly not the case that the money was the only factor; if Qatar mediated or 
otherwise intervened everywhere it had investments its foreign policy would be even more 
active than it already is. Gulbrandsen puts together more sporadically compelling statistics 
regarding the depth of Qatari investment in Yemen and in Sudan, yet still the question of 
correlation and causality is problematic.458  
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In the Sudanese case one potential reason for Qatar’s mediation stems from issues of food 
security. Qatar is one of the most food insecure nations on earth importing at least 90 per 
cent of its food from abroad. With a fast-growing population and regional competition to 
secure farm land abroad, Qatar established Hassad Foods to act as the agribusiness 
component of its sovereign wealth fund. Given that Sudan was once known as the ‘bread 
basket’ of Africa and Qatar’s desire to secure long-term sources of food stuffs, it is difficult 
to disassociate Qatar’s mediation involvement from these issues. Engaging in mediation is a 
good way to establish and build up good will, good contacts, and a potentially good track 
record of business. Indeed, with the mediation costing Qatar up to $2 billion, Qatar showed 
deep commitment to the issue. Even when Sudanese President Bashir was being pilloried in 
the Western press and indicted as a war criminal, still Qatar stuck by him.459 
As yet there is insufficient evidence to link Qatar’s mediation in Sudan to subsequent land or 
food purchases. Though there have been not insignificant land purchases, Qatar has bought 
land across the world and one cannot establish a causative link.460  
Regional 
In the 1970s Kuwait invented the role of a small, Gulf country, seeking to forge a range of 
international relations, while using its financial largesse to bolster causes deemed worthy to 
engender a positive, non-aligned reputation.461 Kuwait’s oil money has long been used for 
foreign and even defence policy to the extent where “virtually every time a danger 
presented itself, Kuwait responded with foreign aid.”462 
While Kuwait was gallivanting around the region using its financial largesse to support 
friendly causes, Qatar was decades behind in terms of development. From the eighteenth 
century onwards Kuwait - the ‘Marseilles of the Gulf’ as Goldberg memorably describes it463 - 
was more established and advanced while Qatar was still a collection of small, mostly poor 
villages. There was, therefore, little opportunity for Qatar to emulate such a foreign policy.  
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As oil began to flow more vigorously in the 1970s and the price rose steeply with the 
regional crises, as noted in Chapter 3, Khalifah Bin Hamad engaged in sporadic policies to 
burnish Qatar’s international image notably by following the Kuwaiti example and offering 
international aid. Yet there was no paradigm shift in Qatar’s foreign policies here; more of a 
peripatetic desire to dabble internationally when the international climate was favourable.  
Yet it was this quietest regional history that subsequently helped Qatar when it sought to 
become a mediator. By virtue of being such a restrained international actor, Qatar could 
credibly note that it scarcely had any axe to grind on the international scene. Unlike Saudi 
Arabia, which by virtue of its size and geopolitical self-image had long had defined policies 
and allies around the region, Qatar was a relatively blank slate.  
In Lebanon in 2008, Saudi Arabia was one of the many would-be mediators that failed. A key 
part of the reason for their failure is that their history in the region demonstrated that Saudi 
Arabia could not possibly be seen as impartial. In particular, Hezbollah, the Shia group with a 
significant say in the negotiations, would never accept the Kingdom in a meaningful 
mediatory role. By contrast Qatar had no history of animosity towards Hezbollah and had 
been seeking to diversify its international contacts and open lines of discussion and support 
with all parties. Qatar was thus in the unique position of being able to call Tel Aviv and 
Tehran in the morning and the hills of Lebanon and Washington in the afternoon. Qatar’s 
unique ability to be the interlocutor in negotiations which needed the acquiescence and 
support of diverse actors like Israel, Iran, and America gave Qatar a comparative advantage, 
which it used to good effect. In this sense, Qatar sought to fill a gap that was missing in 
regional politics.  
Similarly, it is possible to see Qatar’s mediatory forays as a way of calming regional tensions, 
particularly in relation to Iran.464 Arab-Persian animosity dates back to perennial questions of 
identity, culture, and religion with some aspects stemming back thousands of years. The 
modern twist stemming from the 1979 Iranian Revolution sharpened the differences and 
concerns between the conservative Sunni monarchies and the proselytizing republican Shia 
revolutionaries.  
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The reaction of the Gulf States to Iran and its international politics differs. Saudi Arabia 
typically leads a staunch block seeking to contain and constrain Iran wherever possible. 
Accommodation and negotiation, though occasionally undertaken, is the exception that 
tests the rule. Abu Dhabi has in recent years, notably since 2007, followed this Saudi path. 
Kuwait occasionally falls into place though its effervescent and near-uncontrollable 
Parliament instilled Kuwait’s foreign policies as the 2000s progressed with ever more 
balance. Bahrain follows Riyadh’s path and has done so with extra gusto since the Arab 
Spring arrived in Manama in February 2011. Oman and Qatar have largely eschewed the 
Saudi line for decades. Both believe that it is in their best interests to attempt to deal with 
Iran constructively. This is not to say that Iranian bilateral relations are necessarily warm, 
but that Oman and Qatar usually display a different conclusion to the ‘Iranian equation’ 
compared with Saudi Arabia. Indeed, several instances of Qatari mediation may be seen in 
this context; of Qatar seeking innovative and non-confrontational ways of addressing 
growing Iranian influence.  
While Qatar has a positive relationship with Hezbollah, which has allegedly included 
supporting the organization financially and certainly defending it politically, this does not 
mean that it wants to see Iran’s proxy take untrammelled power in Lebanon.465 Clearly 
Hezbollah is a power to be reckoned with in Lebanon. Qatar’s relationship with Hezbollah 
does not stem from ideological conviction but from a sober reflection on the realities of 
power in the Levant: it would do Qatar no good (just as it does Saudi Arabia no good) to 
simply ignore them.   
Aware of the realities of power in the country as demonstrably shown by Hezbollah in the 
run up to the Qatari mediation, Qatar sought to salvage the situation by enshrining the de 
facto Hezbollah power in a more de jure fashion. Qatar, it can be argued, undertook a 
damage limitation exercise preventing Hezbollah fermenting further civic strife and gaining 
a position where the Iranian-backed group could push for even more gains against a weak 
and divided Lebanese state and Army.  
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In the Yemeni example the Iranian link is tenuous. The Houthis are Zaydi Muslims, which is 
closer to Shia Islam than Sunni, but still not analogous despite attempts to portray Iran as a 
natural, religiously-aligned supporter of their cause. Nevertheless, there have been several 
documented visits by Houthi leaders to Iran as well as sporadic reports of weapons 
shipments and other support.466 In this context it is possible to suggest that Qatar’s desire to 
seek some kind of equitable solution in Yemen was a part of a wider desire to shore up the 
troubled country to prevent any growth of Iranian influence.  
Lastly, in terms of the wider Sudanese-Horn region, Iran has been a weapons supplier to 
Sudan historically and particularly since the mid-2000s the Islamic Republic has been 
explicitly seeking to augment relations.467 More recently the Iranian angle in Sudan has come 
to light after strikes on weapon-smuggling convoys bound for Gaza and on a munitions 
factory in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital.468 Reports of Iran developing a military base in Eritrea 
appear to be baseless, but it has certainly increased significantly its profile with Iran with a 
raft of agreements.469 More generally, the Economist notes that Iran has been active in 
pushing senior diplomatic visits to Africa, at least in part to seek support against an 
increasingly hostile international community.470 To some degree, this is working with Iran 
receiving notable diplomatic support regarding its nuclear issues, while Iran has also been 
accused of supplying weapons throughout the region often with the aim of supplying anti-
Israeli groups.471 
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Just as with mediation in Yemen, there is logic to the notion that Qatar may want to attempt 
to assert itself in the Horn-Sudanese region. Involving itself in the machinations of the 
Darfur questions with all the personal contacts that that will necessarily create is potentially 
a sensible approach to take to gain a primary understanding of the regions’ goings on. 
Similarly, by investing in Sudan via the mediation (in terms of time, money, and effort) Qatar 
is shoring up its relations across the country, which may prove useful as a foil against Iranian 
encroachment.  
International 
For most of the reign of Khalifah Bin Hamad (1972-1995) the Cold War prevailed. Its 
dynamics set the overarching tone of international relations instilling a set of constraints on 
the international system that were implicitly and explicitly acted upon. The place of states, 
their role in the system, the limits of their actions, and the expectations upon them were 
set. With the end of the Cold War came a transformation of these fundamental issues. Stern 
and Druckman offer a brief summary of some of the effects of this paradigm shift.   
The end of an era of bipolarity, a new wave of democratization, increasing globalization of 
information and economic power, more frequent efforts at international coordination of security 
policy, a rash of sometimes-violent expressions of claims to rights based on cultural identity, and a 
redefinition of sovereignty that imposes on states new responsibilities to their citizens and the world 
community.
472
  
Simultaneously, in the words of former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director James 
Woolsey, the end of the Cold War meant that conflicts that had been pent up were released 
and the dragon of the Soviet Union had been slain to be replaced by a “jungle of snakes.”473 
This change in the international system and the change in type and number of conflicts 
“opened the door for small state facilitation in conflict resolution.”474 
This theoretical approach positing that the international system was not conducive to small 
state mediation tallies with a perusal of the basic history of the region. Under the duress of 
cold war bipolarity where assisting or even maintaining positive relations with a particular 
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state was potentially enough to pin one’s colours to the wall with all the ramifications of 
being readily identified with one particular camp, it is understandable that a small relatively 
defenceless state like Qatar would not pursues such an action. 
Yet with more conflicts finally escaping their Cold War-based repression, there emerged 
something of a target rich environment for actors looking to engage in mediation. 
Empirically, Yilmaz notes that from 1948-1978 thirteen peacekeeping forces were 
established but this number was not augmented from 1978 to 1988. However, from near 
the end of the Cold War in May 1988 to October 1993 twenty new missions were created. 
By December 2008, he continues, a total of sixty-three had been created.475 Such statistics 
highlight the explosion of smaller conflicts that the end of the Cold War era heralded and 
the ability of the international community to react and do something about them.  
After the end of the Cold War, the next paradigm altering event for the Middle East was the 
attacks on America on 11 September 2001. The post-9/11 America saw the Arab world from 
a basic, Manichean perspective; as President George W Bush put it, “you’re either with us or 
against us.”476  
Qatar was one of the states that was seen – though not without a couple of crises – as an 
Arab State ‘on America’s side.’ Support in the War on Terror not least through increased 
basing agreements meant that Qatar had more latitude to act than other states as the 
decade progressed. Certainly, there were sometimes angry statements emanating from the 
American administration such as former Presidential candidate John Kerry’s admonishment 
that “Qatar cannot continue to be an American ally on Monday that sends money to Hamas 
on Tuesday.”477 Yet, over time, America’s Government came to realise that Qatar, though 
not perfect, was nevertheless a useful ally.  Indeed, Qatar fostered a niche role for itself as 
an interlocutor between America and some of the more problematic Arab regimes and 
Muslim groups with whom Qatar regularly engaged, often in the pursuit of its mediatory 
activities.  
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The case of the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar, first mooted in late 2011, is an 
interesting example of Qatar seeking to position itself as a key interlocutor.478 In the light of 
the US and coalition draw-down of troops in Afghanistan and given the difficulties of finding 
suitable representatives from the Taliban with whom to negotiate, an opening appeared for 
an intermediary to bring the two sides together. Qatar, with Germany’s assistance, put the 
proposal forward, which was eventually accepted. Despites several apparent ‘cancellations’ 
of the office, it has been operating in Qatar since late 2012 and a fully-fledged office is 
expected to open in 2013.479   
Qatar lives to provide just such a role. America’s exit from Afghanistan is of critical 
importance to the US Administration. Much blood and treasure has been expended in 
Afghanistan in the past decade and Americans do not want to see this count for naught. 
These negotiations, as unpalatable as some may find them, are an important part of 
ensuring a more stable Afghanistan going forward. Qatar, by facilitating this potentially key 
avenue for talks on such a critically important topic, is reminding America and the wider 
international community of the almost uniquely important role that Qatar can play in the 
international community.  
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International Relations and Investments 
In 1989 Qatar began to discuss with Iran the possibility of piping water from the lake behind 
the Shahid Abbaspour Dam on the River Karun, Iran’s largest river, under the Gulf to 
Qatar.480 This overture from Qatar came as key events such as the death of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the rise of Ayatollah Khamenei, and President Rafsanjani were turning “the 
doctrines and the practices of Iranian foreign policy on their heads.”481 Qatar, perennially 
nimble in its foreign policy, sought to take advantage of this changing situation at a time 
when Qatar and Iran were going to have to delineate and develop their giant gas field. 
Soon after the Kuwaiti invasion Iranian Defence Minister Ali Akbar Torkan visited Doha482 
and the Heir Apparent Hamad Bin Khalifah welcomed the 1991 mini-rapprochement and 
resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia believing that Iran must 
“have a say in any security architecture devised for the region in the post crisis era.”483 
Hamad Bin Khalifah then visited Iran in November 1991 being the highest ranking GCC 
visitor to Iran post-invasion and signed a raft of agreements and understandings with 
Iranian counterparts. In 1992 First Vice President Hasan Habibi headed a delegation visit to 
Qatar “regarded by the Iranians as “watershed” events in the relations of the two 
countries”484 and the Qatari Minister of the Interior then visited Tehran in reply to sign 
further agreements, while Qatar’s new dynamic foreign Minister, Hamad Bin Jassem Al 
Thani, spent two weeks of 1993 in Iran.485   
One Egyptian report from Misr Al Fatah after the 1992 Qatar-Saudi border skirmish went as 
far as to claim that Qatar signed in retaliation a $13 billion agreement for Iran to construct 
“ports, jetties, and roads in Qatar” even noting that “the Qatari leadership requested 
Iranian protection against  Saudi threats.”486 Similarly, in 1995 after an alleged coup attempt, 
reports emerged suggesting that Iran pledged to send 30,000 troops to defend Hamad Bin 
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Khalifah in Qatar.487 In reality, these reports (and particularly the former) are an 
exaggeration if not outright speculation, but they nevertheless speak to not only the 
feverish climate at the time but the potential as seen by some for the Qatari-Iranian 
relationship. Indeed, Hamad Bin Khalifah himself hints that he believed that such a 
rapprochement with Iran could be useful for forcing the Americans to sit at the negotiating 
table with Qatar to establish a security framework; the implicit threat being if America 
cannot guarantee Qatar, maybe Iran could.488  
Continuing Qatari attempts to boost relations with Iran include using its diplomatic role 
when on the UN Security Council in 2006 to vote against Resolution 1696 censuring Iran and 
demanding that it cease nuclear enrichment. Though the resolution easily passed, Qatar 
sent a strong message to Iran of its support. Similarly, the next year Qatar abstained on UN 
resolution 1757 seeking a tribunal to investigate the assassination of Rafik Hariri in Lebanon, 
a move that also played well in Tehran (and Damascus, its key ally).  
In 2007 Qatar invited Iran to the GCC’s annual meeting, the first time that an Iranian leader 
had been so invited, much to the chagrin of other GCC attendees. 2008 saw Qatar’s key 
intervention in Lebanon (as noted above), which some see as Qatar aiding Hezbollah and 
unverified though plausible reports suggest that Qatar was sending up to $100m per year to 
Hezbollah.489 2009 was a year of numerous bilateral visits including the Emir and the Chief of 
Staff of the Qatari Armed Forces visiting Iran culminating in agreements on their joint 
border and related security arrangements and the signing of an unspecified military 
cooperation agreement the next year.490  
Such relatively strong and numerous actions supporting Iran may be interpreted as Qatar 
seeking some kind of balance for hosting of US forces during the Iraq War with Qatar 
wanting to prove that it is not beholden to America at all. Indeed, what better way could 
there be of proving its independence than engaging consistently with America’s key regional 
enemy? There are also many smaller examples of Qatar pursuing a balance. For example, 
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when in 2010 US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton delivered a harsh, at times anti-Iranian 
speech at the Doha Forum, Qatar gave permission for several Iranian warships to be docked 
in Doha at the same time, as Press TV proudly reported.491 Similarly, Qatar refused the Bush 
Administration’s request to close down Iranian banks working in Doha and while not 
allowing any new ones to open, the Qatari Government announced that it would allow “in 
classic Qatari fashion” the existing Iranian bank in Qatar to open another branch on the day 
of former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s visit to Qatar in mid-2008.492 Former American 
Ambassador James LeBaron went on to explain that this behaviour “does not satisfy either 
the U.S. or Iran, but it exemplifies how the Al Thani leadership tries to maintain balance 
between competing interests.”493 Indeed, as much as such examples of relations hint at 
serious Qatari-Iranian competition, it is questionable how meaningful the relationship 
actually is or if it is more of a public relations exercise as Hamad Bin Jassem noted about his 
Iranian counterparts, “they [Iran] lie to us; we lie to them.”494 
Around this time Qatar was boosting its relations with Israel too. Stemming from the 
November 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, Qatar signalled its willingness to end its boycott 
of Israel. Slowly thereafter Qatar increased levels of recognition of Israel until it was “the 
first GCC State to offer de facto recognition of Israel by launching trade relations.”495 The 
signing of the 1993 Oslo Peace Principles further facilitated relations and several visits 
ensued. This progressed to Hamad Bin Khalifah attending the ‘Oslo 2’ signing ceremony, the 
Qatari Minister of Information attending Prime Minister Rabin’s funeral, and his successor, 
Shimon Peres, visiting Qatar in April 1996, which laid the ground-work for the official 
opening of the Israeli trade office in Doha on 24 May 1996.496 
The trade office focused on telecoms, aviation, and Israel also sent a large trade delegation 
to the military and police trade fare Milipol in November 1996.497 While relations were 
inevitably somewhat strained and unusual (even if it transpires that Toys ‘R Us in Doha sold 
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F-16 toy airplanes with Israeli markings), both sides were optimistic and set about slowly 
building ties.498 Potentially the most important deal focused on LNG with Enron acting as the 
key interlocutor. Discussions began in 1993 and eventually failed in 1998. 
The office in Doha struggled in the face of Arab criticism. Qatar managed to resist Arab 
pressure to close the office until November 2000 when Qatar was scheduled to host the 
Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) summit after which, Qatar was to take over its 
presidency. Violence in the Palestinian Territories exacerbated by Israel Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon’s visit to the Al Aqsa mosque - a provocative action - exacerbated relations and Saudi 
Arabia and Iran threatened to boycott the event unless the Israeli office was closed. Qatar 
announced the closure of the office on 09 November 2000.499 However, according to leaked 
US Diplomatic Cables, the office “never effectively closed. In fact, Israeli personnel remained 
in Qatar, keeping a low profile, until normal operations of the office resumed.”500  
Without an official announcement the office restarted and was led by Ambassador Roi 
Rosenblit from 2006 to 2009. This period saw sporadic elite interaction such as Foreign 
Minister Tzipi Livni speaking at the Doha Forum on Democracy, Development and Free 
Trade on 14 April 2008.501 However, in reaction to Israel’s December 2008 Operation Cast 
Lead, Qatar officially closed the office and broke off diplomatic relations. Subsequent 
overtures from Qatar to reopen the office in 2010 and 2011 were also rejected by Israel and 
stymied by Egypt.502 Finally, leaks from the Israeli Foreign Ministry in 2011 indicated a 
firming of Israel’s stance against Qatar and a complete closure of the office facility. 
The relationships with Israel and Iran are starkly different from the past when such relations 
were unthinkable under Saudi Arabia’s auspices. Yet there was also a deepening of relations 
with other actors in the region that while not as unique still constitute a significant change 
from the past’s less concerted attempts at augmenting diverse relations.  
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In 1995 Qatar announced its intention to open an office in Gaza mirroring its increasing 
interest in the region and to act as a centre from which to monitor the increasing amount of 
money it was spending.503 While a small office may have subsequently opened, there is little 
evidence of such a Qatari facility being operational. Building on a long-term relationship 
with Hamas’ Secretary General Khaled Mishaal, in 2012 the Emir of Qatar became the first 
leader to visit Hamas-controlled Gaza since its 2006 election win. Again, to facilitate the 
dispersal of Qatari aid, the Emir announced the opening of an office in Gaza.504  
Aside from Hamas and long-term contacts with the Palestinian Authority, Qatar has an 
ambiguous relationship with Hezbollah. The specifics of this relationship are difficult to 
dissect. Qatar has supported and protected the group diplomatically and politically and 
there are suggestions that Qatar has supported them financially too.505 This kind of a 
supportive relationship with a Shia group like Hezbollah is unusual in Qatar’s history and is 
another feature of Qatar’s policies under the new elite, which maintains that it needs to 
speak to all sides and deal with the realities of whomever has power.  
Just as Qatar’s diplomatic relations expanded under the new Qatari elite, so too did its 
financial dealings as Qatar’s gas ventures came online and the state had more money than it 
could spend. Unlike Kuwait which established the company that would become its SWF in 
1953, Qatar’s SWF the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) was founded in 2005. Previously 
investment was undertaken on a smaller scale by a team under the auspices of the Ministry 
of Finance (MOF) and leaked US Government cables note that the QIA was still run until late 
2007 from the MOF.506 Crown Prince Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani is the Chairman of QIA but 
Hamad Bin Jassem is the Vice-Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the major 
driving force in the operation of the fund.  
Aside from the QIA there are various other Qatar-based funds. The Crown Princes’ Qatar 
Sports Investment (QSI) fund invests heavily throughout the sports industry and was 
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responsible for buying the French football team Paris St Germain in 2011 (not QIA as it often 
noted). There are large family ran funds that invest across sectors but mostly focus on 
banking, sport, and luxury goods, while on occasion it is not at all clear what entity is 
investing as with the much misunderstood attempt to invest in the Muslim-dominated 
suburbs around Paris in 2012.507 Despite these other sources of funds, the QIA is the 
standard-bearer and by far the largest source of investments from Qatar.  
The QIA is split into different companies that control different areas. Qatar Diar is a real-
estate development company, Qatar Holding focuses on strategic private and public equity 
or direct investments, and Hassad Foods focuses on agribusiness investments. The stated 
goal of the QIA is to develop investments to secure Qatar’s long-term financial future 
through economic diversification.  
The QIA has focused on acquiring (often large) stakes in some of the world’s most 
prominent companies including Agricultural Bank of China, Barclays Bank, Cegelec, Credit 
Suisse, Harrods, Heathrow Airport Holdings, Hochtief, Iberdrola, Lagardère Group, London 
Stock Exchange, Miramax Films, Porsche and Volkswagen, Sainsbury’s, Santander Brazil, 
Shell, Siemens, Tiffany, Vinci, Xstrata, and various high-end property deals with a particular 
focus on London and Paris.   
It is interesting to note the prominence of the QIA as compared to its size. Estimates vary 
and accurate conclusions are difficult to arrive at due to the secrecy of most SWFs, but 
according to a range of statistics, the QIA is by no means the largest SWF in the world. The 
US Government Accountability Office lists ten SWFs with larger funds, as does a report 
written at the Wharton School, while an in-depth article in the OECD Journal Financial 
Market Trends places QIA ninth in the world in terms of size.508 Even accounting for growth 
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since these reports were produced, the QIA is still not close to entering the top five largest 
SWF funds in the world. Yet it retains an unusual prominence as a Google Trend search 
neatly highlights. In essence, Google Trends displays the frequency that a given phrase was 
entered into the Google search engine. In this case, ‘Qatar Investment Authority,’ ‘Abu 
Dhabi Investment Authority,’ and ‘Kuwait Investment Authority,’ were the key terms and 
the time frame was from 2004 to 2013. Even though the Abu Dhabi and Kuwaiti SWFs are 
significantly larger and more established (by decades in the Kuwaiti example), as the QIA’s 
blue line shows in the graph below, QIA holds its own very well despite being smaller and 
newer.509  
Figure 1: Google Trend Search for QIA and Other Notable SWFs 
 
“Abu Dhabi Investment Fund” Red Line; “Qatar Investment Authority” Blue Line; “Kuwait Investment Authority” 
Yellow Line 
This has not happened by accident as this kind of business prominence is a part of what 
Qatar seeks.510 It has achieved this in part by having unusually close relations with the 
financial press as well as focusing on taking often large stakes in high-profile companies.511  
Domestic 
In the Qatari context where such a small number of people are of such importance in 
designing the strategic direction and tactical policies, a single individual can have the most 
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profound effects. For Qatar emerging in the 1980s and 1990s there was a small group of 
people who shared a broad vision for how Qatar should change to meet emerging 
challenges. This group is traditionally understood as containing the Hamad Bin Khalifah, 
Sheikha Moza Bint Nasser Al Misnad, and the Foreign and Prime Minister Hamad Bin Jassem 
at the very top with Abdullah Bin Hamad Al Attiyah the former long-term Industry and 
Energy Minister and key advisors like Dr Ibrahim Al Ibrahim playing important supporting 
roles.  
Divining the intra-group dynamics and who ought to be considered as members of the 
group is not straight-forward without access to the country’s leadership for full and frank 
interviews and there are only limited in-depth interviews in the media and no published 
memoirs or similar sources. In lieu of such evidence, it is necessary to rely upon sensible 
deductions based on available evidence to understand the core motives for designing 
policies such as Qatar’s desire to broaden its international relations.  
Firstly, the relative youth of this new cohort is striking. Hamad Bin Khalifah was 43 when he 
took power in 1995 while most regional leaders were a full generation older: his peer was 
72 in Saudi Arabia, 76 in the UAE, 69 in Kuwait, 62 in Bahrain, and 54 in Oman. Hamad Bin 
Jassem was in his late 30s when the coup occurred as was Sheikha Moza Bint Nasser, Hamad 
Bin Khalifah’s most prominent wife.512  
Born in the early 1950s, Hamad grew up in a world of revolutionary, Nasserist rhetoric. State 
borders were seemingly weakened by these pan-national movements carried by pan-
national broadcasts like Sawt Al Arab, the central medium of information propagation of its 
era.513 One must refrain from engaging in after-the-fact rationalisations, but it is striking how 
similar one of the Emir’s early ideas (Al Jazeera) was to Sawt Al Arab. Both were 
revolutionary uses of newly available technology in the Middle East and both were uniquely 
powerful for years and seen as the key medium of imbibing information by huge numbers of 
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Arabs around the region.514 It is not possible to work out what goes on in the mind of a 
leader or what the most important factors were that shaped his thoughts, yet as Dr Steven 
Wright of Qatar University notes, the fact that the Emir grew up in such an internationalised 
climate punctuated by pan-regional phenomena cannot be ignored as an instigating factor 
in the development of ideas (the promotion of Al Jazeera, pursuing new, in depth 
international relations, etc.) that were subsequently enunciated by Hamad Bin Khalifah’s 
policies.515 
Secondly, Hamad Bin Khalifah was the first ruler in Qatar to study abroad. This experience at 
the UK’s Sandhurst military training college exposed him to a world, to a discipline, and to 
new sets of ideas that would scarcely have been imaginable for his father. A new, rigorous 
education steeped in military logic, doctrine, and tactics may have given Hamad Bin Khalifah 
a new impression of Qatar’s own history. For a cursory glance at the modern history of 
Qatar shows a perennial search for some kind of a suzerain. While great empires have 
guaranteed Qatar’s security – the Ottomans and the British – they eventually left leaving 
Qatar looking for a replacement. Qatar seeking to broaden its international alliances under 
Hamad Bin Khalifah’s stewardship can be seen in this context; of a small country seeking to 
diversify its dependencies.  
Aside from the domestic angle stemming from the leadership itself, the adage that ‘all 
politics is domestic’ is never far from the surface in Qatar. For example, supporting the 
Palestinian cause naturally resonates approvingly with Qataris. Equally, there is often 
support for the more radical actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah, for they are viewed by 
many in Qatar (and the wider Arab region) as engaging in legitimate acts of defence against 
Israel.516  
Aside from domestically-based motives in terms of international relations, the central 
reason for Qatar’s investment activities stems from the domestic realm. Diversifying Qatar’s 
economy and acquiring different income streams is fundamentally about securing Qatar’s 
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continued domestic growth. In Qatar as in other Gulf States, where traditional structures 
and understandings of ruling bargains combine with the modern rentier economy, it is the 
duty of the Emir to provide for his people without asking in return for taxes and such 
impositions. The QIA’s role is to augment and ensure the longevity of the state’s ability to 
maintain this bargain. When economic concerns threaten to undercut domestic expansion 
and curtail opportunities for Qataris, the QIA directly invested in Qatar’s economy as in the 
financial crisis in 2008.517   
It is interesting to note in comparison to most SWFs that seek smaller stakes in a greater 
range of companies or who engage in obtuse financial deals to make money, many of QIAs 
investments are relatively easy to understand. While behind the scenes there is complex 
debt-restructuring, on the surface the QIA often acquires stakes in companies or prestige 
‘trophy’ assets. Not only this but many of the companies in question are engaged with 
tangible goods and services that Qataris could easily recognise: luxury hotels in Europe, 
German car manufacturers, Tiffany, Harrods and so on. Or if they are not tangible goods 
often the investment is in household names (Heathrow Airport’s holdings, Shell, Siemens, 
etc.) Like all SWFs, the QIA is spending the country’s money; the inheritance for future 
generations of Qataris. It is plausible to suggest that QIA’s preference for recognised brand 
names and for investing in companies that sell recognisable products stems from a desire to 
show Qataris ‘where their money is going.’ Indeed, the fact is that Qataris more than most 
other citizens can easily see where their money is being invested by their SWF, if working 
out their return on their investment is difficult because of QIA’s accounting secrecy.  
Equally it is true that the QIA is personally driven by Hamad Bin Jassem. While a shrewd 
business man, he is not a banker or an accountant trained in abstract financial wizardry; he 
buys what he instinctively understands and takes advantage of opportunities presented to 
him as he travels around the world as Qatar’s foreign minister.  
Regional  
Once more the central importance of Saudi Arabia as a factor determining or at least 
shaping Qatar’s foreign policy is evident. As the relationship soured as the early 1990s 
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progressed, America took up the mantle of protecting Qatar. Yet Qatar still faced more 
subtle challenges. After resting under the aegis of Saudi Arabia for so long, with their 
histories being so intertwined and with such little autonomous activity undertaken by Qatar 
over the years, there was an abiding need for Qatar’s elite to differentiate itself. Seeking 
improved relations with Iran and Israel is one pronounced way to do that.  
Nothing about traditional Saudi Arabian values and policies chimes with Hamad Bin 
Khalifah’s world-view or proclivities. While he is a pious man, he appears to have no time for 
the rigidity that characterises the core of the Saudi state. Nor does he believe that women 
must play an anonymous, subservient role. Had Hamad Bin Khalifah followed the Saudi line 
he would never have entrusted the control to the multi-billion dollar-backed engine of social 
and educational change in Qatar, the Qatar Foundation, to his wife. He would not have 
enfranchised women to vote having announced in 1997 that he “saw nothing wrong with 
it”518 and nor would he have sat beside his wife in an interview with CBS’ 60 Minutes News 
Show in 2003 leaving Qataris in “complete shock – and not because of the emir’s 
ruminations on the freedom and democracy...rather [Qataris] were focused on the woman 
sitting beside him. It was the first time that the vast majority of them had seen any of their 
first ladies.”519 Such progressive policies are antithetical to Saudi Arabia’s ethos. Similarly, 
Hamad Bin Khalifah’s policies indicate a pluralist world-view prizing debate and discussion 
among all actors, friend or foe; also not something that is typically found in the Saudi 
lexicon.  
Crucially, the emerging elite atmosphere in Doha and the trajectory that was being 
fashioned was incompatible with Saudi Arabia’s continuing role as a suzerain and, 
moreover, many of the policies were explicitly anti-Saudi in character. Were Hamad Bin 
Khalifah to have assembled a range of policies that would cause the most friction with Saudi 
Arabia the list would include offering women a prominent place in the public discourse, 
suggesting opening up the political arena with elections, improving relations with Iran, and 
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establishing and improving relations with the Israel. 520 Qatar, for so long seen as little more 
than an appendage of the Saudi Arabian state, was resolute in its desire to separate itself 
from any association with Saudi Arabia and engaged in policies which are essentially the 
exact opposite of those of the Kingdom.  
Aside from this focus on Saudi Arabia, other dynamics in the Gulf region were changing. A 
decade after the Iranian Revolution, in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, and with the 
death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 came an opportunity for change. Following his death 
and the exhaustion of the war, the Islamic Republic “downplayed its desire to spread its 
ideological message across the Gulf by propaganda and subversion.”521 The early years of 
Rafsanjani’s tenure as President starting in 1989 were a period of rapprochement with Arab 
States and even with Saudi Arabia.522 With an Iranian leadership open to improving relations 
and with the cover of the GCC’s lessening anti-Iranian tone, Qatar took advantage of this 
opportunity to normalise relations with Iran.  
Yet with or without a brief window of improved relations, the development of the North 
Field mandated that relations with Iran would have to change. If Qatar was to develop and 
extricate gas from the joint field, relations with Iran would have to be amicable if Qatar and 
those investing in the field were to have confidence that the Iranians would not interfere. It 
is under this rubric that a call for the UN Secretary General to intervene and calm Iraqi 
Iranian relations in 1985 can be best understood.523 Furthermore, as Qatar then became 
increasingly reliant on revenues from the field via shipping its gas through the Strait of 
Hormuz, its vulnerability to Iran increased.  
Commercial diplomacy has occasionally been used as a policy to improve relations with Iran. 
Importing water from Iran was one attempt to tie Iran into commercial ventures with Qatar 
to edge towards normalising their relationship. Despite unfulfilled initial plans to jointly 
invest $3 billion in the shared field in 1990, subsequent examples of cooperation are rare 
and quickly denied when they become public.524 One potentially significant venture with Iran 
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and Russia was the proposed gas cartel.525 While this idea has subsequently faded away, not 
least with poor Russian-Qatari relations, this remains a potent carrot that Qatar has to coax 
Iran into boosting its relations if it chooses to use it.526 
Just as the brief rapprochement with Iran helped Qatar so too with Israel the 1991 Madrid 
Peace talks, the 1993 Oslo Accords, and the Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace signed in 1994 
construed a period of active negotiation by Arabs and Israelis that provided cover for Qatar 
to improve relations. This did not prevent Qatar from being lambasted by its GCC allies for 
engaging with the Israelis particularly as Arab-Israeli relations soured as the decades 
progressed, but it offered them initial rhetorical cover and an opportunity to engage.  
Simultaneously, Qatar was also augmenting its relations with various Muslim groups. Like 
most regional states, Qatar had been long-term supporters of the Palestinian cause and was 
disappointed to hear Yasser Arafat defending Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Nevertheless, Qatar 
was the first state to propose a reconciliation in the early 1990s to Kuwait’s displeasure. At a 
time when Qatar was boosting relations with Israel, such overtures were necessary for 
Qatar to maintain a sense of balance. Moreover, establishing relations with both sides 
potentially places Qatar and its financial resources in a powerful position to act as a broker 
to tackle the central conflict in the Arab world. Contributing to settling the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, doubtless a long-term aim of Qatar’s rapprochement with Israel, would inscribe 
Qatar into the history books. Though this grand bid has failed thus far, Qatar still intervenes 
when it can. From seeking to secure the release of Gilad Shalit, the Israeli Defence Force 
soldier captured by Hamas in 2006 (which included Qatar accepting forty of the ‘militants’ 
released by Israel as part of the French-backed deal) to the 2012 engagement with Gaza, 
Qatar wants to reengage and be important in this seminal issue. 527 
Qatar’s desire for greater engagement is a thread that runs through its international 
relations and its investments, yet Qatar does not always deploy its financial strength 
through the QIA. In 2012 and 2013 much of Qatar’s financial assistance to Egypt came in the 
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form of government-to-government assistance with at least $5bn worth of deposits and aid 
announced in addition to an estimated $18bn worth of investment promised by 2018.528  
In return for these large and quickly-arranged investments that contributed to propping up 
the Egyptian economy at a precarious moment, Qatar wants to make itself important to 
Egypt. This is advantageous for a range of reasons. It has been suggested that Qatar could 
benefit from exemptions from foreign investment laws and Qatar will be the first to hear of 
emerging potentially lucrative large investment opportunities.529 Yet it is diplomatically that 
Qatar could see the most returns. Egypt is a centrally important actor in Middle Eastern 
politics. It has significant influence across a wide range of issues, some of which have direct 
relevance to Qatar. The mediation in Darfur, access to Gaza, cooperation with policy on 
Syria or Iran, or in international bodies such as the Arab League are all key issues for Qatar 
where Egypt could have a profound effect. Examples of Egypt striving to stymie Qatar’s 
activities in Darfur and in the Arab League are well known but could become a thing of the 
past.530 In short, Egypt represents a great “prize” for Qatar and establishing good will with its 
elite is an understandable political goal of Qatar’s leadership.531 
International  
The invasion and liberation of Kuwait and the end of the Cold War came at a seminal 
moment for Qatar’s emerging elite. As has been noted, they had been accruing and 
consolidating power since the mid-1980s with policy initiatives, cabinet reshuffles, and the 
creation of new, influential Supreme Councils. Midway through this consolidation of power 
the dominant structural system in the world changed more from 1989-1991 than at any 
time since the end of World War Two.532 President George Bush summed up the aspirations 
of the resultant new world order in his post-Gulf War speech to Congress.  
And now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect 
of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a "world order" in which "the principles of 
justice and fair play . . . protect the weak against the strong." A world where the United Nations, freed 
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from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders. A world in which 
freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.
533
  
The sense of optimism that greeted the fall of the Iron Curtain should not be forgotten. The 
tone of the new age, of collective action, of upholding international law and norms as 
personified in the defence of Kuwait was, at the start of the decade at least, deeply 
positive.534 The cleavages and fears of the Cold War were over and while they would be 
replaced by new concerns (a ‘jungle of snakes’), as trying as these new concerns would be 
they would not, it was believed, be as existentially pressing. The embodiment of the change 
that the end of the Cold War heralded can be found in Francis Fukuyama’s contention that 
history itself was at an end.535  
While Bush’s speech marked an optimistic agenda for a new era, the promise of the ‘New 
World Order’ soon lost its lustre. Joseph Nye pointed out that when “reality intruded [and] 
grand schemes turned into a liability” the White House soon decided to dial down “the 
rhetorical volume.”536 Similarly, in an essay rejecting the assumed importance of the end of 
the Cold War on the Middle East, Karsh noted that it was not long before “euphoric 
predictions of a ‘New World Order’ and the ‘End of History’ …[were]…buried in the alleys of 
Sarajevo and the killing fields of Rwanda and Chechnya.”537 As Karsh cautions, it is important 
to refrain from blithely assuming that the end of the Cold War in the Middle East had the 
same dramatic effects as it did for the West and for the Soviet bloc.  
Exactly what impression this lofty rhetoric had on the young elite in Qatar is difficult to say. 
What is clear, however, is that this kind of rhetoric; an appeal to and a pursuit of higher 
ideals characterises Qatar’s approach across the policy spectrum. From domestic concerns 
with grand social and educational goals embodied in the Qatar Foundation to Qatar’s 
diversification of international relations to previously verboten states like Iran and Israel, 
such policies are an encapsulation of the ethos of the new, post-Cold War age. Whether the 
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elite believed in this change or not, democracy had ‘won’ and it would have made sense to 
mirror America’s rhetoric to display to the world’s sole remaining superpower that Qatar 
sought to follow this vision.  
Aside from rhetoric there would necessarily be changes in the international system with the 
collapse of one of the hegemons. Concepts such as regionalism, multilateralism, and statism 
were pushed to the fore. The bipolar world did not eliminate such concepts but 
“strengthened all three by co-opting and integrating them into the two superpower blocs. 
Any post-Cold War system therefore will involve [sic] the resurfacing of all three of these 
alternative structural configurations.”538 
Such a rejigging of the international system would be underscored, in the absence of a 
unipolar world and the centralisation inherent in the Cold War’s structure, by a diffusion 
and decentralisation of power.539 In this new world, the options for small states to act 
assertively and potentially take advantage to expand their influence would be far greater.   
Though the structural dynamics of the Cold War and the post-Cold War system may not 
have been discussed in such technical ways in Hamad Bin Khalifah’s Diwan or Majlis, to a 
practitioner the differences were obvious. Leaving aside the lofty aspiration inherent in the 
new era, without the Cold War zero-sum constraints of necessarily seeking to balance 
America, Soviet, and non-aligned blocks, a leader was freer to make his own decisions. 
Certainly difficulties were still present and balance still had to be maintained with other 
actors, but not having the concern of alienating one of the two superpowers in the febrile 
Cold War atmosphere was liberating.  
Amid these strategic changes in the nature of international politics are tactical factors. With 
the perennial need to seek guarantees against worsening Saudi relations, Qatar sought to 
open a dialogue with America. However, though the paradigm was shifting with Operations 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm and even though America wanted an opportunity to engage 
with Gulf States this took some time to come to fruition. From the Qatari perspective this 
meant that its initial overtures for some protective arrangement were, according to Hamad 
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Bin Khalifah, rebuffed.540 Needing to secure American protection, he continued to note that 
relations were boosted with Iran and Iraq to provoke America into coming to the 
negotiating table. Eventually, when overtures to Israel were undertaken, America became 
more amenable.  
This explanation makes sense. For America, it could extract a concession to boost the 
regional support for its strongest ally in the Middle East – Israel – while such a gamble was 
not difficult for Qatar to undertake if it received US protection as it subsequently did. Given 
Qatar’s subsequent decades of augmenting relations with Iran, the initial overtures cannot 
solely have been to force America’s hand. The perseverance the elite showed in maintaining 
such a relationship indicates that this policy chimed with its own proclivities. 
In the world of Qatari investments too there are strategic as well as tactical concerns. Qatar 
seeks not only financial returns on its investments, but it invests to accrue importance in 
and of itself. That Qatar owns 20 per cent of The London Stock Exchange and 20 per cent of 
Heathrow Airport’s holding company not to mention an estimated £20 billion worth of QIA 
investment in London means that Qatar has bought far more than just financial influence.541 
Qatar has tied itself into two of the UK’s most critical hubs – its stock exchange and its key 
airport – and will have a say in decisions surrounding them for as long as it holds the shares. 
Qatar’s importance and visibility is increased and entrenched across segments of the British 
economy, while its moves to take these positions in the first place highlights Qatar’s 
statesmanship and business savvy. With over £20 billion invested in a country’s capital city, 
the Qatari Emir and Prime Minister can demand a meeting at any time of the day or night 
with anyone in the country. With such access and such investments comes influence. How 
much Qatar can affect British policies or secure votes in international organisations is 
debatable, but it is interesting to note that the UK and France, two of the countries that 
Qatar invests in the most, were the two countries that initially backed Qatari calls to arm 
the Syrian opposition.542 Equally, Qatar’s deep importance to the UK in terms of investment 
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and gas sales are one of the key reasons that the UK is rethinking its security commitments 
and foreign policy towards the Gulf States in 2013.543 
Outwith the Government sector Qatar longs to be referred to as a “kingmaker of corporate 
Britain” in a British broadsheet.544 Even accounting for a certain hyperbole, such sentiments 
signal that Qatar is one of the central financial powers in one of the world’s most important 
financial centres and this is where Qatar wants to place itself. Given not only the historic UK-
Qatari connection, the Anglophile nature of Qatar’s leadership, the economic downturn, 
and Qatar’s huge financial reserves, there cannot be an influential trader or banker in 
London that is not familiar with Qatar and the QIA. 
It is not just the UK that has such a close relationship with Qatar for there is a Francophile 
streak too in the Qatari elite too stemming from decades of close business contacts, military 
sales, and the Qatari penchant for acquiring property in France under beneficial tax 
regimes.545 Qatar’s investments in France have been mounting steadily in recent years, if not 
quite matching the scale and depth of investments in the UK. Prime property on the 
Champs-Élysées, a string of luxury hotels, and important French conglomerates have been 
acquired as has Paris St Germain, the Paris-based football club, which was bought by a fund 
under the control of Tamim Bin Hamad, Qatar Sports Investments (QSI). As ever, these 
acquisitions are expected to be financially sound and profitable, while they cement ties with 
an important state sitting on the UN Security Council and with an important military 
presence in the Gulf.  
The question of political influence in France is equally interesting. In particular, there are 
concerns that Qatar used its relationship with key members of the French elite to boost its 
chances of winning the right to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022.546 Such accusations have 
been denied and rejected by football’s European governing body, UEFA. Nevertheless, this 
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kind of tangential and esoteric quid pro quo is exactly what Qatar’s relations are about; 
establishing and bolstering bilateral relations so that Qatar can extract support as and when 
it needs it on important matters.  
In 2011 and 2012 Qatar was the top European property buyer, driven primarily by purchases 
in London and Paris.547 However, Qatar’s investment is far from limited to the UK and 
France. The QIA took large stakes in companies in China as well as acquiring a licence to 
invest up to $5 billion in Yuan-listed Chinese companies.548 Elsewhere, the QIA established a 
$5 billion fund to invest in Greece in the midst of the financial crisis, sought up to $10 billion 
of investment in Malaysia, and up to $1 billion in Vietnam.549 In these smaller countries such 
large investments will give Qatar significant influence so while Qatar may make a profit, it 
will also boost relations to prepare for the day when it can call in its quid pro quo should, for 
example, Qatar need a vote in an international institution.   
Lastly, a European diplomat based in Qatar noted the profound effect that a significant QIA 
purchase had in his home country. He described his phone as subsequently “ringing off the 
hook” with business delegations curious to know about this seemingly rich country called 
Qatar.550 This deal and others that soon followed were directly responsible for numerous 
trade delegations coming to Qatar to seek business opportunities. Numerous goals of 
Qatar’s policy are visible in this instance from Qatar boosting its visibility, encouraging 
further investment and further opportunities for Qatari investment, as well as making Qatar 
a recognised and more important state to a key European country.  
Al Jazeera 
The concept of a new Qatar-based TV channel dates back at least to August 1994 and was 
first envisioned by then Crown Prince Hamad Bin Khalifah.551 After discussion and debate as 
to the format and the overarching holding company (use the existing Qatar TV or create a 
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new entity) on 01 November 1996 Al Jazeera aired its first broadcast. Though it was not an 
overnight success, within two years it had made inroads into traditional news media 
coverage and was noted as “the most influential Arab TV channel.”552 When Al Jazeera’s 
cameras were the only ones broadcasting from Baghdad as Operation Desert Fox in 
December 1998 struck the Iraqi capital, Al Jazeera came to the fore.553 Subsequently, Al 
Jazeera became a fixture of the Middle East landscape and prompted a paradigm shift in 
Arab media.  
Al Jazeera was truly revolutionary. Never before had there been an Arab television news 
broadcast as outspoken, as outlandish, as watched, and as influential. Previously most 
people tended to distrust and dismiss media outlets as little less than uncritical Government 
propaganda. While the BBC, Voice of America, and French radio Monte Carlo broadcast 
popular radio broadcasts in Arabic these were nevertheless foreign in origin.554 Al Jazeera 
was the first to successfully tap the latent Arab desire for news with a semblance of 
impartiality. The fact that Al Jazeera’s coverage was so salacious added to its appeal.  
Al Jazeera courted controversy (and viewers) by showing video messages from Osama Bin 
Laden, though it never showed beheadings as is often claimed. It interviewed Israeli 
spokespeople for the first time on an Arab channel, a popular but controversial move.555 Its 
reputation garnered countless exclusives across the world, such as covering the destruction 
of the giant Buddhas in Afghanistan in March 2001, while the brand of Al Jazeera has been 
noted as one of the most recognised brands in the world.556 It has caused practically every 
Arab State to complain to the Emir of Qatar at some stage, while the Algerian Government 
went one step further on 27 January 1999 when it shut down power to its capital city and 
other major cities to prevent an Al Jazeera interview from being broadcast with a dissident 
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diplomat and an exiled journalist.557 Much of this success is based on two fortuitous 
instances of happenstance.  
First, on 24 March 1994 a Saudi consortium and the BBC signed a ten year agreement to 
establish BBC Arabic.558 Predictably, this arrangement was soon scuppered. The interview of 
a prominent Saudi cleric suffered from a mysterious power cut in January 1996, while a BBC 
Panorama documentary months later critical of Saudi Arabia was the final straw.559 The BBC 
channel was replaced with the Disney channel a week later and a whole news room – 
presenters, producers, researchers, technicians – was looking for work. Al Jazeera, a venture 
still largely on the planning table in Doha, gladly took advantage of this serendipity and 
hired 120 of the professional BBC journalists.560  
Second, even after Al Jazeera was up and running, its audience was small. It was limited by 
the capacity that the Arab Satellite Corporation’s satellite could offer; a measly ‘Ku-Band’ 
transponder, when it coveted a strong (and unavailable) ‘C-band’ transponder, which would 
augment the number of viewers who could receive the Al Jazeera signal.561 Happily for Al 
Jazeera mid-afternoon in July 1997 Canal France International (CFI), while meant to be 
showing a children’s educational show, instead broadcast half an hour of Club Privé au 
Portugal, a hard-core pornographic film, to up to thirty-three million Arabs.562 CFI lost its C-
band transponder and Al Jazeera took up the contract, increased its air-time to seventeen 
hours per day and never looked back.  
After expanding coverage to 24 hours per day in 1999 the Al Jazeera range expanded in the 
next decade with Al Jazeera sports emerging from November 2003; Al Jazeera Mubasher 
(live), a C-Span like channel, in April 2005; Al Jazeera children’s channel in September 2005; 
Al Jazeera English in November 2006; Al Jazeera Documentary Channel in 2007; Al Jazeera 
Misr, a 24-hour channel dedicated solely to Egyptian coverage in 2011; and Turkish-based 
and American-based Al Jazeera platforms in 2013.  
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Despite belonging to the same overarching brand and reporting ultimately to the same 
controlling editors, Al Jazeera English and Arabic are poles apart. From the beginning the 
English Channel was a slick production similar in appearance to existing US and UK-based 
rivals, with staff being hired from the major Western TV organisations including household 
names like David Frost. It was pursuing viewers in the same market as the BBC and CNN and 
thus its tone and style were similar even if its focus was more on the ‘global south 
orientation’ to much acclaim.563 In comparison to English’s more reserved character, Al 
Jazeera Arabic’s coverage could be described as sensationalist and provocative; a true 
adherent to the media cliché of ‘if it bleeds, it leads.’564 When Arab States complain to the 
Emir of Qatar about Al Jazeera they are almost always referring to Al Jazeera Arabic.565  
In terms of reach and influence Al Jazeera’s English Channel is negligible compared to Al 
Jazeera Arabic. This is often forgotten or ignored from a Western-focused perspective; many 
may watch the English broadcasts and fail to see what all the fuss is about. A brief perusal of 
some of the lead shows in Arabic, however, in particular هاـجـتلإا سـكاـعـمـلا  (The Opposite 
Direction) and the platform for Sheikh Yusuf Al Qaradawi ةعيرشلا ةايحلاو  (Religion and Life) 
would show a vastly different side to Al Jazeera. 
The former is a fast-pace debating show often pitting representatives from opposite ends of 
the spectrum against each other. Bahry rightly describes The Opposite Direction as 
“undoubtedly the most popular and most controversial political talk show in the history of 
Arab television.”566 While the format itself was not new it was the novelty of seeing some of 
the guests on the show that was the change. Erik Nisbet, a US-based academic who has 
focused on anti-Americanism in Arab media, writes that Al Jazeera “took press freedom to 
the extreme” noting that some of their guests may be the equivalent of a major American 
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network inviting members of the Klu Klux Clan onto a prime-time discussion show.567 Though 
shrill and not a perfect analogy, there is some truth to such a comparison.  
The latter, Al Qaradawi’s show, has been a place for him for the past fifteen years to 
dispense advice on any and all topics from the mundane to the most political. His audience 
is an estimated 60 million per week cementing his place as the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
leading intellectual.568  
Never a stranger to controversy, in the Arab Spring Al Jazeera has become the story itself, at 
least to some in the Arab World. Initially, Al Jazeera’s coverage of the emerging Spring in 
Tunisia and then Egypt was lauded, though there was an initial lag in the coverage of Tahrir 
Square with those at Al Jazeera not wanting to be tagged as having ‘created’ and 
exaggerated the disturbances. Nevertheless, its in-depth coverage with reporters strewn 
around key cities and a fearless desire to report the story was appreciated. However, there 
has been an increasing backlash against what some see as Al Jazeera’s slavish reportage of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in an uncritical manner.569 This is tied in with Qatar’s overt support 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has, in conjunction with the replacement of long-term 
Director Wadah Khanfar with a member of the ruling Qatari Royal Family in September 
2011, meant that Al Jazeera’s reputation has been tarnished with accusations that it is now 
little more than a mouthpiece for Qatar’s foreign policy. While such claims are over-
exaggerated, Al Jazeera has certainly lost traction and is losing viewers to competing 
outlets.570   
Domestic  
As ever the basic domestic realities of Qatar facilitated the creation of Al Jazeera in two 
particular ways. Firstly, the fact that the elite was so powerful meant that they could 
establish whatever institutions they wished. Al Jazeera is not an organic growth stemming 
from Qatari civil society. Al Jazeera’s attitude towards including Israelis in the conversation, 
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fostering debate on political topics, the discussion of women’s rights and of controversial 
religious issues is at odds with Qatar’s intrinsic conservatism.   
Secondly, Qatar’s significant financial resources allowed Al Jazeera’s continued growth even 
at huge costs. The initial grant of money for Al Jazeera was an estimated $137 million while 
its annual running costs are estimated to be between $25 and $100 million annually with Al 
Jazeera English’s launch needing an investment of up to $1 billion.571 With Qatar’s January 
2013 $500 million acquisition of Al Gore’s Current TV, a plan to vastly expand Al Jazeera’s 
reach in America, which includes the hiring of hundreds of new staff, its cost on the Qatari 
state is likely to increase significantly in the short term.572 Furthermore, Al Jazeera has found 
it difficult to offset its costs with advertising. Historically Saudi Arabia put unbearable 
pressure on companies that advertised on Al Jazeera to pull out, driving up costs for the 
station.573 Similarly with Al Jazeera’s often negative coverage particularly in right-wing 
elements of the American landscape, Al Jazeera could find accruing advertising revenue 
challenging.574 That Qatar can quite easily afford such luxuries as a TV station is thanks to the 
hydrocarbon resources, which is a basic enabler of Qatar’s hosting of Al Jazeera that cannot 
be forgotten.  
One of the central tenets of the new Qatari policies in the 1990s was a desire to be seen and 
to be heard. Al Jazeera is the apogee of this thrust; to shatter the old cliché of Qatar being 
‘known for being unknown.’ It gave Qatar a uniquely powerful comparative advantage over 
all other Arab States to be the centre of a new wave of information dissemination in the 
region. In this sense it is similar to Sawt Al Arab, which was similarly useful for Nasser’s 
Egypt even if this was more politically skewed to pontificating about a particular system of 
Government.  
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The creation of Al Jazeera is also a savvy asymmetric move. Qatar does not have a 
population, a land-mass, a military or a diaspora to exert influence, all it has is money. While 
this can certainly wield some power, by creating Al Jazeera and thanks to its remarkable 
popularity in the early 2000s, Qatar became for the first time preeminent in its region in a 
particular role. Whether it was the elite growing up at the time of Sawt Al Arab and seeing 
the power of pan-regional media, seeing the embedded CNN cameras in the Gulf War, or 
understanding that the media revolution could not be stopped but needed to be embraced, 
the decision was savvy and timely.  
Regional   
Qatar’s old international dynamic exuded a logic whereby it deliberately eschewed 
significant international attention. However, following Kuwait’s invasion anonymity – 
Qatar’s previously default position – became a detrimental quality. Given that ‘the worst’ 
clearly can happen, under such a circumstance a leader wants his country to be well known. 
He does not want leaders around the world, foreign soldiers or their families potentially 
being sent to rescue his country to be searching for a map noting that they never knew 
there was a country beginning with the letter ‘Q.’ Several strategies of the new elite are 
ranged against reversing Qatar’s previous anonymity, with Al Jazeera in particular being a 
central plinth in the desire to actively publicise the country.  
For Qatar in the early 1990s the rhetorical problems with Saudi Arabia soon became a 
threatening military confrontation in 1992 with the border skirmish. That America was in 
the process of signing up to a protective arrangement was reassuring but still the elite 
deliberately sought to publicise the incident, further angering Riyadh. From this perspective, 
with an increasingly vociferous Saudi Arabia and with plans afoot to further antagonise the 
Kingdom with Hamad Bin Khalifah’s raft of new policies, it would have been understandable 
had Qatar started Al Jazeera with the sole aim of giving Qatar a public, international media 
platform to use in case it needed to, in an emergency, broadcast escalating concerns 
stemming from its Saudi border without relying on anyone else.  
Indeed, in this context Al Jazeera can be thought of as either a unique form of deterrence or 
at least comprising a bow in the Qatari self-defence quiver. For any state - but particularly 
for a state that is far from well known - having an indigenous media organ that has the 
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potential to publicise mounting tensions or concerns is useful. While using Al Jazeera in such 
a capacity was unlikely to be needed, an equally unlikely event – the invasion of Kuwait – 
had just occurred.  
Aside from such serious concerns personal politics is as important as ever. The Qatari elite 
knew perfectly well what would happen if it gave a BBC trained crew carte blanche in 
editorial control; naturally the seasoned reporters would pursue the most salacious topics in 
the region. With the Emir explicitly not setting any boundaries, the sacred cows that had 
henceforth been unassailable were suddenly fair game. Burgeoning audience figures 
showed that Al Jazeera’s desire to poke, prod, and report on elite politics across the Gulf 
and Middle East was wildly popular. In this context Al Jazeera can be seen as one of Qatar’s 
most significant ways to antagonise Saudi Arabia. Qatar has no diplomatic, economic, or 
military weight with which to bully as large a state as Saudi Arabia. Instead, it can, via Al 
Jazeera, embarrass the Kingdom with coverage of its Royal family’s disputes and speak to 
Saudi dissidents. Whether instigated purposefully by the elite or as a natural but expected 
corollary of unleashing Al Jazeera, it was certain to cause friction between Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar. Aside from any personal animus or a desire to hit back at the mighty Saudi Arabia, it 
was a prime way to remind the elite in Riyadh that Qatar was an independent state and 
would resolutely not do as it was told anymore.  
Al Jazeera can also be seen as influencing the region’s wider politics. Giving Yusuf Al 
Qaradawi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s leading cleric, access to Al Jazeera and tens of millions 
of viewers is a deeply political decision. Understandably it is construed as another example 
of Qatar supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. However, Qatar’s elite is not doing this 
because of a philosophical or religious connection but for reasons of realpolitik. 
Understanding the central role that religion plays in the region, Qatar is pragmatically 
facilitating one of the most popular organised, and relatively moderate political parties in 
the Middle East. 
International  
‘News framing’ is a standard technique in fields associated with media analysis and social 
psychology that seeks to categorise eras in news coverage. An infamously difficult topic to 
specifically define, a news frame refers to the whole normative structure at a given time 
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that provides the backdrop, assumed values, and typical narratives that coalesce into any 
given ‘frame.’ As Norris notes, “Frames represent stereotypes.”575 In terms of the Cold War 
frame she identifies the key characteristics.  
The Cold War frame highlighted certain events as international problems, identified sources, offered 
normative judgements, and recommended particular policy solutions. Specifically, the Cold War frame 
depicted international events in terms of rivalry between two major superpowers and ranged other 
countries into “friends” and “enemies” of these superpowers. Warfare in Vietnam...or Afghanistan 
could be interpreted as internal power struggles provoked by religious, ethnic, or regional civil 
wars...Alternatively, these conflicts could be seen in terms of international rivalry for global 
ascendency...interests were defined in large part by virtue of opposition to Soviet allies. This led to a 
policy framework in which American involvement in the Middle East, Latin America, or Southeast Asia 
was justified by a policy of containment.
576
 
Eras change and with them change the news frames. Norris highlights that the end of the 
Cold War provided a clearly identifiable change in backdrop, assumed values (for example, 
of the ‘enemy’), and of typical narratives, which changed quite profoundly the American 
news frame entering the post-Cold War world.577 In the Middle Eastern context there is no 
similarly detailed qualitative and quantitative study as Norris’. Yet the media revolution(s) 
that occurred in the Arab World in the 1990s manifestly stemmed from the emancipation in 
the post-Cold War era.578 
Specifically in terms of Al Jazeera, in addition to the other instances of happenstance 
already mentioned (Qatar having the funds, a leadership interested in establishing such a TV 
network, etc.), Al Jazeera needed end of the Cold War era in order to be established. It 
would have been too difficult to attempt to tread a neutral line amid Cold War rivalries and 
would have resulted in either an emasculated TV network or angering one of the 
superpowers; not a pleasant prospect for an intrinsically defenceless state that sought some 
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notion of non-alignment. The profound changes in the international system allowed Qatar 
to position itself in such a way (with US guarantees) as to be able to host an entity such as Al 
Jazeera.  
On a more general level it was the international lacuna in the Middle East media landscape 
that allowed the Qataris to steal such a march on the competition and be the first to 
establish a professional and popular media organisation. The power of the media had only 
recently been demonstrated to great effect in the Middle East during Operation Desert 
Storm. While the definition is contested, the eponymous ‘CNN effect’ entered the lexicon as 
a phrase for describing the vastly increasing range, popularity and in some cases impact of 
media in the post-Cold War world.579 Definitions aside, a doctorate in media studies was not 
needed to see the revolution in TV coverage unfolding with CNN’s coverage of Operation 
Desert Storm.  
Yet indigenous to the Middle East itself there was no such media organisation; a chasm into 
which the Qataris stepped and established Al Jazeera. As such they benefitted from ‘first 
mover advantage’ and remain today seen as the pioneers. In addition to being in control of 
the Middle East’s most powerful media outlet for years until competition inevitably pared 
down the Al Jazeera share, the act of founding Al Jazeera mirrored the ethos of the age. 
What better way to evidence Qatar’s desire to reorient itself along broadly progressive lines, 
than an iconoclastic, revolutionary, popular TV news channel to both advertise and 
demonstrate a new understanding of the emerging Qatar to the international community? 
Soft Policies: MICE, Sport, Culture and Education  
This section looks at a range of ‘soft power’ policies in Qatar including the Meetings, 
Incentives, Conference, and Exhibitions (MICE) industry; the sports industry; cultural 
promotion and education in Qatar. Though not exactly analogous, there are numerous 
similarities between these industries particularly in terms of the underlying reasons as to 
why they are supported, the goals that they are trying to achieve, and the methods by 
which the goals are to be achieved. Moreover, all of them contribute quite specifically to 
promoting a Qatari form of soft power in the guise of a coherent brand. This synopsis of 
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these industries highlights that while there were elements of these industries pursued pre-
1990, their promotion in Qatar as the 1990s and 2000s progressed was of a different order 
of magnitude.  
The MICE industry is widely regarded as a lucrative sector of tourism, which can contribute 
to a country’s economy with MICE visitors seen as unusually high spenders; at the “blue-
chip” end of the industry.580 Amid a wider trend to shift marketing focuses “away from 
simply increasing the numbers of tourists to enhancing ‘the quality’ associated with tourism 
growth”581 the MICE sector is thus “one of the fastest growing segments of world 
tourism.”582 
In recent years Asia and Australasia have been a hive of MICE activity. Cities like Singapore, 
Bangkok, Hong Kong, and Sydney have increased their capacity to attract more MICE 
industry to accrue the knock on economic and other benefits.583 More recently, Dubai has 
entered this crowded market as has Doha. Indeed, Doha is currently coming-of-age in terms 
of its MICE industry potential. Plans many years in the making are coming to fruition and 
providing Qatar with a world-leading MICE infrastructure. Qatar’s £1.15bn National 
Convention Centre (QNCC), opened in December 2011, is the embodiment of Qatar’s push 
to augments its MICE credentials under the Qatar Foundation (QF) banner, while its world-
spanning and award winning airline is used to spread Qatar’s brand and fly tourists and 
businesspeople to Doha in style.584  
While the marketing hype predictably describes the QNCC as being “built to be one of the 
most sophisticated convention and exhibition centre in the world,” there is some 
justification to this hyperbole. No expense has been spared on the cavernous convention 
centre, from its ostentatious ‘Sidra tree’ external design, to its curved escalators that serve 
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no real purpose past the fact that QF can say that they are the first in the Middle East, to the 
multi-million dollar 30x33ft Louise Bourgeois spider sculpture, to its ‘first in the Middle East’ 
LEED Gold Environmental rating.585 AEG Ogden, the QNCC’s management company, insist 
that it exceeded its first year targets within seven months, boasting an estimated economic 
impact of nearly £20m from 128,000 visitors attending 128 events in the first seven months 
of operation.586 At the end of 2012 Qatar hosted the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change conference (COP 18), one of the largest conferences in the world showcasing 
Qatar’s ability to logistically host world-level events.  
Qatar’s desire to attract important conferences is not new. In 2001 it hosted the Doha WTO 
round of negotiations, entering ‘the Doha round’ into the vernacular of trade discussion. 
Otherwise, Qatar inaugurated a ‘permanent committee for organising conferences’ in 2004 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This body oversaw up to fifteen 
significant conferences per year including Qatar’s regular ‘Interfaith Dialogue,’ the ‘US-
Islamic World Forum,’ and the ‘Doha Forum.’ The elite-led push to make Qatar a centre for 
discussion and dialogue knows no bounds. Tens of conferences are arranged every month 
by some Ministry, Supreme Council, or organisation. These range from the Pipeline Integrity 
Management Forum, the Underground Infrastructure and Deep Foundations Conference to 
key mini-conferences or ‘contact groups’ focusing on Libya and Syria. Qatar also hosts (and 
pays for) conferences for institutions that Qatar is neither a member of nor a candidate for 
membership such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, whose 2009 
conference was supported by the Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs.587 Aside from the QNCC, 
the Qatar Tourism Authority will open its own convention centre in 2013 of roughly equal 
size and sophistication. Given that nearly 10 per cent of Qataris could be seated in these 
two convention centres, quite clearly Qatar’s ambitions are firmly set on international 
markets.  
Underpinning these projects to attract MICE Industries is a reputed $17 billion investment in 
Qatar’s tourism infrastructure in terms of constructing meeting facilities, resorts, and 
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hotels.588 Equally, between Stenden University and the QF sponsored MICE Development 
Institute (QMDI), Qatar is building up its capacity in hospitality management and associated 
areas necessary to facilitate its push to be a world-class MICE destination.  
Another mechanism for boosting Qatar’s popularity and spreading its message is hosting 
sporting events. While Qatar hosted the Asian Cup (football) in 1988, the FIFA Under-20 
football World Cup in 1995, and an annual ATP Tennis event from 1993, it was particularly 
after the millennium that Qatar emerged as a key world centre of sport. The 2000s saw 
Qatar hosting regional (Asian) Handball, Basketball, Sailing, Indoor Athletics, and Fencing 
Championships as well as World Table Tennis and Weightlifting championships. Qatar also 
hosts top-class annual Tennis, PGA Golf, Moto Racing, Equestrian, and Athletics events. 
2006 saw Qatar host the Asian Games, the largest sporting event to date held in the 
country, and in 2011 the Asian Football Cup, another large and prestigious sporting event. 
Clearly, winning the right to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup, the second largest sporting 
event on earth, is the pinnacle of Qatar’s sporting ambitions 
A key part in Qatar’s plan to make itself a world centre for sport is its investment in sporting 
infrastructure. Doha boasts one of the world’s best sporting hubs in its Aspire Zone. A 
complex including a world-class sports-injury hospital and one of the world’s largest indoor 
sporting arenas fit for multiple sports, Aspire acts as an international academy for athletes 
at youth and professional levels.589 Qatar’s investment has extended to not only paying large 
sums to persuade older football (soccer) stars to play in Qatar’s domestic league (Pep 
Guardiola, Ronald De Boer, Gabriel Batistuta, Nene, etc.) but also to paying athletes to 
change nationality to represent Qatar in tournaments, and for luring top-class football 
teams to Aspire for mid-season breaks.    
In terms of wider cultural sponsorship, the Qatari Government has undertaken a variety of 
initiatives that when taken together construe a cohesive policy to garner a reputation for 
Qatar as a cultural hub. The overt promotion of Qatar as a cultural hot-spot is a direct, 
planned elite-led project comprising different strands. The New York-based Tribeca film 
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festival first came to Qatar in 2009 and has been an annual fixture since held under the 
auspices of the Doha Film Institute (DFI).590 Against the backdrop of emerging film industries 
and competing festivals in nearby Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the Tribeca has been successful at 
attracting Hollywood Stars, film premieres, and international press coverage.591 Some even 
hope that this will catalyse the start of a Qatari ‘film industry.’592 Towards this goal there has 
been significant success; the 2012 Tribeca in Qatar hosts a total of 19 films that have been 
made in Qatar.593  
Given Qatar’s relative youth as a country it has quickly developed a world-wide reputation 
in the art world. The Museum of Islamic Art on Doha’s corniche contains an impressive array 
of artefacts from all walks of Islamic heritage. IM Pei was coaxed out of semi-retirement to 
design the museum with carte blanche, while luminaries ranging from Damien Hirst, Jeff 
Koons to Robert De Niro and Ronnie Wood attended the glitzy opening in 2008.594  
The personification of Qatar’s push into the art world is Sheikha Al Mayassa Bint Hamad Al 
Thani, a daughter of Hamad Bin Khalifah and Moza Bint Nasser. She has become one of the 
largest art buyers in the world with a taste for Mark Rothko, Francis Bacon, Andy Warhol, 
and Paul Cezanne for whose ‘The Card Players’ she paid the highest price ever for a work of 
art sold at auction, approximately £156 million.595 In total Sheikha Al Mayassa is believed to 
have amassed a £650 million collection to add to existing works in Qatar bought for over £1 
billion throughout the 1990s and 2000s by the now disgraced Sheikh Saud Bin Mohammed 
Al Thani.596 Sotheby’s opened its first Middle East office in Qatar in 2008 and Doha is now, 
along with London, New York, and Tokyo, a stopping-off point for exhibitions of major 
Sotheby’s art sales tours.597  
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In addition to being the third place after Los Angeles and Versailles to host a significant 
Takashi Murakami exhibition (for which the Museum Authority built an exhibition hall 
especially on the orders of Murakami), Qatar has the clout to obtain objects from museums 
that even America’s established institutions cannot procure as in the ‘Gifts of the Sultan’ 
exhibition.598 The Qatar Museum’s Authority (QMA) also seeks to lavishly sponsor key 
retrospectives in some of the world’s most established museums as with the Damien Hirst 
retrospective at London’s Tate Modern in 2012.599 Overall, there is more than a passing 
desire to establish a reputation in the art world; instead there is ample evidence of a well-
funded and systematic policy of placing Qatar at the forefront of this industry.  
The same sense of a well-funded and well-crafted policy is evident in education in Qatar; 
indeed, since Hamad Bin Khalifah came to power in 1995 the education system has changed 
beyond all recognition. Spearheading this educational revolution is his most prominent wife, 
Moza Bint Nasser. Under her guidance and at her request in 2003 the American consultancy 
RAND established itself in Qatar and set to work analysing the existing educational system 
from top to bottom. RAND’s research methodology, conclusions, options, and suggestions 
have been exhaustively documented at each stage and reveal a fascinating story.600 
The overhaul started from the premise that “the leadership of the Arabian Gulf nation of 
Qatar sees education as the key to Qatar’s economic and social progress.”601 As the report 
continues to note, long-standing beliefs that the existing educational structures were not up 
to the task of providing a 21st century education motivated the changes. RAND came in, 
examined existing educational structures and in keeping with local values proposed various 
options for reform. Presented with this choice Hamad Bin Khalifah and Moza Bint Nasser 
chose the most extreme option involving “system wide structural change.”602 Such profound 
changes in education are a key part of the Qatar National Vision 2030, a clear articulation of 
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the goals that Qatar is striving to attain, which underpin much of the economic 
diversification inherent in the work of Moza Bint Nasser’s Qatar Foundation.603  
RAND also contributed to an overhaul of practices at Qatar University but it is Qatar’s other 
higher education policies that are more noteworthy.604 Starting in 1998 with Virginia 
Commonwealth University followed by Weill Cornell Medical College in 2002, Texas A&M 
University in 2003, Carnegie Mellon University in 2004, Georgetown School of Foreign 
Service in 2005, Northwestern University in 2008, and University College London (UCL) in 
2012, leading foreign higher educational institutions were established in the Education City 
project in the north of Doha. Degrees are now available in a range of subjects at 
undergraduate and at Master’s level. HEC Paris also offers professional MBAs also under the 
QF umbrella.  
Sheikha Moza who is also a UNESCO Special Envoy for Basic and Higher Education, 
frequently describes education as of central importance whether externally as a “tool for 
peace” or internationally to boost dialogue and mutual understanding, while a Qatar-based 
Ambassador described education in Qatar as undertaking a “silent revolution.”605 Yet some 
Qataris are fearful of the implications of these new educational programmes, which has led 
to a backlash against Education City. Interviews reveal a certain amount of animosity or at 
least some discomfort with practices and curricula at the institutions. The mixed teaching 
and socialising in Education City, for example, were highlighted by some Qatari students as a 
source of controversy.606 Equally the sheer cost of the initiative infuriates others with many 
believing that Qatar University does not receive its fair share. Such complaints have 
frequently spilled out into the Arabic and English press in Doha, with comparisons between 
the lavish graduating ceremonies in Education City and the more demure counterparts at 
Qatar University being drawn as symptomatic of disparities in spending.607 To some degree, 
these complaints are unfair. Qatar University has all the funding it wants; departments are 
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only constrained by issues of space and procurement and not cost.608 While Education City is 
full of beautiful, state-of-the-art campuses and much of Qatar University is located in 1980s 
buildings, which inevitably leads to unfortunate comparisons, the women’s campus in 
particular at Qatar University is growing significantly with huge construction projects and 
impressive facilities.  
Nevertheless, the elite are aware of the growing concerns. 2012 saw an edict from Sheikha 
Moza changing the language of instruction in key courses at Qatar University from English to 
Arabic (for example, in International Studies and Management). This decision was taken 
with no discussion with the management of Qatar University and goes directly against the 
Qatar National Vision 2030 in that it limits Qatar University’s ability to produce English-
educated Qataris for the future work-force in Qatar, which will increasingly demand English 
speaking, reading, and writing abilities as a core skill.  
Part of the motivation for this is to make it easier for Qataris to enter Qatar University who 
did not make the English-language proficiency levels. Though this decision will inevitably 
lower the standards (in addition to weaker students filling courses there simply are not 
enough suitably qualified Arabic-speaking lecturers and Professors) this will sate some of 
the societal criticism that the Qatari elite is too focused on supporting the foreign 
educational establishments.  
Domestic  
One of the central tactical reasons as to why MICE industries have been so rigorously 
pursued as a key policy by the new Qatari elite is that they are expected to form a plinth of 
Qatar’s future post-hydrocarbon economy. A desire to counter post-oil and gas economic 
concerns is not new; economic diversification has been a goal enunciated by Gulf elites 
since the 1960s. However, the reality of these drives is almost universally meagre. Only in 
Bahrain is there some success and there it is because Bahrain ran out of its hydrocarbon 
resources first. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have no such immediate pressure 
and thus consistently dodge the difficult decisions that need to be made.  
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Large vanity projects are no strangers to the Gulf region and the power of individuals in 
Qatar is significant so hosting these events could be the result of a Sheikh’s (or a Sheikha’s) 
whimsical desire to ‘play host.’ However, the large sums involved and the thought-out 
rhetoric and plans behind the various policies suggest that they are actually attempts at 
economic diversification.  
Part of the way that the MICE Industries are expected to contribute towards economic 
diversification is through job creation. Values and expectations that have been established 
in recent decades mean Qataris will not engage in menial or labour intensive work in the 
near future. Clerical industries, however, offers potential for Qataris in which to work; a 
prosaic but salient point. Similarly, one Qatar-based Ambassador noted that the focus on 
clerical and (certain) hospitality-based jobs are more suitable in the Qatari context for 
women.609  
Some of this inspiration to bolster Qatar’s domestic economy and future-proof it comes 
from following examples from abroad. Singapore in particular is known to have been used 
as something of a model for Qatar, particularly in the economic realm with its prominence 
and prosperity despite a relative dearth of domestic resources.610  
Aside from inspiration taken from successful city-states around the world, the decision 
taken by QF to build the QNCC and the Tourism Authority to construct its own separate 
world-class conference centre highlights the importance of personal politics. Qatari society 
in a business context is beset with ‘Chinese walls’ between fiefdoms. Sheikha Moza Bint 
Nasser and her Qatar Foundation and Hamad Bin Jassem with his diverse interests in 
business including the Tourism Authority are two significant entities in Qatar where there is 
often little crossover. This difference will be personified in their two conference centres, 
which in any other country as small as Qatar would be an absurd duplication of resources. 
While this may turn out to be the case in Qatar too, the fiefdoms have differing goals and 
targets with the QF being increasingly focused on social and education projects. Thus while 
personal politics may militate against the sharing of one convention centre, if these entities 
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can specialise enough in their own sectors, given that both Moza Bint Nasser and Hamad Bin 
Jassem have deep pockets, each can pursue MICE Industries tailored to their own focus. 
Indeed, in yet another context, Qatar’s fiscal strength is manifestly a key aspect facilitating 
the pursuit of these goals.  
Equally with Qatar’s sporting aspirations, gas-fuelled growth was essential in allowing these 
policies to be pursued with such expensive vigour. Extensive interviews in Doha with former 
and current Ambassadors to Qatar, senior advisors to members of the elite, academics, and 
those working specifically in the sporting field highlight the importance of individuals in 
Qatar’s engagement with sport.611 The fact that the Emir and the Crown Prince are sport 
fanatics is – as benign as it may sound – a central reason as to why Qatar has become such a 
hub for sport.  
While members of the elite may want to host sporting events because of their own personal 
desire to see such events in Qatar, there are a number of corollaries that benefit the wider 
nation. Using sport to bolster a national identity is much discussed trope in the literature 
and has been applied to case studies from Northern Ireland to Hungary.612 In the Qatari case 
too where there is a relative lack of ‘uniqueness,’ particularly in relation to similar and 
nearby city-states like Dubai and Abu Dhabi, sport is part of the emerging tapestry giving 
Qatar its own unique character. Indeed, in the UNESCO-published International Social 
Sciences Journal, Geoffrey Caldwell notes that “sporting success in international sport [can 
be used] as an internal and external validation of that system's worth…[a] drive for 
international sporting success maybe a testament to the insecurity of a country's identity.613 
Such a conceptualisation fits well to the Qatari example. Not only is the Emir using sport “as 
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the vehicle par excellence” for the promotion of his leadership, but by virtue of the world 
class sporting events that Qatar is hosting, he is endowing Qatar with a global status as 
compared to Qatar’s previous almost complete lack of a status on the international stage.614 
Aside from the issue of national identity (more of which will be discussed in the regional and 
international sections below) providing sporting spectacles as well as a vast increase in 
sporting facilities for Qataris is a domestically popular move. One former Ambassador noted 
that Hamad Bin Khalifah’s use of sport by constructing facilities was one of the key ways in 
the 1980s that he increased his popularity in Qatar.615 Similarly it was interesting to note 
that on winning the right to host the 2022 World Cup the Emir took a slow procession down 
the Corniche in Doha amid celebrating Qataris of all generations explicitly linking himself 
with the remarkable Qatari victory.  
The vast increase of sport on the Qatari calendar is of potentially critical importance given 
the epidemic levels of obesity in the country. The World Health Organisation says that 74 
per cent of Qatari men and 70 per cent of Qatari woman are overweight, with other surveys 
suggesting that nearly 50 per cent of adults and 33 per cent of children are obese.616 Qatar-
based health experts have even suggested that by 2015 73 per cent of woman and 69 per 
cent of men may be clinically obese.617 ‘National Sports Day’ – a mandated national holiday – 
was inaugurated in 2012 by the Crown Prince to encourage Qataris to undertake exercise. 
Whatever professional-level sport can do to encourage Qatar’s increasingly fat youth in 
particular to take up a sport is a good thing, especially if the burgeoning epidemic of type-2 
diabetes incapacitates increasing numbers of Qataris when there are so few of them in the 
first place to staff the Qatari economy. Many of these ideas referring specifically to the 
sporting benefits for Qataris themselves and Qatar more generally are contained in the 
Qatar Olympic Committee Strategic Plan.618 
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Nonneman’s framework dictates that for domestic determinants of foreign policy one must 
consider ‘domestic survival’ as a key instigator of policy. While one cannot link sport or art 
purchases to concerns of an existential nature, one must consider these cultural gambits as 
a part of wider policies with wider aims that contribute to assuaging Qatar’s core security 
concerns albeit in tangential ways.  
Many of these cultural policies are a key part of a desire to differentiate Qatar as a unique 
and unusual country engaged in overtly developmentary actions. While there are reasons to 
do this vis-à-vis an international and a regional audience, so too it is important to burnish 
and carve out a clear, positive, and unique image – or brand – of Qatar for Qataris.   
With a limited history on which to draw and surrounded by other states with 
overwhelmingly similar identities, Qatar needs to carve a niche for itself. Moreover, creating 
a distinct, attractive brand around Qatar – otherwise known as place or country branding – 
is all the more important given the wider context of the general thrust of globalisation.  
Today...national boundaries are under siege at myriad of levels – from civil wars and economic 
transnationalization, from cultural exclusivity and religious revivals, and from political disillusion and 
institutional decay (and reinvention).
619
 
Gulf States are particularly vulnerable to the homogenising powers of globalisation as they 
are, in the language of Cerny, archetypal ‘postmodern’ states. His theory revolves around 
the emergence of so-called ‘competition states’ by which he is referring to states that are so 
actively seeking to augment their business credentials and business ties throughout the 
world (as Qatar certainly is doing) that “today’s state constitutes the main agency of the 
process of globalization.” States undertake this push for economic gain and to remain 
relevant to their people, Cerny continues. Yet by seeking to relentlessly attract a variety of 
economic activity to the state in order to fulfil the needs of domestic constituents, states 
foist a paradox upon themselves in that by undertaking such business-savvy, business-
attracting actions this very processes “hinders the capacity of state institutions to embody 
the kind of communal solidarity or Gemeinschaft which gave the modern nation-state its 
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deeper legitimacy, institutionalised power, and social embeddedness.”620 This is where state 
branding is so critical. 
Against this doubly homogenising backdrop branding in the domestic context is crucial for a 
state to maintain a sense of individuality. The domestic importance of country branding is 
well noted in the literature; Van Ham for one notes that “internally, they [states] are making 
their citizens feel better and more confident about themselves by giving them both power 
and identity.”621  
The pressing need to establish a unique brand for Qatar for Qataris themselves to latch on 
to is, therefore, evident. Mediation and sport - as already mentioned - contribute towards 
the Qatari brand as do the various cultural initiatives.  
At this point the discussion inevitably turns to Benedict Anderson, one of the most 
influential authors on the topic of nationalism and its origins in the post-colonial world. He 
argues that nations are ‘imagined’ communities: 
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion...Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style 
in which they are imagined.
622
  
Along with a census and a map, museums form the third spoke of the key “agencies for 
culturing ‘the public’ and for ‘thinking’ nation-states“ as Macdonald puts it.623 Macdonald 
also notes that not all museums “were an expressive site and agency of some of these new 
ways of thinking and of public culturing” nor is this role limited to museums with other 
public institutions playing a role in fostering and inculcating new norms of identity.624  
In Qatar’s case the art museums established by the new elite along with the film festival and 
the cultural village hub of Katara, which hosts numerous art galleries and small museums 
not to mention a huge open-air amphitheatre, which hosts visiting theatre and opera, are a 
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part of establishing, inculcating, and propagating a worldly, culturally-sophisticated, and 
internationally-orientated brand. The national museum will not open until 2015 but it is not 
crucial from Anderson’s perspective that the museums are full of national artefacts charting 
the nation’s history.    
The idea of ‘having a culture’ has become crucial to nationalise and politicised ethnic discourse: it is 
taken as a mark of being a bona fide ‘people’ who should also have rights of at least some degree of 
self-governance…For nations, culture is their means of such expression: it is the outward sign of 
distinctive ‘inner depths’.  
This did not necessarily mean that all that was on show had necessarily to be ‘of the nation, though 
‘national’ artefacts and art works were an important strand. Just ‘having a museum’ was itself a 
performative utterance of having an identity.
625
 
By expending so much time and treasure on explicitly fostering and advertising the fact that 
Qatar ‘has a culture,’ Qatar is asserting its legitimacy as a bona fide nation.626 JE Peterson 
sees this assertion of legitimacy – stemming not only from cultural heritage but from Qatar’s 
brand creation as a whole – as assuring “the legitimacy of the micro-state…[which] in turn 
leads to the single most important factor: increased awareness of and legitimacy accruing to 
Qatar – in domestic and external terms – enhances [sic] the prospects for the state’s 
survival.”627  
Both the tactical use of culture to augment the Qatari brand and the strategic use of a brand 
are resolutely elite-led ventures. In particular it is Al Mayassa Bint Hamad who is personally 
in charge of museums, art, and cinema initiatives in Qatar as the public figurehead and the 
Chair of the Qatar Museums Authority, the Doha Film Institute, and various other cultural 
and charitable organisations. 
As Nonneman notes, the policy making elite are of particular relevance in the Middle East 
for often they have unusual sway and freedom of action. This is particularly true of Qatar as 
a small country with a small native population that has been historically dominated by the 
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ruling family. It is plausible, therefore, to suggest that the personal whims and desires of 
one of the most important Al Thanis may be enacted on a state level and that they may use 
their power, influence, and financial might to pursue personal policies on the larger political 
scale. It should be noted that this is potentially all the more true with ethereal policy 
spheres such as art and culture where there is more room for personal subjectivity to play a 
part. Indeed, The Economist intoned a haughty warning to Al Mayassa Bint Hamad noting 
that she would have to make sure that “to be more than a rich girl’s plaything” the 
Museum’s Authority under her leadership would have to “do better than put expensive 
foreign baubles on display in her homeland.”628 
However, Al Mayassa Bint Hamad firmly seeks to couch the various cultural initiatives within 
a much wider thrust of Qatari policy. Her speeches and remarks on the reasons as to why 
she is emerging as such a leading figure in the art world and so assiduous a promoter of an 
array of other cultural activities in Qatar fit the strategic thrust of many Qatari policies. For 
example, in her speech at the TEDx Forum explaining her rationale behind the cultural 
policies and museums that she oversees, Al Mayassa discusses the place of culture and art 
acting as a tool to smooth the transition between the globalized, homogenising world and 
the domestic necessities of retaining a sense of identity. Indeed, she favourably quotes 
Richard Wilk and his notion of ‘globalizing the local and localizing the global.’629 Al Mayassa 
also notes that there is a certain “security” in having a local identity; an interesting turn of 
phrase that harks to challenges that Qatar faces establishing its sense of self and the 
important role that her cultural projects play therein. Echoing Macdonald she notes that 
“art becomes a very important part of our national identity…social and political impact of an 
artist on his nation’s development of cultural developing is very important.” 
In addition, the personal role of Moza Bint Nasser, the Emir’s consort, in the pursuit of 
improving Qatar’s education standards cannot be overestimated. There is little doubt that 
without her personal desire, prominent position, and sheer force of will RAND would not 
have undertaken their key initial evaluation of Qatar’s education system and their 
subsequent overhaul. In the same way only someone as powerful as Sheikha Moza Bint 
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Nasser could have secured the billions of dollars of funding that was required to establish so 
many foreign universities in Education City in Doha.  
Regional  
There are many facets and levels of regional competition. States can compete in the 
cultural, political, economic, or sporting arenas and they can do this for reasons including 
those stemming from personal elite rivalries, the need to establish a competitive edge, or 
the need to carve a niche vis-à-vis regional competitors. All of these concerns and drivers 
are manifest to some degree in Qatar’s decisions to vigorously pursue its various ‘softer’ 
policies as a part of an overall strategy to establish a new brand for the country.  
At the core of these accentuated regional rivalries, as noted already, lies the issue of the 
homogeneity of the Gulf States. For the majority of history on the Arabian Peninsula there 
have not been clearly demarcated dividing lines between tribal-political entities as Brauer 
notes.  
[I]t is not unjust to conclude that [medieval Muslim] geographers…recognized the existence of 
political boundaries in the sense that as one progressed in a direction away from the centre of a state, 
one would sooner or later pass from one sovereignty to another or that one's taxes would flow to 
different places on either side of such a division. Yet, clearly in the minds of these cartographers such 
boundaries were constituted not as sharply defined boundary lines but rather as transition zones of 
uncertain sovereignty between two states.
630
 
Historically resonant borders, for example as demarcated by a river or a mountain range, 
are but one way that a community can begin to coalesce against another community across 
the dividing line. The Arabian Peninsula is largely without such physical features particularly 
in the case of Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait. This is not fatal to nationhood-forming, but 
makes it more difficult, particularly in a context where roaming, tribal dynamics have been a 
way of life.  
Aside from endowing states with specific issues, such as with the Bidoon in Kuwait or the Al 
Murrah in Qatar, with pressure to establish a border where previously none existed there 
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needs to be a reason to separate state A from state B.631 But this is difficult when the 
religion, culture, political dynamics, social milieu, familial links, histories, economic practice, 
and tribal structures are all similar. Needless to say there are differences such as between 
port cities and those further inland or the settled (hadar) and the roaming (bedouin) 
peoples. Yet, overall, there are more features of commonality than difference.  
One area where there are distinctions to be made is in terms of the ruling elites. That 
Kuwait is synonymous with the Al Sabah and Qatar with the Al Thani is part of each state’s 
drive to differentiate itself. Yet the tribal dynamic cuts both ways as Wilkinson notes.  
Even today the formal state divisions, which are largely the heritage of the British presence, are still 
permeated by tribal, clan and family relations, whilst membership and affiliation to commercial, 
linguistic, religious and ethnic groupings and networks cut across borders and are often still of greater 
significance than state citizenship.
632
 
The tribe is a competitor for loyalty to the state and its links span the region. Tribes and 
families are spread throughout the GCC; there are Al Rumaihis, Al Najjars, and Al Ghanims, 
in each Gulf State.633 Moreover, the tribe is a unit that has been commanding some form of 
loyalty for hundreds of years; these new states have barely passed a few generations yet 
seek to demand the ultimate loyalty of its people over the tribe. This is a difficult sell and 
one that needs to be explicitly worked upon.  
Equally in the Gulf Islam is a pan-state phenomenon that demands devotion and is, in this 
context, in some kind of rivalry to the state for loyalty. The story of Islam is embedded in the 
DNA of the Arabian Peninsula and has a deep history that is used to maintain loyalty. It is a 
significant challenge to any state; let alone to newly emerging states. Making this concern 
all the more acute for Gulf States is the fact that their large neighbour Saudi Arabia is the 
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central state in Islam. It not only dominates the region by virtue of its sheer size but because 
of its long-established, religiously-based credentials; something that the other Gulf States 
find it difficult with which to compete. 
In short, the history of the specific region in terms of its geography, people, and society 
provide two interrelated problems for a modern state. Firstly, a pervasive homogeneity 
means that each state must fight vigorously if it wants to differentiate itself and vie for 
recognition. Secondly, the history of the region provides several strong competitors for the 
loyalty of the people with Islam (personified in the state of Saudi Arabia), tribal, and pan-
Arab dynamics all having differing degrees of influence on a citizen’s loyalty. The MICE 
Industry as well as sporting and cultural endeavours are a part of Qatar’s tactical answers to 
these strategic issues.   
As Peterson rightly notes, “Few countries have taken the lessons and importance of 
branding to heart more thoroughly than Qatar has in recent years.”634 Peterson discusses 
the importance of hosting key events such as the WTO ‘Doha Round’ in November 2001, the 
Organization of Islamic Conference summit in March 2003, and the Second South Summit of 
the Group of 77 in June 2005. He also notes the importance of sports in contributing to 
Qatar’s emerging brand. Top tennis and golf tournaments alongside hosting major events 
like the Asian Games in 2006 and the Asian Cup in 2011 lead the way. Obviously securing the 
hosting of Qatar 2022 FIFA World Cup is the crowning jewel in this arsenal and is arguably 
the single most prominent act that Qatar has undertaken in terms of publicising its brand.  
The sport and MICE Industry examples contribute to significantly if not exponentially 
boosting Qatar’s brand recognition world-wide. There are several key benefits to this. 
Boosted recognition is critical to competing for greater Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The 
literature discusses at length the recent growth in place branding in the context of obtaining 
greater FDI.635 The personal context, for example, is crucial.  
It [is] clear that the decision maker’s personal views of target countries, and related influences from 
personal contacts with competitors, customers, suppliers, distributors, and others, play a pivotal role 
in the target country selections....research has found that the images that executives hold of various 
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countries are significantly different from objective descriptors of these countries, and yet influences 
their actions.
636
 
The authors continue to quote a study of American business leaders relying on their 
perceptions of countries in South East Asia in terms of their decision to invest there or not, 
while another long-term study found that “subjective considerations by executives involved 
play a major role in investment decisions.”637 With personal impressions being so important, 
Qatar’s explicit focus on the luxury tourism sector and lavish MICE Industry events - 
whisking delegates from Business Class travel with Qatar Airways to a luxury five star hotel, 
and then on to world-class conference buildings - is arguably a savvy business-orientated 
policy, though questions remain about the cost-benefit analysis. Similarly, by getting Qatar 
known as a state that actively supports leading sports and cultural events, it is endeavouring 
to create an attractive and familiar image for the country.  
The boost to Qatar’s international profile that sporting and MICE events bring is frequently 
commented upon, as one sports media professional put it: “[Qatar] is putting itself on the 
map…Its hosting of major sporting events is also a significant endorsement of a country’s 
emergence, its credibility, its infrastructure and of it being a destination in its own right.638 
Academic sources too echo this thrust with Campbell referring to Qatar carving “a global 
niche through hosting world sporting events.”639 Amara sees Qatar’s various sporting 
ventures as a way to ‘modernise through sport’ and a way to assure national prestige 
through sporting success.640 Equally, through textual analysis of statements from official 
Qatari organs including the Crown Prince’s office, he suggests that it can be used “externally 
for establishing Qatar as a leading country, and thus not a periphery of Saudi Arabia.”641 On 
a personal basis it was interesting to note the difference between Qatar in 2007 and Qatar 
in 2012. On leaving for Doha few friends in the UK knew of Qatar in 2007 but when 
returning in late 2009, Qatar was suddenly ‘that place England played Brazil [at football]’ 
where as today Qatar is most certainly ‘that place that will host the World Cup in 2022.’ 
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As well as a savvy strategy to foster a place for Qatar as a destination with unique 
attractions, it is impossible to ignore the regional elite competition, which can play out in 
different ways. In terms of the tourism industry Dubai has gone for a mass-market tourism 
appeal while Qatar prefers to concentrate on the high-spending MICE visitors. The former 
acting Director General of the Qatar Tourism Authority, Jan Poul De Boer, is quoted in a US 
Embassy cable explicitly discussing Qatar’s strategy in opposition to a ‘Dubai strategy.’ 
Instead of the mass-market approach, Qatar pursued “a niche market for educational, 
medical, and sports tourism along with the existing meetings, incentives, conventions and 
expo travellers market.”642 Such a repudiation of Dubai’s strategy stems not only from a 
rejection of the fundamental model, but from the sensitivities of Qatar’s leadership over 
concerns of overt westernisation.643  
Equally, the states are too rich to be concerned with the costs of duplication. Instead they 
can be driven by deep often personal elite-to-elite desires to compete. The duplication of 
cultural and educational strategies in Abu Dhabi and Doha (the Sorbonne, New York 
University and the Guggenheim versus Education City, Tribeca, the Museum of Islamic Art 
(MIA)) is informed by the regional context and of regional competition. Certainly, each fits 
into wider domestic strategies but though impossible to quantify, one cannot ignore the 
country-to-country, elite-to-elite question of rivalry and competition. 
International  
In terms of the international sphere the key determinants of importance refer to deep, 
systemic changes in the international system that have diluted the grip of traditional states 
on the levers of the world economy. In her seminal article in Foreign Affairs Matthews 
described this in terms of an issue of relative decline.   
The most powerful engine of change in the relative decline of states and the rise of non-state actors is 
the computer and telecommunications revolution...Widely accessible and affordable technology has 
broken governments' monopoly on the collection and management of large amounts of information 
and deprived governments of the deference they enjoyed because of it. In every sphere of activity, 
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instantaneous access to information and the ability to put it to use multiplies the number of players 
who matter and reduces the number who command great authority.
644
 
Writings like this particularly in the 1990s discussing how globalization will ‘erode national 
boundaries’ were vogue for a time and while the rhetoric can go too far, few would deny 
that what one may describe as globalisation has diluted the reach and power of states.645 
Moreover, for a small state seeking to emerge in its own right in the early 1990s under a 
new leadership with a fundamentally different idea of how to conceptualise the Qatari 
state, these new challenges were doubly as daunting.  
One potential answer to this conundrum is with the post-modern conception of state 
branding. Specifically in terms of globalization in a branding context, along the lines of Cerny 
as noted earlier, Olins discusses the internationalisation of commerce, while having 
numerous positive impacts, has also resulted in “a very harsh and turbulent commercial 
environment [where] The nation that makes itself the most attractive wins the prizes – 
others suffer.”646 Van Ham continues on this theme: 
Globalization and the harmonizing effects of European integration put further pressures on territorial 
entities to develop, manage, and leverage their brand equity. To stand out from the crowd and 
capture significant mind share and market share, place branding has become essential.  
... 
One has to recognise that the unbranded state has a difficult time attracting economic and political 
attention. Why would we invest in or visit a country we do now know, and why would we pay 
attention to its political and strategic demands if we have no clue what the country is all about and 
why we should care.
647
 
For Van Ham’s concerns with the ’harmonizing effects of European integration’ read in the 
Qatari context – as dealt with above – the issues stemming from regional homogeneity. Yet 
Van Ham elevates these concerns to the international level. 
Nation branding is currently justified among state and corporate actors as a necessary corrective to 
the waning importance of the nation-state in the context of globalized economic, political, and 
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cultural exchange. Nationally imagined identity is compromised by a number of indigenous and 
exogenous factors: the spectre of cultural homogeneity or, conversely, hyper-hybridity; stronger 
allegiances at the subnational, supranational or transnational levels...and widening networks of 
mobility, media and migration. In this context, corporate branding is a demonstrably effective way to 
assign unique identification by conscious highlighting certain meanings and myths while ignoring 
others. It is increasingly adopted by governments as a means to promote national identity while 
encouraging the economic benefits necessary to compete in a modern globalized world.
648
 
Qatar’s MICE Industries along with the explicit promotion of sport and Qatar’s cultural 
ambitions are key plinths in Qatar’s emerging state brand. They have the publicity element, 
crucial to branding and carry positive, new, trans-cultural messages attesting to Qatar’s 
modern appeal. Indeed, another way to conceive of the international sphere is in terms of 
Qatar’s evident desire to join the mainstream, international consensus. By hosting sporting 
and other key events, Qatar is asserting its right and its legitimacy to act as a traditional 
state; a small point but one worth making considering Qatar’s backdrop against overarching 
Saudi power and concerns as to its independence. But in a wider sense one can also see 
“the Asian Games as an opportunity for Qatar to reiterate its adherence to the universal 
values of democracy, solidarity and human rights.”649 
Qatar’s brand is ranged against regional competition and at the international realm as both 
an economic lure, a way to establish Qatar as a true member of the international 
community, and to publicise Qatar as a dynamic country of modern values through the 
levelling medium of international sport and by persuading if not paying people to come to 
Doha to find out about the country themselves.  
In the educational sphere there are further tactical issues in the international level. 
Originally in the plan for Education City it was assumed that the venture would be populated 
by British universities given the historic Anglo-Qatari relations.650 Yet no British university 
could be persuaded to engage with the venture leaving the Qataris to turn to America 
where there was no shortage of candidates. The fact that Qatar now has US institutions at 
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the heart of its society is a significant factor intimately tying America to Qatar and sends a 
deep signal to America and the world of Qatar’s intentions. It implicitly shows that Qatar’s 
orientation is towards a Western-centric curriculum, pedagogy, and ethos situating Qatar 
firmly on a path Western states can understand and of which they approve; a potentially 
important point given the depth of misunderstanding and mistrust that has consumed 
Western-Arab and Muslim relations since 11 September 2001.  
Overall, the central driving goal of these branding policies with their cultural, sporting, 
educational and business-orientated facets is to contribute to diversifying Qatar’s economy 
and facilitating the transition to a post-hydrocarbon economy, which will depend upon skills 
that a traditional Gulf education system does not provide (professional use of the English 
language, analysis and critical thinking skills, etc.). Such concerns are at the heart of the 
Qatar National Vision 2030 and the educational thrust post-1995. While one can prima facie 
recognise the importance of developing such educational skills and business-related 
attributes and facilities, equally one can empirically point to their importance.  
In their study on the importance of country branding, after much hypothesizing and 
subsequent testing, Kotler et al discern ten key concerns for companies that are searching 
for a new location for their business.  
- Local labour market 
- Access to customer and supplier markets 
- Availability of development site facilities and infrastructure 
- Transportation 
- Education and training opportunities 
- Quality of life 
- Business climate 
- Access to R&D facilities 
- Capital availability 
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- Taxes and regulation [clarity]651 
If these issues are of interest to potential businesses by definition they are desired by 
existing businesses too. The brand that Qatar is so assiduously creating primarily though not 
exclusively through its cultural, sporting, MICE and educational projects speaks directly to 
several of these concerns. A suitable local labour market is referring to a local labour force 
suitably educated to work; the central goal of the Qatar Foundation. Further education and 
training opportunities and the creation of research and design location (Qatar Science and 
Technology Park (QSTP)) are also crucial to the Qatar Foundation’s mission. Equally, 
concerns over quality of life and even a business climate improvement are answered to 
varying degrees by Qatar’s cultural policies and by the MICE industry policies in Qatar.  
In this way these cultural, sporting, and educational policies, far from being perennially 
relegated to the ethereal world of branding and popularity, can be seen as direct tactical 
answers to key business-related questions designed to make Qatar more viable an 
alternative for businesses.  
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Gas Policies 
Since the discovery of huge quantities of gas in the north of Qatar in 1971, there have been 
plans to export it. However, for decades these plans barely progressed as Qatar was not 
alone in seeing gas as at best a by-product in the search for oil and at worst an annoyance 
that had to be flared off.652  
Before the discovery of what came to be known as the ‘North Field,’ initial plans to use the 
associated gas (that is, gas found with oil) for domestic power generation in 1960 foundered 
but similar projects were put forward subsequently, including mooted plans to ship LNG to 
Japan in the early 1970s.653 The first natural gas liquefaction plant (NGL 1) came online in 
1975, saving the automatic flaring of approximately 80 per cent of associated gas produced 
daily.654 NGL 2, which came online in 1979, and a growing realisation of the waste of flaring 
meant that onshore flaring was reduced to 66 per cent of gas produced by 1974 and to 
under 5 per cent by the end of the decade.655 
However, in April 1977 Qatar’s newly built NGL 1 plant exploded in what was described at 
the time as the most expensive accident in the history of the gas industry worldwide.656 It 
cost insurers $68 million, which in 2013 dollars is approximately $268 million. This event 
cast a pall over the industry in Qatar. Initially, it was questioned whether this incident would 
be used as a justification “to cut back rather than diversify” into gas.657 Even though 
subsequently the plant was rebuilt, this incident added to existing reservations about the 
gas industry. Indeed, at the time of the discovery of the North Field few realised its potential 
and the overarching sentiment according to Abdullah Bin Hamad Al Attiyah, a close 
confidant of Crown Prince Hamad Bin Khalifah and the future long-term Minister of Industry 
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and Energy, was of ‘disappointment’ that it was a gas field and not an oil field despite its 
apparent size.658 
While Qatar’s oil was expected to run out by the end of the millennium, this was not an 
imminent enough concern to overturn the fixation on oil to the detriment of gas.659 The oil 
price spike in the 1970s further insulated the oil industry and undercut the argument for 
diversification. Annually Qatar made $2 billion in 1975 from oil alone which rose to over $5 
billion by 1980.660 
Figure 2: Qatar's Oil Exports & Oil Revenue 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2012
661
 
Despite the fact that scores of Japanese companies were seeking to invest in Qatar’s gas 
resources in the 1970s, gas was still received with indifference.662 These factors along with 
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concerns as to global gas demand led diplomats based in Doha to suggest that the North 
Field would be left “until the late 1980s.”663 
As the 1980s progressed the oil price fell and Qatar endured a relatively difficult financial 
period sustaining successive budget deficits for the first time and financing the debt with 
external borrowing.664 Lethargy, inaction, and institutional difficulties with decision-making 
characterised Qatari action in a difficult regional climate. Though the Qataris offered Shell, 
BP, and Total [then called CFP] 7.5 per cent equity stakes in a joint venture to exploit the 
North Field for LNG sales in 1982 and Total, BP and QGPC established Qatargas in 1984, the 
reality was that LNG sales were low down the priority list of the Qatari elite.665  
Instead Phase one was to be the exploitation of the gas field for domestic Qatari use and 
Phase two was to position Qatar as a regional gas supplier with a network of pipes. The LNG 
plan was Phase three, which was half-heartily undertaken and no progress was made for a 
decade.   
Phase 1 began in 1987 after several delays stemming from poor work quality and a hostile 
regional environment. Nevertheless, in 1991 on the twentieth anniversary of independence 
and of the field’s discovery, production began on Qatar’s North Field.666 
Phase 2 concerned the creation of a regional gas grid. This plan was cheaper than engaging 
in the LNG industry and was the preferred choice in the 1980s.667 Initial discussions occurred 
between GCC Oil Ministers in 1988. At the 1989 GCC Annual summit the idea of piping 
North Field gas to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain was approved and at the next 
year’s summit the “GCC Nations agreed to nearly all the essentials for the regional pipeline, 
except the price.”668 However, this concept soon foundered as regional competition, 
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rivalries, and war came to the fore. Grand plans for pipelines to Israel, India, and Pakistan 
rumbled on for several years before also being abandoned.669 
As for Phase 3, non-prioritised progress was slow following the 1982 discussions between 
the state and international oil companies (IOC). In 1984 a Joint Venture Agreement 
exporting LNG to Japan was signed providing BP and Total a 7.5 per cent stake each in the 
Qatargas LNG plant.670 However, Qatar’s miserly demands on the IOCs slowed negotiation 
and made it almost uneconomical – “marginal” as one IOC executive put it671 – while the 
escalating Iran-Iraq and Tanker war disincentivised the external parties.672  
Nevertheless, amid growing LNG competition from South Korea and Taiwan entering the 
LNG market (on the demand side) in 1986 and 1990 respectively, there was pressure on 
Japan to secure long-term contracts. Japan’s Sogo Shosha – general trading companies like 
Mitsubishi and Marubeni – that had been operating in Qatar for decades acted as “the glue” 
between the Japanese State, Japanese regional gas companies, and Qatar throughout 
negotiations in the late 1980s and 1990s.673 Overall, the Japanese role in the development of 
Qatar’s LNG was significant.  
In addition to Japanese end customers, Japanese Sogo Shosha brokering the deals, Japanese firms 
involved in the construction of the apparatus, the Japanese Government oversaw key financing. The 
Government-led Export-Import Bank of Japan (J-EXIM) provided the majority of the $3bn for the first 
LNG ‘train’ in Qatar along with other Japanese banks.
674
 
The Japanese persevered despite the Iran-Iraq War, the Tanker War, the invasion of Kuwait, 
the flight of skilled personnel from the Gulf, repeated infrastructure problems in Qatar, and 
BP pulling out in 1992 and being replaced by Mobil. Finally, in January 1997 Japan received 
its first LNG from Qatar. 
In the first year of LNG exports Qatar only exported to two countries, Japan and Spain. Over 
95 per cent of Qatar’s LNG went to Japan in the first year though the percentage of LNG 
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exports to Japan (red line, below) decreased as Spain and Korea (from 2000 onwards in 
particular) imported more LNG and Qatar diversified its export markets (green bar below).  
Figure 3: Qatar's Dependence on Japan and LNG Destinations 
 
Source: Natural Gas Information 2000-2012
675
 
 
Korea and Japan provided the mainstay of Qatar’s LNG exports until 2004 when India began 
importing significant quantities of LNG. In the late 2000s the UK began to import large 
quantities of LNG from Qatar, becoming the top buyer in 2010 and 2011. As noted in the 
graph above, with new LNG trains coming online in 2006 and 2009, Qatar significantly 
diversified its suppliers to include Brazil, Chile, Kuwait, Luxembourg, and Mexico.  
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Figure 4: Qatar's LNG Exports By Importer 1997-2011 
 
Source: Natural Gas Information 2000-2012
676
 
When Qatar entered the LNG market in 1997 it exported 4 per cent of the world’s LNG 
exports that year (blue bar, below). Indonesia (red line, below) was by far the world’s largest 
LNG supplier while Algeria and Malaysia were substantial suppliers too.  
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Figure 5: World's LNG Suppliers 1996-2011 
 
Source: Natural Gas Information 2000-2012
677
 
Subsequently, Qatar became a mature and then powerful supplier with an ever growing 
share of the world LNG market. With its fourteenth train coming online in January 2011 
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Qatar jumped to a 31 per cent market share accounting for nearly 90 per cent of the 
increase in LNG trade in 2011.678 As of 2011, Qatar was by far the largest LNG producer in 
the world, a position it is expected to retain until the late 2010s. 
The abandoned Phase two plan to establish a network of regional pipes was reanimated in 
the late-1990s. Saudi objections blocked any northward pipes to Bahrain and Kuwait, but 
their objections to a pipe going to the UAE and onto Oman were tenuous and eventually 
ignored. A subsection of the Emirati Ministry of Defence – the UAE Offsets Group (UOG) – 
and the Qatari Dolphin Group were created in 1999 to oversee and administer the new 
project piping Qatari gas to the UAE and onto Oman.679 The desire from the Emirati side was 
multifaceted. Politically this move would increase regional integration between Qatar, the 
UAE, and Oman. Economically it made some sense given foreseeable energy shortages in 
the Emirates.  
The project called for a 370km pipe to be laid from Qatar’s processing facilities at Ras Laffan 
on the East coast to Abu Dhabi and new facilities to be built costing $3.5 billion in total.680  
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Figure 6 : Dolphin Energy Gas Pipelines 
 
Source: Dolphin Energy website
681
 
January 2004 was, as Dargin notes “a truly historic moment in that it was the first ever 
cross-border gas transmission in the history of the GCC.”682 Subsequently, Dolphin came up 
to speed supplying 2 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) of natural gas to the UAE; 
approximately 30 per cent of the daily UAE demand as of 2012.683 Though the UAE is 
currently seeking to maximise the pipe’s capacity, which can supply up to 3.5 bcf/d to meet 
surging domestic demand, negotiations are proving to be difficult. It took the intervention of 
the Emir of Qatar to force QP to lower its price and considering that Qatar can sell the gas 
for a higher price via LNG, it will be hard to persuade the Qatari elite again to accept a loss 
to supply the UAE.  
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Domestic  
Despite the apparent difficulties, there was a certain inevitability about Qatar’s move into 
the LNG market. As noted earlier, technically it has been an espoused goal since at least 
1973.684 However, there is a great deal of difference between remarking on a goal and 
mortgaging the country to engage in a risky paradigm-shifting venture. Indeed, Khalifah Bin 
Hamad and his elite seemed unwilling to take gas seriously. Their focus was dominated by 
oil and as Abdullah Bin Hamad Al Attiyah noted, the discovery of the world’s largest gas field 
mostly within Qatari territory was greeted in some quarters with disappointment. Indeed, 
the timidity of the old regime in pursuing such a risky policy is summed up by Justin Dargin 
who discretely described Khalifah Bin Hamad as “far less aggressive in promoting the 
country’s resource development.”685   
LNG began to be taken seriously and progress was made at the end of the 1980s as the new 
elite rose to power in Qatar, led from the front by Hamad Bin Khalifah. The international 
flavour of LNG policy making Qatar crucial to leading countries around the globe was exactly 
the kind of policy that one might expect to emanate from the new elite with their drive to 
internationalise Qatar.   
The 1992 cabinet reshuffle got rid of “those Ministers who had long ceased attending their 
offices” and, like the 1989 reshuffle, was undertaken to breathe new life into the Qatari 
Government and to allow Hamad Bin Khalifah to install key allies.686 Notably, Abdullah Bin 
Hamad Al Attiyah was given charge as the new Industry and Energy Ministry and made head 
of the board for QPGC, as it was then known. 
While Khalifah Bin Hamad and his elite would probably have sought to develop Qatar’s LNG 
capacity eventually, nothing about their priorities, their working practices, or their outlook 
suggests they would have pursued this opportunity with anything like the speed and success 
of their successors. Part of this assertion is an issue of vision as much as it is a question of 
personnel. In terms of the former, the old elite’s actions were characterised by caution and 
a resolutely intra-regional mind-set. The decision to mortgage Qatar’s future income made 
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in the early-1990s when the new elite were mostly running the country in all but name is 
the kind of risky decision that was to characterise their tenure and bears little resemblance 
to any old elite policies. Equally, aside from a spate of Embassy openings and rounds of 
dolling out foreign aid when economic times permitted, the old elite seldom sought 
prolonged and involved interaction with anyone outwith the Gulf region. Deeply and 
inextricably intertwining the economy of Qatar with that of Japan, Spain, Korea and later on 
in particular the UK is a feature very much associated with the new rather than the old elite.  
In terms of personnel Khalifah Bin Hamad was, for much of his tenure, the personification of 
a hands-on ruler and in the 1970s and early 1980s he insisted on signing all cheques of 
approximately $50,000 and over.687  Such a lack of delegation of responsibility is deleterious 
on efficiency and severely impinges upon long, complex negotiation. Indeed, it is no wonder 
that Hashimoto et al conclude that this kind of “lack of institutionalized decision-making in 
Qatar likely stalled progress in negotiating the complexities of LNG development.”688 They go 
on to quote a Shell executive who worked in Qatar at the time as noting that the situation 
was also vastly complicated and made worse by the presence of ‘advisors’ who “were not 
unnaturally intent on protecting their positions and so raised question after question to 
justify their presence.”689 
While Qatar is today still plagued by the overbearingly top-down nature of politics, a 
younger, more energetic elite intent on pursuing LNG as a crucial piece in their plan to 
bolster Qatar’s independence naturally places more emphasis on LNG. Moreover, in the 
person of Abdullah Bin Hamad Al Attiyah, the new elite installed a trusted executive who 
doggedly, effectively, and professionally focused on the gas industry in Qatar.  
Both the old and the new elite felt pressure to use the gas industry to diversify Qatar’s 
income to maintain the ruling bargain and the generous Qatari welfare state. The key 
difference was that the new elite were more dynamic in pursuing such a goal as opposed to 
the more plodding lethargy and reluctance to change that characterises many ageing Arab 
Governments. Indeed, as many changes as the new elite brought to Qatar they did not seek 
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to alter the basic ruling bargain. This understanding demands that the citizens do not agitate 
for a political say in how the country is run and in return they receive cradle-to-grave 
welfare support from the government while paying no taxes. This system can only function 
with a successful rentier economy, which typically requires significant oil or gas rent for the 
state to distribute. Bolstering this bargain by offering the public more and better services for 
free is an obvious goal of government in Qatar and a goal that getting the LNG industry up 
and running meets.  
Moreover, though this bargain was strong in Qatar in the 1990s, it had suffered in the early 
1980s in particular when the constriction in global oil prices and production meant that 
services and jobs had to be cut and charges introduced. It was readily apparent that the 
source of the state’s income needed to be diversified to maintain the rentier bargain 
without even considering the added dimension of the vast array of plans that the new elite 
had. New LNG policies were the key to unlocking Hamad Bin Khalifah vision for Qatar.  
Regional  
Once more Saudi Arabia is of key importance influencing the decision making hierarchy 
within Qatar and informing major policy changes. Following the 1988 and 1989 GCC 
meetings that initially welcomed Qatar’s regional gas initiatives, over the next few years 
Saudi Arabia’s elite changed its position on the matter for various reasons.  
Firstly, Saudi Arabia’s own gas reserves increased not insubstantially towards the end of the 
1980s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 : Saudi Arabia’s Proved Gas Reserves 1980-1998 
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Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010
690
 
From 4.19 trillion cubic metres (tcm) in 1987 they increased by around 30% or more than 1 
million tcm by 1989 to 5.22tcm, as indicated by the blue circle. With the potential of more 
to come this spurt reminded Saudi policy makers that they themselves might want to 
become gas exporters some day and that facilitating Qatar’s expansion in this field could 
harm such opportunities. Indeed, Saudi Arabia had implemented a ‘Master Gas’ system in 
the early 1980s to try to collect more of the associated gas from its prodigious oil 
production, showing it was increasingly aware of gas as a potential energy alternative.691 
Secondly, Saudi Arabia was doubtless unhappy to see the younger elite increasingly take the 
lead in Qatar and engage in policies such as seeking to build relations with Iran. Similarly, 
without waiting for Saudi Arabia to take the lead, as noted, Qatar established diplomatic 
relations with both the Soviet Union and China in 1988 and had been burnishing its NAM 
credentials throughout the late 1980s indicating an increasing distancing from Saudi 
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leadership.692 Stymying these new gas initiatives could have been seen as a way by the Saudi 
elite to put Qatar in its place. 
Thirdly, these emerging bilateral issues were consolidated by the border skirmishes in 1992, 
1993, and 1994 which led to deaths on both sides. Moreover, the 1995 coup in Qatar caused 
relations to plunge with the conservative Saudi state unwilling to countenance a son 
usurping his father, while at least one Saudi-supported counter-coup finished bilateral 
relations in all but name. Even without this dislocation in the bilateral relationship the new 
Qatari elite had shown they were unwilling to maintain their dependency on Saudi Arabia. 
They knew their policy orientation – progressive and international – would never have been 
sanctioned by Riyadh and they understood Qatar was not benefitting from whatever tacit 
protective agreements were in place with the Kingdom increasingly seen as a paper tiger.   
The LNG policies were crucial in two ways in facilitating Qatar’s escape from Saudi Arabia’s 
‘gravitational pull,’ as Dargin called it.693 Firstly, financially it allowed Qatar to engage in a 
range of policies whereby Qatar sought to reach beyond its previously Saudi-dominated 
international relations to the wider international community. In short, it facilitated Qatar 
becoming a meaningful international actor and not just a small-scale regional player. 
Secondly, it also deliberately intertwined Qatar with a number of key international countries 
in an inextricable and crucial energy-economic nexus. Qatar was diversifying its 
international alliances, no longer needing to listen to or follow the Saudi line.  
Surging demand in Oman and particularly in the Emirates was a key catalyst in reanimating 
the Phase two intra-regional pipeline project.694 Though the Emirates is flush with oil and gas 
it chooses to export it for a higher price; a standard tactic in hydrocarbon producing states. 
Moreover, its sour gas deposits, though plentiful, have long been thought uneconomical in 
terms of tapping them for domestic energy consumption. Both countries seek greater 
supplies from Qatar going forward if they are not to suffer from “substantial gas 
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shortages.”695 As Dargin continues to note, this potentially places Qatar in a strong position. 
Already Dubai and other Emirates have suffered from relatively severe petrol shortages.696 
Put in such a context the uneconomical sale of gas to the UAE and to Oman makes more 
sense as a wily political gambit guaranteeing Qatar influence in the region.697 
International  
Expected growth in Asian economies facilitated the decision in Qatar to invest heavily – via 
debt – in the LNG industry. From 1975-1996 LNG demand from the Asia Pacific region was 
strong at around 3.31bcm per year; a significant amount given that this accounted for more 
than the capacity of the average LNG train at that time (as in new demand demanded the 
creation of the equivalent of one new train per year).698 From 1980 to 1992 the gross 
national product of 11 key Asian countries (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and India) grew at just under 5 per 
cent per year with many countries individually outstripping this rate.699 Such growth has a 
commensurate effect upon energy demand, which also grew at a healthy rate.700 Such 
economic growth would necessarily have to be fuelled by a growth in energy imports and 
the Asia Pacific region is - ceteris paribus - “poor in resources, particularly in oil and gas.”701 
Oil from the Middle East would be a part of the answer. Equally, LNG would take an ever 
more prominent role too. It had been seen as a relatively clean fuel as far back as 1974 and 
the premium placed on avoiding dirtier fuels only increased.702 Indeed, in the mid-1980s 
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some even expected gas to become the world’s leading fuel such were its intrinsic 
advantages.703 
Back in the mid-1990s only Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were importing LNG in Asia. 
Estimates from the Institute of Energy Economics in Japan suggested that their LNG demand 
would double by 2010. In fact their estimates were far off; demand from these three alone 
was to increase 480 per cent from 65 to 314 billion cubic metres (bcm) of LNG imports from 
1992 to 2010.704 
Figure 8 : Actual v Estimated LNG Imports for Japan, Korea & Taiwan 
 
Source: IEA Natural Gas Information & Koyama
705
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But this was not even the beginning. By 2010 China and India were significant LNG 
customers for Qatar importing 47 bcm of gas.706 In short, though one must be careful about 
pontificating from hindsight, there was cause to be assured that there would be significant 
demand for LNG were Qatar to develop this capacity.  
Much of the Western literature focusing on the meaning of the end of the Cold War 
unsurprisingly discusses this watershed event as a victory of the capitalist method. This 
means different things to different people but there is often a sense that the fall of the 
Berlin Wall precipitated or was the harbinger of an era of increased globalisation. In such an 
age the autonomy of the state was seen by some to be under threat and others 
hyperbolically touted “the end of geography.”707 Increased economic trade in this brave new 
world would “create positive economic interdependencies that contribute to global stability, 
prosperity, and security.”708 Or, in yet more bombastic terms as Bergsten writing in Foreign 
Affairs put it “the international position of individual counties will derive increasingly from 
their economic prowess rather than their military capability.”709  
With hindsight one can see hubris and excitement colouring the thoughts of practitioners. 
For example, the imminent economic collapse of Japan as a state assumed to take over from 
America as the world’s largest economy made a mockery of some of the analysis that was 
predicated on Japan being along with the US and Europe part of the new tri-polar world. 
Nevertheless, the international spectrum had changed significantly. The constrictions that 
the Cold War fostered such as the zero-sum nature of international relationships and the 
unusually acute preoccupation with security were either gone or no longer as acute. Such 
changes created a space for countries like Qatar. In the most basic terms, Qatar could not 
have exported LNG to Italy, Korea, and America as it did in 1999 without – whether it 
wanted to or not – pinning its colours to the non-Soviet mast.  
Along with the supposed economic-empowerment that occurred after the end of the Cold 
War, it could be argued that Qatar plugged neatly into the new cooperative ethos that 
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pervaded. No longer riven with division between two poles, the international realm was 
more amenable to overtures and attempts to forge new relations. Qatar’s attempts to use 
its gas as a hook to build and augment relations with Israel as well as with India and Pakistan 
were attempts towards such a goal.  
These international relations that Qatar was building and consolidating with its LNG trade 
placed Qatar in a position of importance that otherwise it would not have. Potentially on 
matters of hard security, such ties could come into use. Indeed, the more Qatar engages in 
tapping its shared field with Iran and the more revenue it draws from it, the more Qatar is 
vulnerable to Iran. Incidents in the mid-2000s showed the Iranian willingness to attack and 
steal equipment from Qatar’s unmanned rigs and were doubtless the encapsulation of long-
held Qatari fears.710 America’s security umbrella is of primary importance protecting Qatar, 
but a web of influential international actors increasingly dependent upon Qatar for their gas 
supply has its own benefits as well. 
Firstly, should Qatar need political backing in an international forum such as the UN Security 
Council, then providing a sizable proportion of the energy mix of important states could give 
Qatar considerable influence. Secondly, Japan has historically positive relations with the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.711 Were Qatari-Iranian relations escalating to the point where LNG 
production and shipping were threatened, Japan would be forced to use its relations with 
Iran to seek some kind of a workable accommodation if it was not to potentially quickly run 
short of gas. The same logic applies to all of Qatar’s LNG customers. In the case of the UK, 
Qatar has made its security of supply a concern of the first order: if the UK wants its gas and 
there is Iranian aggression, it is necessary for the UK to ‘keep the lights on’ to join with the 
international community to find a solution. To paraphrase a British Member of the House of 
Lords, the British Government knows only too well that were Qatar’s LNG to be halted, the 
UK would be “up shit creek.”712 This kind of corollary is of key importance to Qatar in 
becoming such a prolific energy exporter. 
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Arab Spring Policies 
The Arab Spring continues to be one of the most tumultuous periods in modern Arab 
history. Staunch dictators embedded in power for decades were in some cases quickly 
evicted from power by popular unrest. It is a phenomenon almost without parallel that 
affected almost all states of the wider Middle East region. The only state in the entire Arab 
World that saw practically no domestic ramifications was Qatar. Nevertheless, the Spring 
had important effects on Qatar’s foreign policy for it provided Qatar’s leadership with the 
space to engage in resoundingly different policies. From a state where Qatar often tried to 
retain something of an air of neutrality (such as in mediation in Lebanon or with GCC-Iranian 
relations) during the Spring, Qatar was foremost in actively seeking support to overthrow 
regional leaders. 
Most notably Qatar took action in Libya across the political, financial, and military 
spectrum.713 Diplomatically, Qatar was the first Arab state to recognise the emerging 
transnational council (TNC) leadership, only days after France led the way. In terms of trade 
and finance, Qatar supported various rebel groups with money and goods from cooking oil 
to weapons. Qatar traded oil under the control of the rebel groups on their behalf to get 
around sanctions on the Libyan regime. Crucially, along with the UAE, Qatar gave the NATO 
alliance the political cover it required by joining in patrolling the no-fly zone over Libya. In 
order to do this Qatar sent six of its Mirage fighter-jets – accounting for the majority of its 
operational fighter jet capacity714 – three thousand miles to the Libyan theatre; a move 
without precedence in Qatar’s history.715 Towards the end of the campaign as more of Libya 
fell out of loyal Gaddafi hands Qatar became bolder and inserted elements of its Special 
Forces to help train and coordinate the rebels, in addition to flying some groups to Doha for 
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training.716 Never before had Qatar taken such direct and combative action to unseat a 
regional leader. 
Qatar continues to play a similarly prominent role in the evolving Syrian crisis. Initially Qatar 
sought to use strong personal elite-to-elite relations to persuade President Assad to step 
aside. Even though these relations went back many years and are considered to have been 
strong, the entrenched position of Assad proved to be too much for the Qatari elite to alter. 
Even overtures from Al Mayassa Bint Hamad Al Thani, the Emir’s daughter, to Assad’s wife 
Asma proved to be futile.717 Subsequently, when it became clear that Qatari efforts had 
failed, the leadership in Qatar moved swiftly to lead the international efforts to remove 
Assad from power.  
While Qatar has not supported the rebels in Syria as comprehensively as their counterparts 
in Libya, Qatar has still been at the forefront of the international push to oust President 
Assad and corral support for the opposition. Though details are sparse, it appears that 2011 
and 2012 saw Qatar supplying - at the very least - significant non-military support as well as 
light weaponry and some manpads (man-portable air defence systems).718  
Qatar led diplomatic activities including hosting key conferences to galvanise support 
against the Syrian regime and handing over the Embassy in Doha to the main opposition 
group, the Syrian National Council (SNC).719 While Qatar has distributed its material support 
widely, much of its financial and political support has been centred on the SNC, an 
organisation that has become increasingly dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood.720 In 
addition to the Emir repeatedly calling for Arab-led intervention, Qatar, Turkey and a variety 
of other countries repeatedly held meetings with opposition groups to discuss how to corral 
the disparate opposition based both externally and internally into forming a meaningful 
opposition in waiting.721 Mid-November 2012 saw Doha host key meetings during which 
Qatar proved to be as pragmatic as ever. Having realised that the SNC was proving 
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ineffective, Qatar followed the American line backing a plan by prominent opposition figure 
Riad Seif’s instead.722  
The support for ousting Bashar Al Assad is more surprising than Qatar’s actions in Libya as 
the Assad regime is one of the central allies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Owing to Syria’s 
location, history, and the groups that Syria and Iran have sponsored for many years 
(Hezbollah and Hamas) Syria is a key plinth of Iran’s extended deterrence.723 Iran has long 
known it is unable to compete on a symmetric basis with Israel, American forces in the 
region, and even Arab Gulf state forces.724 Instead Iran has, via groups such as Hezbollah 
(whose links to Iran are undisputed if issues of command and control are far more 
nuanced725), developed a fearsome reputation as an entity that can muster potentially 
significant asymmetric power and retaliatory capability if necessary.726  
Iran’s defence posture in the Gulf is based not on its traditional capabilities but, for 
example, on its asymmetric fast boats captained by elements of its Revolutionary Guards 
and by its mining capability; two typical examples of asymmetric warfare.727 But Iran also 
wants the ability to project its power and influence pan-regionally.728 Whether Iran wants 
this power to facilitate Iran’s entry into the Palestinian issue or as a mechanism of defence 
vis-à-vis a potential Israeli strike on its putative nuclear programme, the result is the same. 
Via the creation and continued support of Hezbollah and (to a lesser though at one time 
extensive degree) Hamas, Iran has guaranteed its place in Levantine and Israeli discussions. 
Not only did Iran place itself in the middle of the central issue of the Muslim world, but it 
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ensured it retained some punitive capability over Israel. Syria is the lynchpin of Iranian 
foreign policy; the central state facilitator in the battle against Israel.729 Indeed, this role was 
eulogised by Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, in 2011 in an effort to 
defend the Assad regime in the midst of its bloody actions in the escalating Syrian civil 
war.730 
Just as theorists argue that development of missile defence shields are potentially 
destabilising to the equilibrium between two nuclear armed states for it potentially alters 
the calculations if one state feels that it can avoid the mutually assured destruction that an 
exchange of fire is believed to bring, so too potentially removing President Assad with his 
strong Iranian links may be destabilising. Without the active support of the Syrian state, 
though Iran’s support of Hezbollah and their ilk will not end, it will be impeded. Aside from 
the effect of this on the equilibrium of the region, the fact is that Qatar will have played a 
key role in undermining a core foreign policy plinth of Iran. Given the importance of 
placating and building relations with Iran that has been a hallmark of Qatar’s foreign policy 
since the early 1990s, this is a surprising move for Qatar to have made.  
Aside from the generic support of forces seeking the removal of the Syrian regime, Qatar 
played a role in persuading Hamas not to continue its implicit support of the Syrian 
regime.731 Hamas in the form of its leader Khaled Mishaal has been a long-term associate of 
Qatar. He has sporadically lived in Doha and had access to the Emir for many years. In 
October 2012 the Emir of Qatar was the first Head of State to visit the Hamas-controlled 
Gaza Strip since the 2006 elections. This was a significant visit that indicated not only 
Hamas’ desire to reorient its position away from Iran but Qatar’s key role therein.  
Qatar’s prominent role in Syria and Libya as well as its significant financial support offered to 
the new regimes in Egypt and Tunisia is often contrasted unfavourably with the lack of 
reaction in Bahrain. In 2011 in particular, the situation in Bahrain was deteriorating quickly. 
The Government engaged in a protracted harsh repression against its people and broke 
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international laws and norms.732 Without doubt, there were some riotous elements in the 
opposition’s marches, yet the consensus in the form of the Bassiouni report rightly lays the 
majority of the blame at the feet of the Al Khalifah, Bahrain’s ruling elite. Against this 
repression not fifty kilometres from Qatar itself, the relative lack of Qatari reaction is seen 
as an example of double standards and fuels accusations that Qatar does not pursue a noble 
cause but merely pursues policies under an enlightened, progressive façade. 
Domestic  
One criticism of Qatar’s actions in the Arab Spring asserts that Qatar is supporting the 
formation of democracy abroad to stave-off engaging in democratic practices 
domestically.733 Yet this kind of proposition does not stand up to much scrutiny. Despite no 
discernible widespread desire for democratic developments in Qatar, the Emir announced in 
late 2011 that long-delayed Parliamentary elections would go ahead in 2013 though doubts 
remain midway through 2013 as to whether the elections will actually take place. Moreover, 
as Justin Gengler has shown, “in the six tumultuous months spanning December 2010 and 
June 2011, support for democracy and interest in political participation has dropped 
markedly among Qatari citizens.”734 This conclusion is of no surprise for someone who has 
spent years researching, studying, conducting interviews, and working in Qatar where the 
overwhelming reaction to questions of democratic development in Qatar is apathy. Indeed, 
the notion that Qatar’s elite seek to ferment democracy abroad to stave off implementing it 
domestically is just not credible.   
There are, however, other motivations stemming from the domestic arena in Qatar. The 
notion that Qatari leadership are taking the lead among all states in the Arab world and are 
vociferously supporting the rights of Arabs against oppression by increasingly delegitimised 
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Arab regimes plays well in Doha. Indeed, this ties into aspects of the Qatari brand where the 
support for worthy, just causes is a reoccurring trope. While the leadership may be 
undertaking these policies motivated by a desire to bolster their domestic popularity, such 
policies are also intrinsically reflective of the elite’s thinking. In the language of Nonneman’s 
theory which suggests that the leadership’s role conception is crucial in the domestic setting 
for instigating foreign policy, in Qatar the Emir feels a sense of incumbency to help as and 
when he can. Remembering that policy in Qatar can be made by but one or two men, the 
“personal decision” of the Emir is of crucial importance.735 The Qatari elite feel that there 
has been a “regional void” in recent decades with Baghdad being decimated by war, Cairo 
decaying under an introspective dictator, and Riyadh having no dynamism with its 
septuagenarian and octogenarian leaders.736 In the absence of these traditional powers and 
fuelled by a belief that Qatar ought to help if it can – consecrated in Article 7 of Qatar’s 
constitution which encourages Qatar to engage in settling disputes peacefully – Qatar has 
acted. This kind of explanation focusing particularly on the Emir’s personal proclivities is 
echoed time and again in meetings in Doha with diplomats and Qataris alike.737   
Lastly, basic factors affecting the Emir’s decision making status are important. Facilitated by 
significant fiscal wealth, protected by America and key allies, the potential speed of action 
stemming from one decision maker with little bureaucratic impediment are significant 
enabling factors.  
Regional  
Placating Iran and establishing friendly relations with the Persian State have been key 
policies of Qatar from the early 1990s. Qatar sought to do this by opening amicable 
dialogues, seeking to entangle Iran in trading relations, supporting key Iranian allies 
financially and with diplomatic protection, and by undermining international isolation of 
Iran. The desire to build relations with Iran stems from a combination of fear and a 
pragmatic assessment of Qatar’s regional concerns.  
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As the North Field became ever more crucial to Qatar’s continued economic success and 
development, Qatar’s dependency on it increased as did its vulnerability to disruption of the 
field. Given that the field is shared with Iran, that there is a history of antagonism between 
the Arab and Persian sides of the Gulf, and one can point to real-world examples of Iran 
attacking Qatari rigs, the fears are not without foundation. With these concerns in mind 
Qatar’s elite feels that engagement is better than confrontation. 
For Qatar to undertake actions that undermine important and long-standing Iranian foreign 
policies (as in Syria) and go against tenets of Qatar’s foreign policy for two decades is 
surprising. It suggests that the Qatari elite believes that, 1) the fear from Iran has decreased, 
or 2) the fear of Iran remains but is well mitigated, or 3) Qatar no longer wishes to seek to 
bring Iran in from the cold, or 4) risks remain but the feeling of compulsion to intervene in 
Syria was overwhelming.  
There is no empirical evidence suggesting that the threat from Iran has diminished. 
However, two decades augmenting relations with Iran and so overtly seeking to build 
relations sometimes to the detriment of Qatar’s position with local allies has improved their 
bilateral relations. However, relations are not genuinely warm. Even accounting for Hamad 
Bin Jassim’s desire to tell the US Administration what it wants to hear, his quote to a visiting 
US official about Iran noting that “they lie to us, we lie to them” is an accurate encapsulation 
of their bilateral relationship. Interviews with Qataris and Diplomats in Doha reinforce this 
notion that bilateral relations are more of a façade of fraternal relations than genuinely 
warm. Nevertheless, Qatar has established a reputation as a country that certainly does not 
overtly seek to provoke or harm Iran unlike other Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia. Along 
with the US presence in Qatar, these factors may have increased the elite’s confidence that 
either Iran’s threat has declined or that it remains but is sufficiently mitigated to engage in 
actions in Syria.  
From the Iranian side, Tehran clearly values its relationship with Qatar. Not only has Qatar’s 
support boosted Iran and its proxies but their often overt ‘positive, fraternal relations’ as 
they are perennially described, has undercut US and Saudi-led efforts to contain Iran. Qatar 
is thus a useful ally for Iran particularly at a time when Iran is sorely lacking allies as 
international sanctions begin to bite like never before.  
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The notion that Qatar is engaging in an aggressive policy aimed at undermining Iran is not 
persuasive. Such a nakedly aggressive policy towards Iran has never been a trait of Qatar’s 
foreign policy and there is no other evidence or rationale suggesting that Qatar has changed 
its fundamental view that dialogue is preferable to military action. It is plausible that a 
motivation for supporting the anti-Assad forces stems from an elite desire to take this 
opportunity to undercut Iran’s support in the region, but Qatar’s history is overwhelmingly 
of caution towards Iran. 
The core reason for Qatar’s actions in Syria will be a selection of factors stemming from the 
elite’s view of the situation. While Iranian-Qatari relations are amicable and while the fear 
of Iran has been increasingly mitigated by America’s entrenched and advanced support, 
Qatar’s elite would be foolish not to recognise the continuing threat of Iran. Without good 
reason to suppose the threat has empirically lessened – Qatar remains as vulnerable and as 
secure as it ever has towards Iran – the elite must have concluded that its actions in Syria 
are permissible and will not unduly aggravate the Iranians. Two decades of policies engaging 
positively with Iran have built up a reputation of Qatar as a state that seeks dialogue and 
does not seek to pin Iran into a corner. Qatar is banking on this reputation to keep it safe 
from Iran.  
On the other side of the Gulf an oft quoted reason for Qatar’s intervention in Syria and its 
support of particular groups therein is because of Qatar’s desire to compete regionally with 
Saudi Arabia.738 This is something of a reflexive retort by journalists; an automatic 
assumption that the two states are engaging in a game of geopolitical chess to support 
particular sides for some as yet unnamed future eventuality. While it is certainly possible 
that Qatar wants to maintain some control over groups in Syria separate from Saudi Arabia, 
it is equally likely that the divisions in support are a simple result of the contacts that each 
side has. Qatar does not have the intelligence or the assets to actively seek out particular 
contacts; they use what they have. While not as satisfying an answer as issues of 
international intrigue, the reality of Qatar’s limited options in offering support in Syria (or 
elsewhere) are persuasive.   
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Having said this, it is important to address the fact that most of the religious exiles that the 
Qatari authorities have allowed to settle in Doha over the years have often been of a 
Brotherhood persuasion and not, for example, Imams of the Salafi persuasion coming from 
Saudi Arabia. It is understandable that Qatar would not want to host controversial religious 
actors expelled from Saudi Arabia: such an act could be deemed to be deeply unfriendly for 
religion is of central importance to the Kingdom. While Qatar has often undertaken actions 
in the 1990s and 2000s that annoy the elite in Riyadh, each one is judged on its own merits 
and the Qatari elite are careful not to go too far. Otherwise, it is no secret that though Qatar 
is technically a Wahhabi state, in reality neither any of the top-most elite, official cultural or 
educational foundations, nor the Foreign Ministry have ever overtly pushed a Wahhabi line. 
Aside from specific and isolated examples, the State of Qatar simply does not have a history, 
unlike its neighbour Saudi Arabia, of exporting such a conception of Islam. Moreover, official 
state actors like the Qatar Foundation or individuals like Hamad Bin Khalifah or his former 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Hamad Bin Jassim, have no history of promoting what 
may be termed Wahhabi or Salafi values. Indeed, the opposite is true. Universal education, 
social equality, and tolerance have been the by-words of the Qatar Foundation while the 
Foreign Ministry or the two Hamads may be intimately associated with clearly seeking to 
maximise profits or extend influence among key elites around the world; none of which can 
easily be seen to fit into the Wahhabi or Salafi lexicon.  
When seeking to extend influence in the Arab World, for example, there are scarcely any 
reputable examples of an organ of the Qatari state using Qatar’s intrinsic Wahhabi or Salafi 
connections. Instead, Muslim Brotherhood connections are often used. In this context, it 
may be possible to see Qatar’s elite using the Brotherhood because of their religious 
persuasion, but only as far as they are not Salafis. Either way, the Brotherhood are, once 
more, employed in a tactical sense by the Qatari elite.  
International  
The international level facilitated key tactical concerns that allowed Qatar to engage as it 
did during the Arab Spring. Without the Spring the Arab League would never have 
supported a NATO-led action against an Arab country and without the Arab League 
sanctioning of such action, Qatar and the UAE could never have acted as they did. Qatar, a 
country with no history of aggressive ‘regime changing’ policies, would not have sent planes 
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and supported the removal of Colonel Gaddafi as stridently without this overarching 
narrative.  
Indeed, it took the Arab Spring, one of the most powerful revolutionary movements to 
sweep across the Arab world, to provide the prompt and the opportunity for Qatar to 
change some of its central foreign policy tenets. As noted in various studies of Qatar’s 
mediation the notion of relative neutrality was of central importance.739 This logic made 
sense for a small country wanting to mediate in conflicts. Yet with actions in Libya and then 
Syria any notion that Qatar is a ‘neutral’ state is gone forever; from now on it will be seen as 
a state with definite interests that it supports.  
Qatar’s support in the post-Spring countries has often been funnelled through Muslim 
Brotherhood contacts, which has cemented the notion of Qatar having definite ‘favourite’ 
actors that it supports. There is little doubt that across the spectrum in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, 
Gaza, and to some extent in Syria, Qatar supported those closely aligned with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, nor does Qatar deny that it supports various groups around the region. 
The reasons for Qatar supporting the Muslim Brotherhood are varied. Part of the answer 
lies in the international realm with Qatar wanting to support a key emerging actor in the 
Middle East. Qatar’s foreign policy is all about making itself important to as wide a range of 
important actors as possible. In the Brotherhood there is emerging a new force in Middle 
Eastern politics that will be important for generations. Given the large numbers nominally 
affiliated to the Brotherhood and the fact that it has been a bona fide organisation for 
nearly a century, it has the capacity to organise and mobilise its support. Crucially this is 
opposed to the ad hoc coming together of youth actors, secular supporters, and others that 
instigated the Arab Spring uprisings, who struggle to form a coherent, structured grouping. 
Indeed, Qatar is left with little alternative but to support the Brotherhood if it wants to try 
to curry favour with a group that has any power.  
This is a logical approach and may accurately represent the thinking of the Qatari elite, but it 
is not the whole story. As noted, Qatar is a country that runs on personal contacts where 
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the elite is of critical importance in directing policy as they see fit. Qatar’s centuries-old 
policy of hosting a range of exiles from across the Arab World and beyond has been of 
central importance during the Arab Spring. In the case of the Libyan conflict Dr Ali Al Salabi 
remained an influential cleric in Libya despite residing in Doha for over a decade. Ali’s 
brother, Ismael, was the leader of a Qatar-backed militia the ‘February 17 Khatiba.’740 One of 
the most prominent rebel commanders, Abdulkarim Belhaj, is linked strongly to Ali Al Salabi 
too.741 Yet Qatar’s links are not exclusively to Islamists. The secular Mahmud Shammam is 
another Libyan exile who has been a frequent visitor to Doha in recent years and sat on the 
board of Al Jazeera. He was chosen to lead the Qatar-backed ‘Libya’ TV station in mid-2011 
that broadcast from Doha.742 Otherwise in the North African context, it is important to note 
Yusuf Al Qaradawi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s most influential ideologue who has been 
based in Qatar since 1962. His regular TV show on Al Jazeera has been important in boosting 
his popularity and authority in recent years. The former founder of the Islamist group the 
FLN, Abbasi Al Madani, has been exiled in Doha since 2003 alongside Maaouya Ould 
Sid’Ahmed Taya the former Mauritanian Prime Minister and President who arrived in Doha 
on 22 August 2005.743 
Qatar’s association with and support of Mahmud Shammam and a wider view of Qatar 
including its orientation with the Qatar Foundation and its investments indicates that while 
Qatar is supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, it is not out of stringent ideological alignment 
but out of an appreciation of realpolitik. Indeed, there is little discernible affinity within 
Qatar for the Brotherhood and Qatar’s place as a Wahhabi country is unquestioned; witness 
the naming of Qatar’s national mosque the Muhammad Ibn Abdul Al Wahhab mosque in 
late 2011. Just as Qatar is shoring up its regional Salafi-Wahhabi roots in Saudi Arabia with 
the naming of the State Mosque, so too Qatar is attempting to firm up a wider Muslim 
Brotherhood constituency with its wide-spread support.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This analysis set out to delineate and explain the origin and nature of significant changes in 
a range of Qatari policies that emerged as the 1990s progressed. Most of these changes 
were in the realm of foreign policy.  
Qatar’s history was examined in order to contextualise the more recent policies. Such a 
historically-based understanding of Qatar confirms the underlying hypothesis that from the 
early 1990s there emerged a number of policies that were quantitatively and qualitatively 
different from their predecessors. Despite the apparent ‘newness’ of many of these policies, 
they are often aimed at the same concerns that have always plagued Qatar’s leaders but the 
new elite merely adopted new tactics to answer existing strategic concerns.  
In order to understand why these new tactics were undertaken it is first important to grasp 
their context. The first section of the conclusion will explain the enduring importance of the 
ruling elite and more importantly their scope of action as curtailed or facilitated by a range 
of domestic, regional, and international factors. This leads to the second section highlighting 
the persistent strategic concerns, which inevitably stem directly from the regional 
environment (there are many things that a country can change, but its location is not one of 
them).  
Just as the regional level provides some continuity for Qatar, even if it is continuity of threat, 
the changing international system is one of the new features highlighted in the third section 
of the conclusion as providing new strategic challenges and opportunities for Qatar. 
Similarly, a new appreciation of the need to foster a post-hydrocarbon economy, the knock-
on effects of plumbing the North Field, and a growing understanding of the importance of 
foreign policies reflecting positively domestically are also examined.  
The last section will focus on the Arab Spring and on the efficacy of Qatar’s strategy to date 
and going forward. The Arab Spring merits a section by itself but far from being a complete 
change in Qatari Foreign Policy as is often noted it actually highlights continuity in strategy 
just using different tactics. This change in tactics has important ramifications for a holistic 
examination of the effectiveness of Qatar’s foreign policies going forward. 
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Facilitating the Elite 
Qatar’s decision making remains dominated by a small section of the elite. While this is not 
new it introduces an uncertain element into the dynamic. While all Qatari leaders react to 
broadly the same sets of issues, they do so with different intrinsic proclivities and 
preferences. Indeed, few would disagree that the Qatari elite that took over from the late 
1980s onwards were quite unique. Lest anyone forget, Qatar is not the only small, rich 
country in the Gulf; there are various other leaders that could have engaged in the types of 
policies that Hamad Bin Khalifah did. Yet nowhere is there as systematic and as progressive 
a set of policies as in Qatar. Moreover, these policies did not originate organically from the 
Qatari milieu; they reflect the interests of the elite.  
The intrinsic orientation of the Emir and his key advisors (inward or outward looking), their 
innate approach to contemporary concerns like modernisation (to be resisted or embraced), 
and their conception for the future of their country (as a local, regional and/or international 
power) was always going to play a significant role. Such initial conclusions mirror those of 
Ehteshami and Hinnebusch who suggest that the flow of the contemporary world will 
prioritise the domestic determinants as increasingly important factors in determining 
foreign policy.  
Yet as dynamic and innovative as Hamad Bin Khalifah Al Thani and his coterie of advisors 
have been, they could never have had as much of an impact without a variety of facilitating 
variables. Aside from the blind luck of possessing such a large gas field, Qatar needed the 
LNG market to be receptive to their overtures for finance in the late 1980s and early 1990s.   
Equally the elite benefitted from a quiescent public that rarely sought to curb the state’s 
atypical and controversial policies. A combination of societal conservatism, improving 
socioeconomic conditions, trust in the leadership, and an ability to affect domestic policy 
when enough Qataris were sufficiently roused meant that the elite had unusual freedom to 
undertake policies particularly in the realm of foreign policy. Externally too Qatar had 
unusual freedom as it was initially seen by many as an honest broker without 
predetermined interests. When Qatar was undoing its reputation as a ‘neutral’ arbiter 
during the Arab Spring its actions were facilitated by its historic policy of hosting exiles, 
many of whom became Qatar’s key conduits for information and for channelling support.  
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Aside from these Qatar-centric opportunities, timing was also crucial in explaining Qatar’s 
shifting priorities. The ending of the Iran-Iraq War, the swift US-led reaction to the invasion 
of Kuwait, and the subsequent stationing of US troops in the Gulf allowed investment in 
Qatar to be contemplated and insurance premiums to be lowered. For Qatar, the invasion of 
Kuwait recast its own predicament galvanising existing desires to reorient its foreign 
relations, while the end of the Cold War unshackled small states from the polarising 
doctrine of super-power alignment or non-alignment.  
Moreover, removing the clamp of the Cold War sparked latent conflicts around the world 
and created a target rich environment for now more unencumbered small states to 
potentially act as mediators. The immediate post-Cold War euphoria, the presumed triumph 
of the capitalist method, and the surge in popularity of neoliberal institutionalism 
particularly in terms of collective security and notions of reciprocity was the amniotic fluid 
for Qatar’s emergence on the international stage. Notions deeply associated with this era – 
collective defence, the prominence of international trade, a desire to broaden diplomatic 
contacts and dialogue – are shot through Qatar’s subsequent international relations and 
remain a consistent feature of the ruling elite’s policies. Specifically delineating the lines of 
causation and correlation – whether the elite were already of this mind or were persuaded 
to adopt some of these key notions – is difficult to say, but the similarities between Qatar’s 
shifting approaches and the new era’s features are undeniable. 
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Perennial Concerns 
A Saudi Threat 
Throughout Qatar’s history there has usually been a threat emanating from modern-day 
Saudi Arabia. Highlighting the importance of the personal inclinations of the leader, Emir 
Khalifah Bin Hamad Al Thani’s (r.1972-1995) personal affinity with the Kingdom’s rulers led 
to a discernible closening of relations against the backdrop of a mutually-agreed protective 
understanding. This was something of an ahistorical policy, for Qatar’s default position was 
far from acquiescent and typically involved attempts to diversify their dependency on Saudi 
Arabia (as extensively noted in Chapter 3), something there is negligible evidence of Emir 
Khalifah Bin Hamad attempting to do. Not only did Khalifah Bin Hamad’s Qatar devoutly 
follow Saudi Arabia throughout the seventies and eighties, but this relationship reinforced 
Riyadh’s intrinsic belief of its role as the father figure in the Arabian Peninsula and a 
consequently diminutive role for Qatar.  
Against this backdrop, not to mention the culture of the region stipulating deference to 
elders and the deep conservatism of glacially slow political change, the emergence of the 
new Qatari elite was jarring. Slowly taking power from the mid-1980s, the young elite in 
Qatar wanted to change tack significantly; something that found no favour in Riyadh. Going 
beyond the détente of the time, Qatar sought to normalise relations with Iran and entered 
negotiations with Israel. While these relations were undertaken to a large degree as ways to 
engage America, both policies fit snugly with Qatar’s subsequent orientation and indicated 
Qatar’s growing independence from Riyadh. Indeed, the symbolism of these two new 
relationships is important. For a country that was largely unknown and that had previously 
mostly subsumed any vestiges of an independent international personality under Saudi 
Arabia’s auspices, such policies worked to differentiate Qatar.  
In the face of plummeting relations and increasing border tensions, as Hamad Bin Khalifah 
himself noted, Qatar had no choice but to seek new protective arrangements. Just as his 
forebears did throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when faced with 
escalating tensions that cannot be controlled, an external guarantor was sought. In this case 
it was not the Sultan of Muscat, the Al Khalifah in Bahrain, the Ottomans, or the British but 
the power of the age, the United States. While worsening Saudi relations were not the only 
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reason for Qatar seeking the US security umbrella, they were of paramount immediate 
importance. While subsequent defensive agreements with the UK and France closely 
mirrored the tenor of historic relations in seeking to relieve the acute dependency on any 
one guarantor, the reality remained that America was by far the most important ally. 
Nevertheless, by pursuing this diversification of dependence from an external guarantor 
(America) and seeking as much autonomy as possible from regional powers (Saudi Arabia) 
Hamad Bin Khalifah’s policies were a reversion to the Qatari norm.  
With America in place, Saudi Arabia still loomed large and relations worsened with the 
border conflicts in the early 1990s and the 1995 coup and subsequent counter coups. 
Qatar’s determined desire to publicise itself to further differentiate itself on an international 
stage can be seen in part as a reaction against Saudi Arabia’s regional overbearance and 
belligerency. Establishing and propagating a progressive and popular brand using sport, the 
MICE industry, and high profile cultural initiatives increased rapidly as Qatar’s finance 
allowed. Had Hamad Bin Khalifah followed the Saudi line he would never have entrusted 
control of the Qatar Foundation, the multi-billion dollar engine of social and educational 
change in Qatar to his wife, enfranchised women, or sat in an American TV interview with 
her. That these policies were so antithetical to anything that Saudi Arabia could have come 
up with is a part of why they were pursued.   
Al Jazeera was also a key part of this push. Not only did it publicise Qatar effectively but it 
was a potential mechanism for Qatar to alert the wider region if belligerency continued. 
Outmatched on key fronts (financially, politically, and militarily) Al Jazeera was a savvy 
asymmetric policy to exponentially increase one arm of Qatar’s defences. Whether this was 
purely in terms of deterrence or for more active defence by stirring up controversy about 
the Kingdom (or any other state), establishing the satellite channel was a shrewd move that 
gave Qatar an outsized ability to hit back. 
Lastly, a direct consequence of Saudi Arabia blocking any putative intra-GCC pipe network 
was that Qatar was forced to pursue extra-GCC gas schemes, namely LNG. While this 
decision reflected the new elite’s ideas about securing wider relationships and would likely 
have been undertaken in due course regardless, that it was undertaken so early was a direct 
corollary of Saudi’s obstructionism.  
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Regional Dynamics 
No discussion of Qatar and its regional influences can pass without a strong emphasis on 
Kuwait’s invasion as a key catalyst. The comparisons in size, orientation, power, location, 
and wealth have been made repeatedly between Qatar and Kuwait for good reason. The 
invasion of Kuwait was shocking for the region and amounted to the confirmation that black 
swan events do happen. After Kuwait’s destruction it was obligatory for Qatar to secure, by 
whatever means it could, external protection guarantees.  
Regional competition from the similar city-states of Manama, Dubai, and Abu Dhabi is also 
discernible as a driver of Qatari policy. Aside from perennial elite competition and the desire 
among Royals that have known each other for decades to out-do the other, in an era when 
all states are vying to diversify their economies and attract talent and investment, having an 
edge or a particular niche is key. In this context it is possible to see various Qatari policies as 
forming, spreading, and embedding a brand for the country. This brand is designed primarily 
to boost Qatar’s visibility as an attractive state for international business against the 
backdrop of the relatively homogenised appearance of the Gulf States. To a Qatari or an 
Emirati the differences may be obvious, but not necessarily to a European-based decision 
maker who could well struggle to tell Doha apart from Abu Dhabi. Whatever Qatar can do to 
differentiate itself positively from its regional rivals through creating and spreading a unique 
brand is an understandable and necessary ploy.   
Remembering that for Nye soft power emanates from espoused values, like the promotion 
of Al Jazeera and of modern education, Qatar’s mediation also contributes to the brand by 
creating a positive image of Qatar as a state pursuing dialogue and peace. Yet the mediation 
can also be seen as a tactical policy to calm tensions in areas of critical interest to Qatar. For 
example, even though Qatar failed with its mediations in Yemen, the fact that it sought to 
intervene and calm one section of Yemen’s troubles with the Houthis could be seen 
straightforwardly as a self-interested attempt to boost Qatar’s immediate security arena. 
Equally, considering the Iranian dimension in Yemen with the long-suspected but unproven 
links between the Houthis and Iran, a Qatari desire to prevent the implosion of the state 
which could allow Iranian-backed forces to exploit the instability would also be logical.  
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It is a similar issue in Darfur. Aside from notions of Qatar seeking to build relations with a 
view to future agribusiness opportunities, Qatar’s intervention can be understood as part of 
a plan to preserve influence with the Sudanese Government as Iran seeks to boost ties in 
the region.  
In the Lebanese mediation in 2008 there is a more direct Iranian link via Hezbollah. Qatar’s 
role on this occasion was to make de jure the de facto realities on the ground. While this 
may be seen as Qatar helping the ‘Iranian axis’ it is equally plausible to see this as Qatar 
being realistic and preventing an escalation that could further undermine the power of the 
Lebanese state and allow Hezbollah to exploit any resulting turmoil.  
New Concerns 
The North Field 
While the North Field made Qatar the richest country on earth, as Qatar increased its 
dependence on the field, its vulnerability to Iran inevitably increased. This dynamic 
mandated a new approach and it is no coincidence that Qatar improved its relations with 
Iran at the same time as it was corralling interest and investment in the North Field project. 
Qatar could not just hope that Iran chose not to interfere and it could certainly not continue 
the sporadically aggressive anti-Iranian policies of the 1980s of its GCC neighbours. The 
numerous bilateral visits, the water-piping deal and subsequent examples of Qatar’s atypical 
desire as a Sunni, GCC state to occasionally protect Iranian interests and boost relations 
with the Islamic Republic are all primarily consequences of Qatar’s development of the 
North Field.  
While Qatar was eager to augment relations with Iran, it did not do so naively. Well aware 
of Kuwait’s experience trying to placate an irascible larger neighbour on its border, neither 
having any meaningful indigenous military capability nor was relying on the moribund GCC 
Peninsula Shield an option, instead Qatar was forced to find external guarantees. Not only 
were they crucial in boosting international confidence in financing the project but Qatar 
needed a hard security element somewhere if it was not to remain vulnerable to Iran. 
Claiming (as Iraq had just done with Kuwait) that Qatar was ‘stealing its resources’ would 
have been a false but plausible charge for the Iranians to make given the contiguous border 
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and the comparatively quick rate at which Qatar would extract the gas with Western 
technology.   
Once the basic security of the field was secured, accruing a diverse array of international 
alliances and trading partners was not only sensible commercially, but it is the epitome of 
the post-Cold War neoliberal ethos as it tied Qatar into world trade. A certain security 
comes with such interconnectedness in direct ways. If Iran had interfered with Qatar’s field 
in 2011, for example, the supply for Belgium, China, France, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, 
Spain, Taiwan, the UK and the US, each of whom imported over 2000 million cubic meters of 
LNG from Qatar that year, could have been jeopardised, while smaller LNG supplies to 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Kuwait, Greece, and Mexico could also have been 
disrupted.744 This list includes four permanent members of the UN Security Council and two 
non-permanent members at the time (Brazil and India). Such close international ties are an 
inevitable result of Qatar’s prodigious LNG supplies and the need for markets, as well as the 
very encapsulation of the foreign policy thrust to enhance Qatar’s security by enmeshing 
Qatar into the energy nexus of many of the world’s most influential countries.  
A Post-Hydrocarbon Future 
Frequently and unambiguously referred to by the elite in Qatar, enshrined in the Qatar 
Vision 2030, explicitly found in the deep changes wrought across the education system, 
embodied in Education City, and an implicit ribbon running throughout many of the newer 
Qatari policies, striving to create a knowledge economy and commerce-based post-
hydrocarbon future for Qatar is a central goal of state.  
While economic diversification has nominally been a concern of Qatar’s elite for decades 
and various industrial plants were constructed towards this end, the progress made by 
Hamad Bin Khalifah’s predecessors was meagre. Partly this is due to the fact that there was 
nothing like the financial surplus available to his predecessors with which to enact expensive 
policies aimed at securing the post-hydrocarbon future. But equally the specific influence of 
Hamad Bin Khalifah and his close allies is crucial. The central driving force pursuing this goal 
stems from an elite a generation younger than most of their peers across the Middle East 
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when they came to power. Within this elite was the powerful guiding force of Sheikha Moza 
Bint Nasser Al Misnad who had the latitude and trust of the Emir, the financial backing of 
LNG, and the relatively acquiescent domestic social milieu to push-through her radical 
educational vision.  
The project to boost Qatar’s future economy is a constant cycle of self-reinforcing industries 
and strategies, which can be best understood as disparate policies coming together to 
create and propagate a central business-savvy, progressive, and attractive brand for Qatar. 
The MICE industry directly seeks to create economic diversification and to eventually begin 
a self-sustaining new sector of the economy, while leading the international push to boost 
Qatar’s international image. A significant focus on sport and cultural gambits is part of the 
same package designed to boost Qatar’s attractiveness for visitors and businesses alike. It is 
intended that Education City will feed top graduates into Qatar’s nascent industries or into 
research under the QF’s Science and Technology Park (QSTP), which is itself explicitly 
designed to attract foreign research and design. Qatar’s investments often have an element 
of human resource building about them. Investments in top-flight companies can come with 
an agreement to open the regional headquarters in Doha or to open an office in the Qatar 
Financial Centre (QFC). This contributes to creating a critical mass in finance in Qatar which 
it is hoped will eventually act as a self-sustaining part of Qatar’s economic diversification 
and further boost Qatar’s brand as a regional hub for commerce.  
All Politics is Domestic 
Various new policies in Qatar can be readily interpreted as playing to a domestic audience, 
such as promotion of sport, culture, and the founding of world-class education institutions 
in Doha. At times, Qatar has also been popular abroad as demonstrated in Beirut in 2008 
and, more recently, in Benghazi in 2011 with people waving Qatari flags thanking the state 
for its support. Such examples resonate well in Doha with Qataris pleased that their country 
is for the first time developing a good reputation in certain quarters of the wider region. 
While there are those who grumble as to the money that Qatar is spending on these foreign 
adventures or the ‘Western’ influence particularly in the educational sphere, nothing 
approaching a widespread movement critical of Hamad Bin Khalifah and his rule emerged. 
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There are also more subtle effects to note, particularly in terms of the country branding. 
Qatar’s struggle to positively differentiate itself from its regional neighbours because of its 
relative lack of the typical building-blocks of statehood (romantic struggle for independence, 
unique characteristics of state, etc.) is compounded by the homogenising globalised forces 
of international commerce and weakening of national borders. Moreover, as Cerny notes, 
the desire to compete internationally and all that entails undermines the creation of a 
particular and unique Gemeinschaft further retarding efforts to create and maintain a 
unique national identity. In this light Qatar’s burgeoning country brand acts not only to 
differentiate Qatar for the external audience, but for the internal one too.  
This is not to say that Qataris did not know who they were or how they were different from 
Emiratis before branding efforts were undertaken, but that in this era of rapid change the 
mechanics of the ‘invention of tradition’ have come to the fore, as Hobsbawm notes. 
We should expect it [the invention of tradition] to occur more frequently when a rapid transformation 
of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which ‘old’ traditions had been designed, 
producing new ones to which they were not applicable, or when such traditions and their institutional 
carriers and promulgators no longer prove sufficiently adaptable and flexible, or are otherwise 
eliminated.
745
 
Given these pressures it is normal for national identity to evolve. The understanding of what 
it means to be Qatari is being consistently fleshed out and the differences extenuated with 
the adoption of newer policies. Branding is the central tool used by the state to create, 
tweak, and embed an evolving national identity in Qatar.  
An International Perspective  
Few would deny that states have become closer and increasingly homogenized over recent 
decades driven in large part by international commerce, travel, and the exponential increase 
in communication technologies. In response, the Qatari elite has striven to transform Doha 
into an internationally recognised hub for finance, aviation, education, research, sport, and 
culture. While some of these strategies have been more successful than others, the sum 
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total of them means that Qatar has kept itself at the forefront of the phenomenon of 
globalisation.  
This is a savvy economic policy but the process has drawbacks. The huge influx of foreigners, 
a direct corollary of Qatar’s pursuit of its central place in these global industries, is the 
clearest example of the effect of the chase on Qatar. Qataris are a minority in their own 
homeland and English is the lingua-franca across business. These factors and others like 
them provide challenges to Qatar’s identity. Some of the answers to these questions are 
answered (at least in part) by Qatar’s country brand, which aims to resonate both internally 
and externally.  
As much as the international arena has provided challenges to Qatar, it is nevertheless the 
plane on which Qatar increasingly operates. As described in detail at the start of the 
conclusion, the international arena fundamentally facilitated Qatar’s orientation and specific 
policies. Moreover, on a more practical basis without America’s security umbrella Qatar 
could not be the prominent actor that it is today. Far more so than with previous regimes, 
the current Qatari elite see Qatar’s future inextricably tied up with international actors. 
Security guarantees tie-in key international actors to Qatar. Becoming such a large energy 
trader means that Qatar is of crucial importance to many of the world’s most important 
states. Prodigious investment makes Qatar one of the world’s most prominent players in 
international finance and commerce. The apparent desire to make Qatar a central 
interlocutor between the international community and a range of Muslim groups that 
Western States often have difficulty speaking to or understanding (for example, the Taliban, 
Hamas, Hezbollah, Darfur’s militias, and the Muslim Brotherhood) gives Qatar a privileged 
position. Similarly, Qatar’s internationally-recognized tertiary education system puts Qatar 
decades ahead of its regional rivals, positioning Qatar as the region’s most progressive state 
clearly signalling Qatar’s international orientation.  
The Arab Spring 
Never before has Qatar sought to unseat regional leaders or so overtly support one side in a 
given conflict or post-conflict situation. However, while the tactics have changed, the 
strategic aims have not. Before the Spring the fundamental aim of foreign policy was to 
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make Qatar centrally important to as wide an array of important actors as possible and this 
is exactly the aim of Qatar’s policies during the Spring. 
Despite sporadic instances of positive relations with Libya’s former dictator Colonel Gaddafi, 
such as facilitating the release of the Bulgarian Nurses in 2007 or the Lockerbie Bomber 
Abdelbaset Al Megrahi in 2009, Qatar-Libyan relations were fundamentally brittle. Indeed, 
when a leader as unstable and undiplomatic as Colonel Gaddafi was in power the 
foundation for a serious, long-term relationship just was not present. In Egypt the animosity 
with Qatar ran deeper. Partly this stemmed from President Mubarak’s dislike of Al Jazeera 
but more importantly he bitterly resented Qatar’s attempts to intervene in Darfur, an area 
that was firmly considered to be Egypt’s ‘back yard’. While there was something of a 
rapprochement just before the start of the Arab Spring, Egypt under Mubarak could never 
have been a solid, dependable ally for Qatar.  
Egypt is of central importance in the Arab world and the Spring presented an opportunity 
for Qatar to remake its relationship. Primarily using its contacts with and support for the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar immediately established itself first in line to financially and 
rhetorically aid the nascent new regime in Cairo. In the same way that Qatar has sought to 
actively engage and make itself important to America (bases), the UK (gas trade and 
investment), France (investment and trade), Germany (investment), China (energy trade), 
Japan (energy trade), and South Korea (energy trade), it is doing the same with Egypt.  
An important by-product of establishing these relationships is the principle of reciprocity. In 
a low probability, high impact eventuality (natural disaster, industrial accident, war, etc.) 
Qatar will feel that it can call on its allies to offer support. This was clearly expressed by 
Hamad Bin Jassem Al Thani when speaking to a visiting US dignitary. After being thanked for 
Qatar’s $100 million donation in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Hamad Bin Jassem 
replied “we may have our own Katrina someday.”746 Whether this potential future support is 
rhetorical, material, military, political, or diplomatic, for a small state in a perilous region, 
Qatar can never have too much. Taking the example of Iranian aggression, Qatar’s array of 
international allies could potentially provide it with extra anti-mining capability (from 
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Western allies), economic pressure (from consumers of Iran’s oil and gas, Japan and China), 
supporting votes in forums like the UN Security Council or the Arab League (in addition to 
the permanent members, South Korea is a non-permanent member until 2014), or the 
rhetorical support of Muslim Brothers across the region.  
Aside from such plausible if speculative supposition, Qatar positioned itself to be well placed 
to reap economic benefits in the new Egypt. Qatar sought to establish a privileged position 
under Egyptian law as it did in France when it secured an exemption from capital gains tax in 
2009.747 Even without such direct benefits, Qatar hoped that its weekly interaction with 
Egypt’s elite would give Qatar an advantage on any prime investment opportunities and 
allow them to drive a hard bargain. Politically and diplomatically, aside from counting on 
President Morsi’s support in regional forums, Qatar hoped for Egyptian support for its 
policies in Darfur and Gaza.  
While Qatar may benefit from the Arab Spring geopolitically, it would be remiss to omit the 
personal element in influencing Qatar’s policies during the Arab Spring protests. More than 
most Arab Countries, Qatar is run in a personalised manner and the Emir’s decision is final 
and uncontested. The evidence of Hamad Bin Khalifah’s two decades in power highlights his 
role as the archetypal benevolent dictator. Benevolent in that part of the rationale for 
undertaking various policies can be described as enlightened (educational improvement 
along Western lines, banning of press censorship, promotion of significant state-run 
charities, a desire to offer mediation services, etc.), and dictatorial in that the Qatari 
Parliament has no meaningful powers.  
This is not to say that Qatar has a perfect record. From the Qatari poet who was jailed in 
2012 for writing and spreading offensive poems about Hamad Bin Khalifah and his family to 
noble initiatives that were started (notably the Doha Centre for Media Freedom) but failed 
to live up to their promise, there are causes for concern. Indeed, it would be foolish to 
suggest that Qatar operated an altruistic policy during the Arab Spring (or in other 
examples) for there are numerous other political motivations afoot. Yet equally it would be 
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wrong to ignore the evidence of the progressive tenor of many of Qatar’s policies to date 
that is informed by the personal politics of those in power. 
Qatar’s policy towards Syria in the Arab Spring offers more evidence of the importance of 
personal politics. Given how important Syria is as an ally to Iran, Qatar seeking to oust 
President Al Assad is likely to be taken poorly in Tehran where it could be viewed as Qatar 
joining the clichéd Sunni GCC mentality of trying to undermine Iran’s security whenever 
possible. Just as Qatar refrained from acting in Bahrain for fear of antagonising Saudi Arabia, 
so too it would have been natural to have expected Qatar to do the same in Syria out of 
concern to maintain good relations with Iran. 
Empirically speaking the threat from Iran has not changed; it still has its Revolutionary 
Guards and the ability to severely impinge upon Qatar if it so chose. Qatar’s defences in 
terms of American and other Western allies are significant, while its own domestic defences, 
notably its National Security Shield are, while new and untested, potentially effective. 
Nevertheless, given Iran’s asymmetric threat, Qatar’s complete lack of strategic depth and 
that fact that the economic future of Qatar is invested in a small number of locations, Qatar 
continues to be threatened by Iran. Therefore, Qatar’s intervention in Syria is surprising and 
the key factor must either be that the Hamad Bin Khalifah personally does not believe that 
Iran poses a credible threat or he has enough confidence in his long-term relationship with 
Tehran so that he can undercut Iran’s key ally without any serious repercussions. Equally, 
the Hamad Bin Khalifah could feel that the political and humanitarian concerns in Syria are 
so acute that it is worth the risk. Whatever the reason, it is clear that in Qatar’s policy 
towards Syria, the personal element is of unusual importance.  
Overall, the reasons for Qatar’s entrance to the Arab Spring are a mix of personal impetus 
and geopolitical calculation, but the fact remains that the motivation is irrelevant compared 
with the opportunity to intervene. First and foremost Qatar needed a heady confluence of 
domestic, regional, and international factors unique to Qatar and the precise moment in 
history that facilitated the elite and allowed Qatar to play such a decisive role in the Spring.  
Qatar’s Search for Security 
Age-old problems stemming primarily from Qatar’s immediate region continue to vex 
Qatar’s leaders as they did centuries ago. The answer of former leaders of seeking external 
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guarantors and developing ways to diversify dependency upon them is still the same broad 
tactic pursued today. However, infinitely greater domestic financial capacity and an 
unusually progressive leadership since 1995, has resulted in atypical and innovative 
solutions to Qatar’s concerns, which is combined with a profoundly new international 
system with different limits and norms. Qatar’s prodigious financial power is impressive as is 
its ever-growing diplomatic clout. But money can only buy so much influence and Qatar’s 
frenetic diplomatic activity in recent decades is not yet institutionalised and remains 
personalised.  
The lesson of Kuwait’s pre-invasion foreign policy is that while you can rent a friendship or 
an alliance, you cannot buy one. Qatar’s economic diplomacy after the Arab Spring may net 
Qatar some prime investment opportunities, but should not be seen as the establishment of 
new, concrete alliances or the start of a new era of importance for Qatar internationally. 
Moreover, never before has Qatar antagonised such a large number of different interests. 
Given the febrile nature of politics in the Middle East as the Arab Spring progresses, political 
battles are being increasingly framed as if for the very souls of the countries involved. 
Bitterness is extreme and in the zero-sum world of ‘them’ and ‘us’ Qatar is increasingly seen 
as supporting groups like the Brotherhood as partisans. Aside from haemorrhaging support 
from non-Brotherhood followers, Qatar needs to avoid being seen as purely supporting 
Brotherhood elites, who - given the nature of revolutions - are destined to struggle in the 
coming decades. It matters little that there are few coherent non-Brotherhood parties and 
organisations that Qatar could support; it is the perception that matters.  
Such concerns are not confined to the Middle East. In France, Qatar was baffled by the 
vociferous reaction of the left and right-wing press when Qatar tried to launch a €50 million 
investment fund to reinvigorate Paris’ Muslim-dominated suburbs.748 The fact that the 
Qatari elite manifestly had no Machiavellian plots to promote any particular strain of Islam 
or to coax support from the troubled minorities is irrelevant; again, Qatar needs to 
understand how it will be perceived.  
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The personalised nature of politics in Qatar and its foreign policy is both a blessing and a 
curse. Quick to make decisions and to establish relations with the worlds political and 
financial elite, shrewd negotiation can secure for Qatar strategic relationships and gilt-edged 
opportunities. Equally, it can mean that Qatar’s relations are tied specifically to certain 
leaders and when they are removed from office, Qatar struggles to restart relations as 
happened in France with the change from President Sarkozy to President Hollande.   
Another issue is the detrimental degree to which decisions are made only at the very 
highest levels of the Qatari elite. This means that Qatar’s policy is worryingly dependent 
upon two or three individuals giving Qatar as a country little strategic depth or institutional 
back-up capability. The personalised nature of politics marginalises the structures that are 
there to inform and support decision making. This cycle is exacerbated by Qatar’s youth as a 
country which means it has only had a meaningful bureaucracy for a generation. Otherwise, 
every Ministry and company suffers from a chronic shortage of talented, hard-working 
Qataris; partly the result of having such a small population and partly due to a lack of 
motivation caused by pay disparities between sectors that plague all Gulf States. Yet, even if 
the Qatari institutions were in efficient working order, cultural issues hamper their 
effectiveness.   
Consider Qatar’s decision to actively support the ousting of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya, which 
was an entirely new policy direction. While in hindsight the Libyan Revolution proceeded 
relatively swiftly and painlessly, this was far from certain at the beginning. Nor was anyone 
confident that the country’s riven tribal politics, which Gaddafi had been stoking and 
manipulating for generations would not simply implode without Gaddafi keeping the 
tensions in check. Also from Qatar’s own perspective, intervention in Libya was a risky 
move. Colonel Gaddafi was one of the world’s most unpredictable leaders: he had a history 
of directly supporting terrorism, seeking weapons of mass destruction, and had huge funds 
at his disposal. It is little wonder that Qataris in Spain during the early months of the 
Revolution insisted to all that they were Omani, for fear of some kind of Gaddafi-sponsored 
reprisal.  
A wide range of Ambassadors and diplomats in Doha suggest that there is no evidence that 
the Qatari authorities undertook a systematic, rigorous, and meticulous risk assessment of 
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their policy. Moreover, had a Ministry undertaken such a study, it is difficult to imagine it 
presenting findings critical of the Emir’s choice to intervene. Doubtless the pros and cons of 
aiding the anti-Gaddafi forces were discussed at length at the Emir’s Majlis and with key 
Government contacts, but such a process is far from systematic. This kind of an ad hoc 
approach is one thing when Qatar is operating in the Gulf region or otherwise on matters of 
lesser importance but ousting vicious dictators like Colonel Gaddafi and President Assad is 
quite different. 
Given the lack of evidence of a rigorous risk assessment when undertaking such potentially 
dangerous policies, it is prudent to ask if Qatar’s history of reliance on external powers for 
security has removed an element of caution from the calculations of the elite. Now more 
than ever with the greatest military power in history encamped in Qatar, the elite must 
guard against a complacency that could overly embolden policy without a careful 
consideration of the potential consequences of its actions out of a belief that American 
guarantees will perennially be enough. 
Yet such pivotal decisions as Qatar made in the Arab Spring are unlikely to come up again. 
Not only is the Arab Spring a deeply unusual phenomenon, but neither Qatar’s elite nor 
anyone else expects Qatar to continue to lead the Middle East’s reaction to events. At some 
stage Riyadh, Cairo, and Baghdad will return to dominate the political landscape and by 
virtue of their natural disposition, importance, and influence resume their de facto 
leadership positions. Such a turn of events will benefit Qatar if it can make it to such a 
watershed moment without serious disruption.  
Qatar needs to concentrate on sustainable areas of policy where it has a comparative 
advantage. The various fonts of Qatar’s soft power - from Al Jazeera, to cultural and sporting 
policies, to education initiatives and MICE industry promotion - are as forward-thinking, 
economically-focused, and as sophisticated an answer as any regional state has found to 
counter the diverse and pressing problems of modernity. The goals these tactics aim for are 
enshrined in Qatar’s wider 2030 National Vision. Qatar can never hope to compete in 
traditional metrics of power as it does not have the capacity. Yet if it can continue, for 
example, its model of education Qatar could be the America of the Gulf: a veritable hoover 
and font of regional educational excellence, training future elites for decades to come. Such 
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a notion is not farfetched and the plans and projects in place presently are peerless 
throughout the Middle East.  
However, such policies need to be actively nurtured and carefully thought-through. Hosting 
world-level conferences is an impressive endeavour showcasing Qatar’s importance and 
diplomatic clout. But organisers need to remember that these events are about more than 
just the ‘show’ of hosting the event. In the COP 18 conference, for example, there were 
concerns that Qatar did not have the capacity or ability to successful manage the difficult 
negotiating process.  
Similarly, in terms of sporting events Qatar needs to brace itself for increasing waves of 
criticism from Western-based media in the run up to the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Sections of 
the English press in particular have made it clear that they are not happy that Qatar won the 
right to host the World Cup. Articles about how Qatar allegedly bribed its way to winning 
the contest and the inappropriateness of hosting a football tournament in Qatar’s baking 
summer heat are published on a regular basis.749 While negative press coverage may seem 
like a trivial matter, it must not be forgotten that part of the Qatari brand is not only 
designed to boost its popularity with business elites, Qatar also wants a wider positive 
reputation to attract human capital, a goal that such negative coverage could impair. As 
crude as Qatar’s coverage is in the British press at times, it is not as bad as it has been in the 
French press in 2012 and 2013. Fuelled primarily by coverage of Qatar buying French 
companies and real estate (more of a sore point in left-leaning France that the UK) and 
worsened by the Paris suburb-investment fiasco, the coverage has created an atmosphere 
where incorrect stories of Qatar directly supporting Al Qaeda-type militants in Mali in 2012 
and 2013 are taken as plausible and ‘in keeping’ with wider Qatari policy.750 The concern is 
that if the French press’ penchant for ‘Qatar-bashing’ does not subside, this could directly 
affect Qatar’s goals such as investing in property or increasing its stake in French companies.  
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Qatar’s role promoting freedom of expression and freedom of the press, personified in the 
form of Al Jazeera, though imperfect, was an immensely powerful tool that widely and 
effectively built a positive reputation for the Qatari state. While Al Jazeera has always had 
its detractors, with its actions in the Arab Spring it is no longer just governments 
complaining about the satellite channel but increasing numbers of ordinary Arabs. 
Increasingly seen as a stooge of the Qatari Government’s support of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, on top of increasing competition, Al Jazeera’s reputation is being hit as are its 
viewing numbers.   
In part, Qatar needs to express its policies and its goals better. It is not a slavish, ideological 
supporter of the Brotherhood and it needs to actively divest itself of this label by overtly 
seeking greater balance in those it supports. While Qatar has built up support among the 
Brotherhood elites, this is an intrinsically fickle group; beyond finance and shaky notions of 
reciprocity there is no reason as to why the Brotherhood should continue to support Qatar. 
This relationship is not based on energy dependency or deep cultural and political links, but 
a temporary alignment of political and financial convenience. Given the difficulties inherent 
in recovering from a revolution, it is far from clear how long Morsi’s Government will be in 
power or retain the faith of its Brotherhood supporters. Qatar could be left supporting an 
isolated, impotent, and ever more disliked elite while presiding over investments that are 
depreciating in value.   
Qatar needs to revert to the central feature of its foreign policy evident since the late 18th 
century: balance. From the Utub paying a tribute to the Persians to protect them from the 
Sultan of Muscat in 1799 to Ahmed Bin Ali Al Thani refusing to acquiesce to RAF flyovers in 
the 1960s lest this tilt the impression of Qatar as overtly dependent on the British to 
supporting Israel and Hamas at the same time as supporting America and Iran, Qatar has 
always sought balance.  
In the 2000s Al Jazeera was in its pomp, Qatar’s large-scale mediation forays were 
underway, relations were on-going with Israel, Iranian relations showed fitful promise, and 
Qatar was speaking with all actors, favouring none. Qatar was seen as an enemy to no-one 
and a small state that had a dynamic, progressive, and inclusive vision for its place in the 
region. It was because of these types of relationships that Qatar was truly diversifying its 
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dependencies. Indeed, Qatar’s continued integration into the energy nexus of an increasing 
array of international states, its increasing financial penetration across the world’s key 
capitals, and its brand gaining increasing traction in business communities and populations 
alike were all positive signs of progress. Only by following this inoffensive path can Qatar 
assuage its core concerns.  
Moreover, only by following such a trajectory can Qatar ever hope to escape the gilded cage 
of its protective relationships. If Qatar’s history proves anything, it is that such relationships 
always end: America will leave at some stage. If Qatar is to avoid continually transitioning 
from one guarantor to another it cannot be a divisive state. Instead, facilitated by its 
popular brand, it must be able to rely on an ever thickening web of international relations, 
trade agreements, and financial deals uniquely provided by Qatar that make many of the 
most important international states interdependent upon Qatar’s continued prosperity.  
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